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ABSTRACT
BOUNDARY-WORK IN UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF
THREE INTERDISCIPLINARY PROGRAMS
by
Michael J. Root
University of New Hampshire, December, 2005
Between 1970 and 2000 scientists from three interdisciplinary
programs—evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory—
contributed to changing U.S. psychology’s disciplinary boundaries. These
interdisciplinary scientists brought about this change through their conceptual,
material, and social practices. Psychologists used “boundary-work” as a
means to control the influx of these various practices. Boundary-work
connotes activities that promote scientists’ epistemic authority in society.
Boundary-work also serves to demarcate a science’s particular collection of
knowledge from other collections. Through their boundary-work activities,
various psychologists resisted some of the practices of these interdisciplinary
scientists while making accommodations for other types of practices. These
resistances and accommodations illustrate the ways in which psychologists
conveyed their epistemic authority and demarcated their discipline’s
boundaries between these three decades.
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The purpose of my dissertation is to describe psychologists’ boundarywork in reaction to the introduction of these interdisciplinary programs’
practices between 1970 and 2000. First, I present an overview of
psychology’s complex disciplinary boundaries. I then use the history of
psychology and sociology of scientific knowledge literature to describe the
nature of boundary-work activities. Next, I present the foundational
components and a brief history of each interdisciplinary program. Fourth, I
outline each program’s conceptual, material, and social practices. Lastly, I
discuss psychologists’ resistances and accommodations to each
interdisciplinary program’s practices with reference to how they affected
psychology’s disciplinary boundaries.
My results indicate that certain psychologists most often resisted
evolutionary psychologists’, cognitive scientists’, and chaos theorists’
conceptual practices. Psychologists’ resistances seemed ineffective in
preventing these conceptual practices from entering the discipline and did not
stop other psychologists from using them. Accommodations occurred for all
types of practices for all three programs, indicating that psychology’s
disciplinary boundaries are relatively permeable. I argue that psychologists
made accommodations for these practices to increase their epistemic
authority within the scientific community and throughout society. Finally, I
discuss the advantages of writing psychology’s history through an
examination of psychologists’ boundary-work.
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INTRODUCTION

Like every discipline in the humanities, natural sciences, and social
sciences, the discipline of psychology within the United States (U.S.) is an
expansive and complex field of knowledge production.1 Psychology’s particular
collection of knowledge represents every dimension of human behavior,
cognition, and emotion. It includes knowledge of our perceptual capacities to
view complex external stimuli, our ability to make judgments and decisions given
complex information, the role of memory in our ability to recall pertinent
information, our interpersonal communication skills, and the motivations that
allow us to carry out our daily activities. Essentially, psychological knowledge
encompasses the “individual,” or the “self,” and prescribes how we relate to, act
on, and make sense of our social world.
The Dynamic Nature of Psvcholoqical Knowledge
Psychological knowledge is neither stationary nor inflexible; it does not
remain immutable after psychological communities generally agree that it
possesses some pragmatic or truth value for the discipline and the public.
Instead, this knowledge is dynamic, fluid, and locally contingent upon time and
place. Such factors as changes in generations, economic adjustments, political

1 I use the terms “U.S. psychology” and “psychology” interchangeably throughout the text
because I focus on psychological knowledge in the United States. It is important to note that
psychology’s theories, methods, and concepts vary based on one’s culture (Danziger, 1997). For
example, there are differences in how individualist and collectivist cultures interact in their social
environments (Schoeneman, 1994; Trandis, 1994).

1
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upheavals, and new research findings ultimately affect how psychological
knowledge circumscribes and represents our behaviors, thoughts, and emotions
(Chaiklin, 2001; Shweder & Levine, 1984). These factors, in turn, affect the ways
in which we view and understand others and ourselves. In her discussion of
contemporary psychological knowledge, Lisa Blackman (1994) describes this
knowledge as a “form of discursive activity which is not only relative to the socio
cultural, historical and institutional setting of psychology, but also comes to define
the very ways we understand ourselves as human beings” (p. 487). As
psychological knowledge changes and is transmitted throughout our cultural
milieu, our phenomenological experiences of what it is like to act, think, and feel
also change.
Examples abound of how psychological knowledge changes in pace with
societal and cultural changes. For instance, in his book, American Cool, the
historian Peter Stearns (1994) discusses people’s changing emotional behaviors
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Stearns, people
changed their “emotional styles”—the management and presentation of emotions
to others— between the two centuries. In the nineteenth century, people generally
acknowledged their emotions but also tried to control and channel their emotions
appropriately. If people were angry with others, it was common to acknowledge
this anger while directing it towards others in an acceptable manner. In the early
to middle twentieth century however, there was a departure from this emotional
style. In general, people shifted away from channeling their emotions in
appropriate ways and began to hide their emotions behind a “cool” exterior.
2
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People were controlling their emotions as much as people did in the nineteenth
century, but they were not as likely to channel them appropriately. Instead, the
social context of the early to middle twentieth century, especially during and after
the two world wars, played a role in discouraging the outward expression of
emotions. It was not that emotionality disappeared altogether. Instead, people
began to stifle their emotionality. Stearns argues that this change in emotional
styles affected how people came to understand their emotional lives and how
they interacted with others socially.
Ideas about the nature of human intelligence also have changed over the
years (Fancher, 1985; Sokal, 1987). In the early 1900s the English psychologist
Charles Spearman (1904) believed intelligence was a single intellectual ability
called the “g” factor. More recently, psychologists such as L. L. Thurstone (1934),
Robert Sternberg (1985), and Howard Gardner (1983) have challenged
Spearman’s findings and posited various ideas about multiple intelligences.
Sternberg, for instance, believes there is evidence to suggest that people
possess three broad categories of intelligence: analytic, creative, and practical.
Gardner believes that we have seven different intelligences: verbal, mathematical,
spatial, musical, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and kinesthetic. This change has
ramifications for how we behave towards and perceive others. Imagine a
situation in a high school where a student receives a low intelligence test score
from the perspective of Spearman’s conception of intelligence. It is likely that
teachers will think of this student as inadequate in most if not all subjects due to

3
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their low intelligence score.2 When using any of the multiple intelligence theories
however, teachers may not be as likely to label that same student as inadequate
in all subjects. Instead, the teacher may believe the student is poor in the
subjects of mathematics and vocabulary, but believe the student is strong in
musical or kinesthetic abilities.
Psychologists’ views on how to characterize personality have changed as
well. Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud believed that adult personalities form
through psychosexual stages of development (i.e., oral, anal, phallic, latent,
genital stages) occurring in early childhood. According to Freud, when primary
caregivers do not meet the needs of the child, the child may become fixated at a
particular stage. As an adult, when they experience anxiety, they may revert back
to that particular stage of fixation. On the other hand, contemporary experimental
personality theorists view personality as comprised of traits, produced mainly
through heredity, that change relatively little throughout the lifespan (e.g.,
Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1987). Each of these ideas about the nature of
personality has ramifications for how we interact with other people. In the 1960s
and 1970s, at the height of Freud’s popularity in the U.S., people may have
viewed a very talkative person as being orally fixated. From the modern trait
perspective that person would likely be identified as an extrovert.
This profuse and provisional knowledge helps create the extensive nature
of psychology’s disciplinary structure. Producing knowledge about how we

2 There is some evidence that this scenario would hold true (Rosenthal, 1994; Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968). Robert Rosenthal’s research suggests that people tend to treat others in a
manner that coincides with their beliefs about that individual.

4
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understand ourselves and make sense of the world is a vast undertaking. Many
times psychological knowledge production leads to heterogeneous and contested
knowledge product, such as the debate over the factors involved in intelligence.
Simply expressed, psychological knowledge does not “sit still.” Psychologists
continually revise this knowledge based on numerous factors including changing
social contexts, new research, and innovative perspectives by, for example,
feminist and multicultural psychologists (e.g., Hall & Barongan, 2001; Morawski,
1994).
Making Psychological Knowledge Public
Psychologists, as the knowledge producers in this multiplicity of fields from
sensory psychology and neuroscience to counseling and community psychology,
use a variety of techniques and procedures to create, reproduce, represent, and
disseminate these knowledge products to their colleagues in psychology, other
scientific communities, funding agencies, and the public. Irrespective of who
obtains and uses this knowledge, it represents a public commodity and the
process of its circulation and distribution is a social activity. This social activity
consists of a reciprocal relationship between knowledge producers and
knowledge consumers.
To make their knowledge public, psychologists engage in a number of
practices. Like other scientists, they present their findings at professional
conferences around the world. They report their experimental research results by
publishing in peer-reviewed journals. They write both technical and popular
books that distill their sometimes abstruse research findings for professionals in
5
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other subdisciplines and the lay public alike. Other psychologists use their
professional training to prescribe modes of conduct for their clients during
psychotherapy sessions. These psychologists also perform assessments of
psychological functioning and make diagnoses on the mentally ill while working in
mental health clinics, private practices, and hospitals. Still others invent and
reconfigure instruments (e.g., personality inventories, intelligence tests) that they
then attempt to bring into and sometimes market to the psychology community
and the public. Whether psychological knowledge takes the form of a
professional journal article or advice on a call-in radio show, it exists “out there”
in the world for anyone to acquire, consume, and evaluate.
The form a particular piece of knowledge takes and its presentation in
some public domain varies considerably from psychologist to psychologist.
Psychologists’ specialty areas, their institutional training, the laboratories in which
they conduct their research, the quality of their mentoring relationships, and
various other factors all contribute to the presentation format of psychological
knowledge. The complexity and expansive scope of psychologists’ activities in
their knowledge production play a pivotal role in creating the field’s expansive
and complex disciplinary boundaries. In the next section, I explore the concept of
“discipline” and the role of disciplinary boundaries.
The Nature of Disciplines and Disciplinary Boundaries
What does the term “discipline” mean and what exactly constitutes a
discipline like psychology? The word “discipline” is ubiquitous in academic culture
so it would seem superfluous to define the obvious. Within academe, there are

6
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disciplines for medicine, economics, political science, art history, physics, and
psychology along with a host of others. But the meaning of discipline goes
beyond the superficial labeling common in academic institutions. The nature of
disciplines contains tacit assumptions about the production of knowledge that call
for explication in order to appreciate the modern discipline of psychology.
Disciplines
According to Ellen Messer-Davidow and her colleagues (1993), organizing
knowledge into separate disciplines is of relatively recent origins—occurring
approximately 200 years ago—and it has been less than 100 years since the
production of this knowledge took place within the academic settings familiar
today. David Shumway and Messer-Davidow (1991) assert that the organization
of knowledge into disciplines began with the formation of scientific societies such
as the Royal Society of London and the Academie des Sciences of France in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These scientific societies provided
learned people with the freedom to study in specialized areas of knowledge that
went beyond the traditional subjects of grammar, rhetoric, and ethics. Between
the late eighteenth and middle of the nineteenth centuries, this specialization led
to the division of natural philosophy into independent sciences such as physics,
chemistry, and biology. With the proliferation of scientific findings during this time,
the idea and utility of distinct disciplines came into scientific and public
consciousness. But there is more to the term “discipline” than the formation of the
now common academic disciplines.

7
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“Discipline” contains a double meaning that is important for my discussion
of psychology’s disciplinary boundaries and disciplinary boundaries in general.
French philosopher Michel Foucault (1977) discusses the underlying meaning of
the term in Discipline and Punish, his poignant exposition on the structure of
prison systems and schools. First, Foucault tells us that discipline is a method for
assisting people in mastering a particular subject. It is the regimentation,
organization, and transmission of information necessary to help individuals
understand particular forms of knowledge. Secondly, discipline connotes a way
of controlling or exerting power over other people’s behavior. According to
Foucault, power over others and people’s compliance with standardized modes
of conduct dictates the ways in which we interact with each other in the world.
Foucault’s two meanings of discipline have implications for current
academic disciplines. For instance, the sociologist of science Robert Kohler
(1981) posits that academic disciplines indicate specialized knowledge and skills
that individuals pursuing a particular specialization need to master. Secondly, he
suggests that disciplines are political establishments for obtaining resources and
“demarcating areas of academic turf” (p. 104). Timothy Lenoir (1993) also uses
Foucault’s dual meaning of discipline to imply that disciplines are the
“infrastructure of science...that are institutionalized formations for organizing
schemes of perception, appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as
tools of cognition and communication” (p. 72). Both Kohler and Lenoir suggest
that traditional academic disciplines connote a form of cognitive authority used
for internal organization (i.e., keeping its practitioners in line) and for demarcating
8
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one discipline from another (i.e., acknowledging some forms of knowledge as
germane to the discipline while excluding other forms).
Messer-Davidow and colleagues (1993) suggest four dimensions
characteristic of disciplines based on Foucault’s framework. First, disciplines
assist in producing our world. They provide us with theories, concepts, and ideas
of how the world works. These various knowledge products circumscribe the way
we perceive the world. Secondly, disciplines develop knowledge producers.
Disciplines provide training grounds for students interested in producing
knowledge about some part of the world. The training these students receive
varies based on their disciplinary specialization. Third, disciplines produce
prestige and value. Ostensibly, the public views knowledge producers as
possessing a valuable commodity for society. If the knowledge does prove
valuable, the public bestows privilege and rewards, usually in the form of
financial support, to the knowledge producers. Finally, disciplines serve as icons
for society’s advancement. While one can debate whether knowledge truly does
progress in some linear fashion, disciplines and their practitioners assist in
promoting the idea that knowledge progresses in this fashion.
If Messer-Davidow and colleagues (1993) four dimensions are viable
characterizations of disciplines, then an area worthy of investigation is how
knowledge producers construct and manage their disciplinary boundaries. But
what exactly are disciplinary boundaries?

9
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Disciplinary Boundaries
Disciplinary boundaries are the physical, intellectual, and rhetorical spaces
within which knowledge producers engage in their research and professional
practices.3 Within these spaces, a discipline’s practitioners make epistemic
claims about a set of circumscribed phenomena germane to the overall subject
matter of their discipline. They also serve as spaces within which students
receive training in prescribed modes of conduct appropriate for their chosen field.
The physicality of disciplinary boundaries is apparent in the separate
buildings assigned to different academic departments within colleges and
universities. The physical spaces, whether they are for physics, chemistry, or
psychology departments, provide demarcations for the types of knowledge
produced. Physics departments produce knowledge on properties of the universe
such as gravitational and electromagnetic forces. Similarly, chemistry
departments are physical spaces arranged for producing knowledge about
inorganic compounds such as phosphate ions and carbonic acid. Psychology
departments, of course, are spaces arranged for the production of knowledge
about human thought, behavior, and emotion.
These physical boundaries may be broken down further into separate
laboratory spaces that signify the knowledge production of distinct subdisciplines.
Cognitive psychologists, for instance, have laboratory spaces configured in ways
3 While it is common to consider disciplines as strictly deriving from higher education systems,
this is a limited conception of the term “discipline.” There are many individuals conducting
research or that have clinical practices that hold no institutional affiliations but are still affiliated
with a particular discipline. For instance, industrial/organizational psychologists work
predominately in businesses and corporations, but they still consider themselves affiliated with
the discipline of psychology. The same thing is true of clinical and counseling psychologists who
choose to work in private practice or hospitals.

10
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that differentiate their spaces from those of physiological and social
psychologists. But this notion of physical boundaries extends beyond university
settings. Outside the academic realm, clinical and counseling psychologists
practice their disciplinary training in physical spaces such as private practices
and hospital mental wards.
The intellectual components of disciplinary boundaries consist of how
knowledge producers investigate and think about the subject matter within their
discipline. For instance, scientists’ training in the classroom, laboratory, and in
the field play a role in circumscribing a discipline’s boundaries. Other
components that form this intellectual component include their methodologies,
concepts, theories, and instruments. For example, while biologists, psychologists,
and sociologists all study human beings, their training and methods constrains
them to study human beings in different ways. Biologists may study human
mating behavior in a qualitatively different way than either psychologists or
sociologists. Biologists may be interested in only comparing the allele frequency
of human mate pairs. They may not be concerned with the level of commitment
each partner shares with the other, or the strategies they used to become a mate
pair. Psychologists, on the other hand, may not concern themselves with allele
frequencies, but may instead investigate the motivational underpinning of mate
choices, or the dominance hierarchies in relationships. Sociologists may ignore
the approaches of biologists and psychologists and perhaps study the
ramifications of teenage pregnancy on the welfare system.

11
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Closely related to the intellectual component of disciplinary boundaries is
how knowledge producers use rhetoric to delineate their discipline’s boundaries.
This is often a powerful way for them to describe the contours of their disciplinary
boundaries. The purpose of rhetoric is to persuade an audience of the credibility
of a particular claim. In their books, presentations, and journal articles, scientists
use rhetorical devices to persuade audiences of their science’s reliability and
integrity. One way scientists establish a discipline’s intellectual credibility is by
writing their discipline’s history. In the words of James Good and Richard Roberts
(1993) scientists often employ a “rhetoric of legitimation” in these histories.
Scientists legitimize their science by telling internalist histories of the “great”
dates, ideas, and scientists of their discipline for the purposes of gaining respect.
Psychologists, no less than other scientists, employ this strategy frequently in
writing their disciplinary histories. For instance, the historian of psychology Edwin
G. Boring (1929) virtually ignored the applied and clinical areas of psychology
when writing his history of the field. Numerous historians of psychology including
Mitchell Ash (1983), Laurel Furumoto (1989), William Woodward (1995), and
Benjamin Harris (1997) have critiqued these types of disciplinary histories as
serving a legitimizing purpose and distorting the past.
Other rhetorical devices scientists use are inscriptions to persuade
audiences of the validity of their claims (Latour, 1987). Inscriptions are visual
representations of knowledge such as graphs, figures, and tables within texts.
These inscriptions augment or reinforce the author’s textual statements.
Scientists especially use inscription practices as a means to reinforce their
12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

knowledge claims. For instance, graphs allow a potentially doubtful reader to
experience visually the changing nature of a particular phenomenon. Irrespective
of the branch of science from which a scientist hails, they all engage in these
types of rhetorical strategies to reassure others and themselves of their
disciplinary boundaries. While chemists can speak more assuredly on the
number of protons in each chemical element than psychologists can about the
structures and functions of the cerebral cortex, both types of scientists employ
rhetoric in an effort to demarcate their knowledge claims from others’.
In whatever manner these boundaries are fashioned, they are an
important, though often unexamined, component of many sciences. They provide
a sense of identity, status, stability, and community for each discipline’s members.
The sociologist of science Steven Fuller (1991) describes the role of disciplinary
boundaries as “providing structure needed for a variety of functions, ranging from
the allocation of cognitive authority and material resources to the establishment
of reliable access to some extra-social reality” (p. 302). For scientists, disciplinary
boundaries connote areas of expertise. High energy physicists, for example,
reputedly possess expert knowledge of subatomic particles like electrons and
photons, but not expert knowledge on the behavior of galaxies and solar systems.
In psychology, most consider clinical psychologists experts at identifying and
treating psychopathological conditions such as depression, anxiety, and
schizophrenia. But clinical psychologists are not experts in human judgment and
decision-making.

13
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One of the benefits of this shared expertise among scientists is the
accumulation of power. This power often manifests itself in scientists’ decisions
about incorporating knowledge into or excluding knowledge from their discipline’s
boundaries. This is the process of boundary-work.
Disciplinary Boundary-Work
Protecting, patrolling, and reconfiguring a science’s boundaries is what the
sociologist of science Thomas Gieryn (1983) identifies as boundary-work.
Boundary-work usually takes the form of either scientists’ resistances or
accommodations to new concepts, theories, and technologies. Examining a
science’s boundaries can answer many useful questions about a science’s
history. For instance, one can trace how a discipline’s boundaries have changed
since its inception. Disciplinary boundaries indicate the kinds of knowledge
deemed useful or inappropriate by scientists during a particular period. Similarly,
boundaries suggest the types of practices scientists use and how these practices
change as a result of scientists’ resistances and accommodations to different
forms of knowledge. Examining disciplinary boundaries can also specify how
scientists promote, stabilize, and expand their discipline. Finally, these
boundaries suggest the kinds of changes that occur within a discipline when
scientists reconfigure their field’s boundaries.
One of the reasons that scientists open their discipline’s boundaries is to
augment their existing cognitive authority by incorporating some theory,
technology, or method. For instance, in the decades between 1920 and 1940
paleontologists and experimental biologists opened their disciplinary boundaries
14
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after they realized the importance of Gregor Mendel’s work on heredity for
understanding how species evolve (Bowler, 1989). Combining Mendel’s work
with Darwin’s theory of natural selection resulted in the “modern synthesis” in
evolutionary biology (e.g., Dobzhansky, 1951; Huxley, 1942). The modern
synthesis helped promote evolutionary biologists’ cognitive status in the sciences
by providing a cohesive conceptual framework for the discipline.
Conversely, there are times when scientists attempt to close their
boundaries and prohibit some theory, concept, opinion, practice, method, object,
or instrument deemed undesirable from entering the field. Sometimes knowledge
may threaten the existing authority of scientists and they may take action to
remove the perceived threat. Before the 1920s, for instance, evolutionary biology
relied on Lamarckism and orthogenesis to explain the process of species
evolution.4 At the time, both ideas were popular among the lay public and many
scientists. This popularity was due, in part, to the implicit suggestion that some
higher power controlled the evolutionary process. This idea resonated with the
beliefs of many of the religious-minded public and scientists at the time. But
relying on teleological explanations was unacceptable for an assumedly rigorous
science like evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biologists could not substantiate
either of these ideas in their research. It was threatening to the credibility of their
science and they eventually eliminated Lamarckism and orthogenesis in favor of
Mendel’s and Darwin’s ideas (Bowler, 1989).
4 The French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck developed Lamarckism in 1809. Lamarckism is
the theory that species evolve through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Orthogenesis,
which was espoused by many naturalists in the nineteenth century, is the process of species
evolving along a predetermined linear path (Mayr, 1991).
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Statement of Purpose
I will explore the modification of U.S. psychology’s disciplinary boundaries
by systems of knowledge produced by scientists from three interdisciplinary
programs—evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, chaos theory— between
1970 and 2000.5 Scientists from each of these interdisciplinary programs
introduced different forms of knowledge into psychology that somehow affected
the field and the practices of some of its scientists and practitioners.
Interdisciplinary programs arise when scientists from disparate fields come
together because of some common interest in a particular problem or subject. To
examine these forms of knowledge, I look at the types of practices these
scientists introduced into the discipline and the types of boundary-work
psychologists used in reaction to these practices.
Practices under Investigation
Following the emphasis on examining scientific practices from the
sociology of scientific knowledge literature (e.g., Pickering, 1995; Shapin, 1982;
Sulloway, 1991), I divided scientific practices into three interrelated categories:
conceptual, material, and social. Conceptual practices consist of activities
pertaining to what is commonly associated with the cognitive dimensions of
science. Conceptual practices include activities such as the use of metaphor for
introducing new concepts into the field, developing or refining research methods,

5 The term “interdisciplinary” has numerous interpretations and the scientific literature is rife with
terms that connote different aspect of interdisciplinarity. The humanities scholar Julie Thompson
Klein (1990) discusses the many terms used to exemplify interdisciplinarity. These terms include
“multidisciplinarity,” “pluridisciplinarity,” and “transdisciplinarity.” I use the terms “interdisciplinary”
and “interdisciplinarity” as they appear to be the most recognizable and appropriate for my
research.
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and constructing and modifying scientific theories. Examples from psychology
include the refinement of models of human memory systems and introducing new
statistical techniques for analyzing data.
Material practices are those that deal with the physical manifestations of a
science. They include the construction of tests and assessment procedures, the
manipulation of laboratory equipment and space, the creation of new instruments
and apparatus, and the use of existing instruments and apparatus for new
purposes. In psychology, material practices would include the development and
implementation of intelligence tests such as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test
and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Material practices also would include
the development and use of instruments like functional resonance magnetic
imaging (fMRI) devices and Skinner boxes.
Social practices deal with the interpersonal dimensions of science. Social
practices entail attending conferences, publishing research, interactions with
funding agencies, establishing relationships between laboratories, and facilitating
associations with other academic institutions and departments. In psychology,
social practices take the form of endeavors such as applying for funding from the
National Institute for Mental Health or publishing in the journal American
Psychologist.
These types of practices are interrelated. Scientists who write empirical
research articles usually publish their findings in scientific journals, book chapters,
textbooks, or monographs (social practice). Scientists most often derive
inspiration for their research from some kind of theory and their research findings
17
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contain various concepts, models, methods, and possibly metaphors that support
their research findings (conceptual practice). It is also feasible to assume that
scientists who publish their research have developed specific instruments or
artifacts like particle accelerators or Skinner boxes for investigating a particular
phenomenon (material practice).
I contend that the conceptual, material, and social practices of
evolutionary psychologists, cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists spurred
psychologists to engage in boundary-work. Psychologists either resisted or made
accommodations for these practices that ultimately restructured the boundaries
of psychology.
Psychologists resist certain practices because they have their own
conceptual, material, and social practices that they use in their day-to-day
professional activities. In his book Academic Tribes and Territories, Tony Becher
(1989) emphasized that “the attitudes, activities and cognitive styles of groups of
academics representing a particular discipline are closely bound up with the
characteristics and structures of the knowledge domains with which such groups
are professionally concerned” (p. 20). Psychologists train either explicitly or
implicitly in these types of practices; therefore, they have a professional and
sometimes emotional attachment to these practices. Conversely, psychologists
can sometimes make accommodations for a new practice. This usually happens
when they realize the need for or practicality of employing a new analytic
technique for their data. Or they may adopt a concept from another discipline that
more appropriately conveys the meaning of a particular subject. I will
18
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demonstrate instances of these resistances and accommodations in my case
studies.
Rationale for my Investigation
I have two reasons for investigating psychologists’ boundary-work and
using these three programs as my case studies. First, my historical research
interests intersect with these three interdisciplinary programs. Evolutionary
psychologists investigate adaptations in human behavior, thought, and emotions.
Cognitive scientists study the computational aspects of human cognition. Chaos
theorists deal with orderly behavior in seemingly randomly behaving systems.
Fortunately, these three programs infringed upon psychology’s boundaries at
approximately the same time. Secondly, the study of boundary-work in
psychology is relatively uncharted territory. I believe that studying psychologists’
boundary-work is essential for developing a deeper understanding and
appreciation for the history of the discipline. Many authors of history and systems
of psychology textbook still subscribe to the great man or great idea style of
writing so they tend to present distorted disciplinary histories (e.g., Hergenhahn,
2001; Schultz & Schultz, 2000). Many of these textbooks are the work of
psychologists who are amateur historians. Ever since Robert Young’s (1966)
criticism of the scholarship in the history of the behavioral sciences, professional
historians of psychology have responded with revisionist histories of the
discipline focused on narrower topics in specific contexts (e.g., Blumenthal, 1975;
Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986; Guthrie, 1998; Harris, 1979). My approach
complements revisionist histories of psychology in that it focuses on boundary19
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work in specific and narrow contexts, but it also brings to light external factors
(i.e., other scientists’ practices) that play a role in shaping psychology’s
boundaries. Employing boundary-work analysis also allows one to move between
the “micro-histories” common in today’s historiographic approach and the “big
picture” approach advocated more recently by historian of science Roger Smith
(1997; 1998).
Structure of my Investigation
In Chapter 1, I discuss the processes involved in scientists’ boundary-work.
I introduce three kinds of threats to scientists’ authority and explain the types of
boundary-work used in reaction to these threats. Next, I discuss how boundarywork encapsulates the different activities in which scientists engage for
establishing, maintaining, and extending a discipline’s boundaries. Finally, I
discuss how scientists resist and accommodate different forms of knowledge in
their boundary-work activities.
In my second chapter, I go deeper than I have in this introduction into the
complexity and mercurial nature of U.S. psychology’s boundaries. I try to capture
what these boundaries looked like between 1970 and 2000 and provide historical
examples of psychology’s changing boundaries. To do this, I provide two
illustrations of psychology’s changing boundaries during its history as a discipline.
Secondly, I identify three reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries during
the 1970s up to the new millennium: (a) the different levels of analysis in
psychological studies, (b) psychology’s reflexive nature, and (c) the complexity of
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its disciplinary structure.6 Lastly, I review the state of psychology’s boundaries
during this period by discussing psychology’s professional structure as an
academic discipline, its training of students, and its putative fragmentation into
specialty areas.
In the next three chapters, I introduce my case studies: evolutionary
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory. I provide a brief history for each
case study, the program’s theoretical framework, and the conceptual, material,
and social practices that affected psychology’s boundaries. Finally, I discuss the
resistances and accommodations psychologists displayed when carrying out
their boundary-work in response to the practices of these interdisciplinary
programs.
In my concluding chapter, I argue that despite psychologists’ efforts in the
thirty years between 1970 and 2000 to establish and maintain psychology’s
disciplinary boundaries, my investigation indicates that the boundaries of U.S.
psychology remained fluid, permeable, and dynamic. Psychologists especially
resisted the introduction of new conceptual practices. They were less likely to
resist new material and social practices. Despite these resistances,
accommodations occurred with all three kinds of practices for all three
interdisciplinary programs. Conversely, psychologists more readily accepted the
various practices of cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists than they
did the practices of chaos theorists. Interestingly, today some psychologists are

6 Note that these three reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries are just as applicable today
as they were thirty years ago. See Stephen Yanchar’s (1997) discussion on the fragmented
structure of the discipline.
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combining these three interdisciplinary programs in various ways in order to
conduct their research.
Finally, I discuss the benefits of using the sociology of science and
boundary-work for understanding and appreciating the historical processes that
helped shape psychology. Psychology’s boundaries change or shift as
psychologists carry out their own conceptual, material, and social practices. But it
is also important to recognize that psychologists’ resistances and
accommodations to the various practices permeating their field’s boundaries
produce additional changes and shifts. These boundary-work activities need to
be explored more fully in order to obtain a more comprehensive account of the
history of psychology and to appreciate the ways in which psychology dictates
and is dictated by the social world.
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CHAPTER I

DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARY-WORK AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Boundary-work analysis is a procedure used to understand scientists’
activities for protecting the cognitive authority of their field. Boundary-work is an
idea that came to fruition within the field of sociology of scientific knowledge
(SSK), which is an area of science studies. “Science studies” is used as an
umbrella term to represent fields such as science and technology studies,
sociology of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, philosophy of science,
gender studies, literary studies, and the history of science (Biagioli, 1999;
Pickering, 1995). The field of SSK came into prominence in science studies
within the past thirty years mainly through the efforts of British sociologists and
philosophers. Recently it has enjoyed growing success among U.S. sociologists,
philosophers, and historians of science as well as various researchers in France,
Germany, Israel, and Australia (Shapin, 1995). At present, sociologists of science
have mainly analyzed the physical and biological sciences (e.g., Barnes &
Shapin, 1979; Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen, & Pinch, 1995; Latour & Woolgar,
1986; Pickering, 1992; Shapin, 1982). Despite its growing popularity, there has
been very little work done by historians of psychology from this perspective. This
is unfortunate because I believe SSK can contribute a complementary dimension
to previous historical studies in psychology, especially pertaining to
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

psychologists’ boundary-work activities. Before exploring the process of
boundary-work itself, it is important to gain an understanding of SSK. Many
dimensions of boundary-work analysis stem from the ideas put forth by
sociologists of scientific knowledge.
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
The sociology of scientific knowledge is a heterogeneous field of study
because there are many different conceptions of the appropriate objects to study
in science. These conceptions have changed throughout SSK’s disciplinary
history. I outline a few of them here. From the 1930s to the 1960s, Robert
Merton’s (1937; 1938; 1968) ideas on the sociology of science were taken as the
definitive position in the field. Merton focused on the rewards in science (e.g.,
Nobel Prizes) and the effect these had on how scientists conducted their work.
Merton (1968) observed that eminent scientists received a disproportionate
number of rewards for their work, while other scientists, though perhaps just as
deserving, did not. These rewards, or the lack of them, affected the motivational
level of the scientists. One of the criticisms of Merton’s approach is that he did
not take his ideas much further into the social dimensions of science. To Merton,
the veracity or “truth-value” of scientists’ knowledge products were
unquestionable and, therefore, untainted by social elements. It was not until the
1960s that SSK became more social in its focus.
In the late 1960s and into the 1970s a more social component came to the
forefront in studies of science inspired by some radical ideas about scientists and
the making of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1996) widely read
24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

book The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, and the philosopher Paul
Feyerabend’s (1978) Against Method became popular frameworks for
understanding scientific practice. Kuhn criticized scientists’ beliefs in the
“scientific method” and their belief that this method would lead to some form of
absolute truth. Instead, he chose to focus on the social dimensions of science
that allowed scientists to conduct their work. Kuhn suggested that the use of
exemplars— problems scientists were trained to see during their indoctrination as
students—were used as analogies to solve new problems in the course of
“normal science.” The main point that Kuhn contributed to SSK was not the
popularly used term “paradigm shift,” but the notion that scientists’ training
dictates their observations, thus creating scientific facts in particular experimental
contexts. Like Kuhn, Feyerabend questioned the validity of a single scientific
method and demonstrated that many scientists do not follow a single scientific
method—the idea that “anything goes”— using examples from usually
unquestioned models of progress in science like the Copernican revolution.
Since the 1970s, sociologists of scientific knowledge place even more
emphasis on the social components of science. For example, they moved
beyond merely looking at how social components interfere in scientific practice
and replaced this perspective with a focus on how social components contribute
to scientific practices. The historian of science Jan Golinski (1990) identified two
ways sociologists of scientific knowledge are now looking at scientific practices.
First, there are the ethnomethodologists that study scientists in situ such as
Bruno Latour’s (1986) study of biochemists, Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1981) work
25
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with groups of scientists studying plant proteins, Andrew Pickering’s (1981; 1984)
investigations of physicists studying quarks, and Harry Collins’ (1974) study of
laser research. Next, there are studies that look at how science is made public in
books, journals, and presentations such as Timothy Lenoir’s (1998) work on
communication and inscription practices. In his book, The Mangle of Practice,
Pickering (1993) advocates a different version of SSK through an investigation of
how materials in science, such as machines, have an agency all their own that
act upon humans. For instance, the weather controls our behavior to a great
extent in that if it is raining we are apt to pack an umbrella for work. His argument
is that humans are not the only things in science that possess agency. Materials,
according to Pickering, also possess agency that can affect scientists’ practices.
The main function of SSK is to develop a comprehensive account of how
science works, that is, how scientists develop, use, and maintain scientific
knowledge. But what constitutes knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge?
Barry Barnes (1990) outlines four characteristics of knowledge. First, any body of
knowledge exists as beliefs inherited from previous generations. In the case of
scientists, they inherit these bodies of knowledge from their mentors, teachers,
textbooks, and other members of their discipline. Secondly, one can distinguish
between inherited knowledge and mere belief in that some kind of authority (e.g.,
credible scientists) creates this knowledge. This characteristic is what
distinguishes authoritative knowledge from mere belief. Another characteristic of
knowledge is that various procedures accompany it for the purpose of validating
this knowledge in particular contexts. There are methods, instruments, and
26
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various technologies that demonstrate and authenticate this knowledge. Things
like laboratory equipment, computer simulations, data analysis software, and
videos validate this knowledge. Lastly, individuals can use and interpret this
inherited knowledge in different ways; however, this is one of the problematic
aspects of knowledge. According to Barnes, there are no assurances when it
comes to the proper use of the inherited knowledge.
While there are currently numerous versions of SSK (e.g., the Edinburgh
School and the Bath School), sociologists of scientific knowledge generally agree
that in order to understand the process of knowledge production in science it is
important not only to study the final product of scientific research, but also to
consider the social forces that act on scientists and the practices they utilize to
develop their scientific knowledge.7 Summarizing the impact and importance of
these types of studies, the historian of science Jan Golinski (1990) stated:
In tackling the practices of scientists at work, these researchers could be
said to have transcended the limits traditionally regarded as
circumscribing sociological investigations; they were dealing with the
‘content’ of science and not just with its institutional ‘context.’ By
concentrating on the observable features of scientific practice, they had
exposed the interpretive and contingent nature of experiments, bringing to

7 Both the Edinburgh School and the Bath School are representatives of the “strong
programme” in science studies. Essentially followers of the strong programme believe in the
primacy of social factors in the creation of scientific knowledge. This contrasts with weaker
versions of this position where rational thought and empirical observation supersede the
social components of scientific knowledge. The Edinburgh School is associated with David
Bloor and Barry Barnes. The Bath School is associated with Harry Collins.
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light the rich variety of elements that enter into the making of scientific
facts, (p. 493)
Sociologists of science contend that because scientists are human, they are
prone to subjective experiences that affect their judgment and their
interpretations of the knowledge they produce. A founder of the “strong
programme” in SSK, David Bloor (1991), in addition to numerous other
sociologists of science (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996; Knorr-Cetina, 1999;
Pickering, 1981) argue that cultural influences, usually presumed to have no
effect on science, actually affect the creation and development of scientists’
theories and findings. Cultural phenomena such as the types of external funding
programs available and pressures put on scientists by lobbyists and politicians
play a role in the development of scientific knowledge. Encapsulating this idea,
Andrew Pickering (1992) stated that “scientific knowledge has to be seen, not as
the transparent representation of nature, but rather as knowledge relative to a
particular culture” (p. 5). Undoubtedly, most scientists would acknowledge that
outside forces do affect the production of their knowledge. They, however, would
probably argue that this does not affect the “truth value” of the knowledge they
produce. While not denying that external factors affect their practices, they
probably would deny that these factors affect the factuality of their knowledge.
Scientists commonly argue that other laboratories run by different experimenters
can replicate their findings. Another common argument is that their data fit a
particularly successful theory. Truth eventually separates from untruth even if
there are occasional local disagreements. One of the responsibilities of
28
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sociologists of science is to question this confidence and describe instances
where replication or theory fails to produce factuality.
Steven Shapin (1982), in his influential article on the benefits of the SSK
perspective for the history of science, provides some examples. Shapin
discusses how, in the 1860s, Thomas Henry Huxley, a British biologist and one
of Charles Darwin’s most passionate supporters, discovered a protoplasmic
organism he named Bathybius haeckelii in sea-bed mud that had been preserved
in alcohol for 10 years. A number of American, German, and British biologists
and geologists replicated these findings. At the time, Huxley’s findings were
significant because they lent credence to two theories about the origins and
nature of life on earth: the nebular hypothesis and abiogenesis.8 As time passed,
many biologists and geologists questioned the factuality of Huxley’s findings.
They argued that Bathybius haeckelii was not a living organism but, in fact, partly
constructed by the observers’ imagination and the effect of alcohol on calcium
sulfate contained in the sea-bed mud. Those scientists who supported either the
nebular or the abiogenesis hypotheses refused to admit their mistake because
they were intellectually committed to these beliefs. Bathybius haeckelii supported
their theories about the process and origins of life on earth. Shapin concluded the
story with the fate of Bathybius, which “died a gradual death, assisted by the

8 Immanuel Kant and Pierre Simon de LaPlace developed the nebular hypothesis independently
in the eighteenth century. LaPlace posited that the alignment of the planets around the Sun was
caused by gas and dust collapsing and spinning due to gravitational forces. The planets, the Sun,
and their planar alignment were a result of these forces. Evolutionists such as Robert Chambers
used this hypothesis as a means to explain the configuration of the natural world through
historical contingency (Bynum, Browne, & Porter, 1981). Abiogenesis, also known as
spontaneous generation, is the idea that non-living things can produce living organisms (Thain &
Hickman, 1994).
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writings of scientists who opposed the theories which its existence had been
used to support” (p. 160).
This is not to say that sociologists of scientific knowledge believe
everything scientists discover are illusions. This represents an extreme form of
relativism that inhibits meaningful discourse on any subject. Rather, sociologists
of science believe it is important to realize that science is inherently a social
activity between not only scientists, but also between scientists and the rest of
the world. These social activities are worthy of investigation in order to obtain a
more comprehensive picture of the nature and history of science.
Instances of external factors that influence scientists are relatively
abundant. In his history of the life of Francis Galton, the geneticist Nicholas
Wright Gillham (2001) discussed the influence of the social and political climate
of Victorian England on Galton’s belief in the hereditary nature of people’s mental
abilities. Many scientists agreed that social class and profession were the direct
result of race and proper breeding. Rich white men were successful because, in
the words of Herbert Spencer, they were more “fit” to survive in the world.
Conversely, “savages” from Tierra del Fuego, for instance, were savage because
they were lower on the evolutionary ladder than whites were. During his life,
Galton observed that many people of eminence—judges, scientists, literary
figures—also had offspring who were successful. He concluded, albeit
erroneously, that those mental abilities were inherited from the parents by their
offspring. It was not conceivable to Galton—and many others in the Victorian
climate—that environmental factors such as lack of money, social resources, and
30
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education could play a role in whether or not one would become eminent. In a
similar vein, the conservative political climate at that time affected research on
eugenics—a term coined by Galton to connote social changes that could improve
the human race. In the U.S. during the early nineteenth century, for example,
many wealthy individuals were concerned about the growing numbers of the poor
and convinced legislators to pass immigration acts and forced sterilization laws to
prevent the poor from procreating. The popular opinion at the time was that
preventing the poor, criminals, and the feebleminded from procreating would lead
to improvements in society.
In the next section, I move from SSK to discussing boundary-work. I begin
by discussing two philosophical perspectives on boundary-work, and then I move
into a definition of boundary-work itself. I then discuss the types of threats that
may prompt scientists to engage in boundary work. Next, I present three types of
boundary-work common in the sciences. The last two sections cover the
distinction between permeable and impermeable boundaries and the types of
behaviors scientists use while engaging in boundary-work.
Philosophical Perspectives on Boundary-work
Gieryn (1995) outlined two philosophical perspectives for approaching the
study of scientific boundaries: essentialism and constructivism. Essentialists
believe that the boundaries of science are real, not locally contingent, and
invariable. These boundaries constitute what separates science from other
human activities. From the essentialists’ standpoint, science and the scientific
approach to knowledge produce valid and reliable findings. Science produces
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truths and facts. If problems ever arise from scientific findings, the fault lies not in
science, but with the individual or the method used to produce the knowledge.
Science is inviolate, while human interpretations of the data are faulty.
Constructivists’ argue that there is no one method of science that
produces valid and reliable knowledge. Instead, science is locally contingent,
subject to contextual factors that affect the activities of science in a particular
place or at a particular time. As Gieryn (1995) stated:
‘Science’ is no single thing: characteristics attributed to science vary
widely depending upon the specific intellectual or professional activity
designated as ‘non-science,’ and upon particular goals of the boundarywork. The boundaries of science are ambiguous, flexible, historically
changing, contextually variable, internally inconsistent, and sometimes
disputed, (p. 792)
I take the perspective of the constructivists in my investigation. Based on
my research, there is enough evidence to suggest that scientific boundaries are
subject to the individuals within a scientific discipline and to factors outside the
discipline affecting its boundaries. The constructivist position I take does not
entail denying that there is a real world out there that impinges on our senses.
The issues of the fundamental reality of the world and the possibility that facts
actually are what they supposedly represent are not at issue here. What is at
issue here is the contingent nature between sciences’ boundaries and human
perception, bias, and interpretation in the production of these boundaries. This is
where the constructivist perspective plays an essential role.
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Outline of Boundary-work
Traditionally, sociologists of scientific knowledge use the term “boundarywork” to describe attempts by scientists to raise their field of knowledge
production to authoritative and expert status.9 Usually this occurs when scientists
make the distinction between a legitimate science and those disciplines
considered “non-sciences” or “pseudo-sciences.” According to Gieryn (1999), the
process of boundary-work is the “discursive attribution of selected qualities to
scientists, scientific methods, and scientific claims for the purpose of drawing a
rhetorical boundary between science and some less authoritative residual non
science” (p. 4-5). Based on Gieryn’s articulation, boundary-work represents the
action of demarcating one discipline’s intellectual territory from another
discipline’s intellectual territory or from a group’s collective knowledge generally
considered outside the scientific arena (e.g., religious organizations).
Metaphorically, scientists’ boundary-work produces a cartographic illustration of
disciplinary terrains that function as guideposts for the relationships between
scientific disciplines or from groups outside of science. These work in much the
same way as traditional maps portray the boundaries between counties, states,
and countries. Unlike traditional maps that represent fairly permanent
demarcations, maps of scientific boundaries change as scientists incorporate or
expunge material when an individual or group contests this material. Gieryn
(1995) proclaims:

9 While I use scientists for my examples, other endeavors such as businesses and politicians use
boundary-work too.
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Whatever ends up as inside science or out is a local and episodic
accomplishment, a consequence of rhetorical games of inclusion and
exclusion in which agonistic parties do their best to justify their cultural
map for audiences whose support, power, or influence they seek to enroll
(p. 406).
The historian of science and science writer Michael Shermer (1997; 2001)
exemplifies one strategy that scientists use to expunge the knowledge claims of
pseudo-scientists.10 Shermer specializes in debunking claims of pseudo
scientists such as those who claim they have discovered extra-sensory
perception (ESP) or those who believe in alien abductions. In the case of those
believing in ESP, Shermer emphasizes the role of controlled experimentation that
seems to refute any kind of claims of ESP. In the case of alien abductions,
especially those who believe this happens at night, Shermer and others propose
this is merely a case of sleep paralysis.
Scientists’ boundary-work leads to a discipline’s cognitive or “epistemic
authority” whereby scientists gain the “power to define, describe, and explain
bounded domains of reality” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 1). Boundary-work within and
between the sciences delineates those social groups that have access to
“factuality” and “truth” within given knowledge domains and who do not possess
these truths. Those possessing this knowledge are generally considered experts
who are granted the authority to guide those ignorant of these truths (i.e., other

10 Many scientists, philosophers, and science writers engage in ousting pseudo-scientific claims
from scientific orthodoxy to teach students and the public about critical thinking (e.g., Gardner,
1957; Plait, 2002; Stanovich, 2001).
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scientists and the public). Given the power bequeathed to scientists in their role
as experts, it is only reasonable to assume that scientists are motivated to keep
their expert status. Barry Barnes and his colleagues (1996) contend that
“scientific boundaries are defined and maintained by social groups concerned to
protect and promote their cognitive authority, intellectual hegemony, professional
integrity, and whatever political and economic power they might be able to
command by attaining these things” (p. 16). Despite the epistemic authority
granted to scientists through their boundary-work and their motivation for keeping
this authority, there exist threats to the authority of these scientists.
Threats to Scientists’ Authority
Threats to scientists’ epistemic authority come mainly from three sources
(Gieryn & Figert, 1986). First, institutions outside scientific circles, such as
religious organizations, corporations, and engineers, may claim authority over
specific forms of knowledge. A current exemplar of this kind of threat comes from
the claims of creationists about “intelligent design.” Intelligent design is the idea
that living organisms are so complex, yet perfectly designed for their environment,
that there has to be some form of intelligent designer (usually a deity) that at
least started the process of evolution (e.g., Behe, 1996; Demski, 2002; Kenyon,
1989). In the guise of legitimate science, creationists attack evolutionary theory
as consisting of unfounded speculation.
Another example of this kind of threat comes from Gieryn’s (1983) study of
the competition between scientists and engineers in the nineteenth century over
claims of scientific knowledge. Each group tried to establish their profession as
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superior to the other. Gieryn focuses on the Victorian science writer John Tyndall
and his disputes with engineers on who possessed expert knowledge. Tyndall
used various rhetorical strategies to make scientists look more appealing and
have more epistemic authority to the public.
Political factions, such as the military, constitute the second threat to
scientists’ cognitive authority. The military may dictate the types of projects on
which scientists work because they contribute a great deal of funding to various
scientists, including psychologists. Additionally, the military may consider certain
knowledge as best kept within military domains because of potential threats to
national security. Unlike the usual production process, scientists working for the
military may never be able to make their knowledge public.
The final threat comes from within the scientific community. Cases of
fraudulent practices (e.g., plagiarism, falsifying data, and unethical treatment of
participants) within scientific disciplines threaten the credibility of scientists. A
well documented case in the early twentieth century of fraudulent practice within
psychology stems from the debate between hereditarians and environmentalists
over the factor most responsible for intellectual ability. Sir Cyril Burt, the British
educational psychologist, was accused of intentionally falsifying his twin studies
data on intelligence in an attempt to establish the supremacy of heredity over
environmental factors (Zenderland, 1990).11

11 While the evidence to suggest that Burt falsified his twin studies data is convincing, the
historian of psychology, Franz Samelson (1992), questions if this is not a secondary issue to a
more serious problem. Samelson contends that the bigger issue is the question of how so many
other psychologists ignored the blatant methodological flaws and still published Burt’s research.
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Another instance of questioning the credibility of scientists is the
controversy concerning the psychologist Henry H. Goddard and his presumably
retouched photographs of the Kallikak family. In his book, The Mismeasure of
Man, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1981) contends that Goddard purposely
retouched the images to make the Kallikak family look ignorant and sinister to
validate his claim that one side of the Kallikak family produced feebleminded
offspring. The historian of psychology Raymond Fancher (1987) rebuffs Gould’s
claims and provides evidence that photographs taken during Goddard’s time
were sometimes retouched to bring out the physical features of the people.
Scientists do their best to counter these threats to their disciplinary
authority. Scientists use discursive and rhetorical strategies to promote their
theories, methods, practices, technologies, and knowledge claims as effective
ways of discerning the truth about particular phenomena. Despite these threats,
there still exists the idea that scientists are authoritative and expert knowledge
producers. As a result, a discipline gains power over various social dimensions of
its knowledge. With this power comes the authority to decide who obtains and
utilizes this knowledge, how to best use the knowledge in the laboratory and in
society, and who will benefit most from its implementation.
Types of Boundary-Work
In the following section, I outline three interrelated processes of boundarywork: (a) the establishment of a science’s boundaries, (b) the maintenance of a
science’s boundaries, and (c) the expansion of its boundaries.
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Establishing Boundaries
The establishment of a discipline’s boundaries occurs primarily during the
initial stages of a science’s development. It is the time when scientists market
their discipline to other sciences and the rest of society. This marketing strategy
establishes who “owns” the discipline, demonstrates how it differs from other
areas of knowledge, and outlines the relationship it has with these areas
(Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991). As with the other stages, the initial stage
of boundary-work contains struggles for power, expertise, and authority. During
the establishment process, scientists attempt to provide justification for the
worthiness of their discipline. Scientists distinguish their discipline from other
scientific disciplines in addition to other professions outside the scientific
community that supposedly have similar goals. Scientists validate their
knowledge claims as “truthful” through the implementation of their various
technologies and methodologies. Moreover, scientists persuade the public sector
of their potential contributions to the advancement of knowledge and applications
to society.
Many boundary-work studies pertain to the establishment of a science’s
disciplinary boundaries (Klein, 1996). Investigations of how scientists establish
their discipline are useful for the appreciation of the genesis of a discipline. They
can outline the successful and unsuccessful strategies scientists use to establish
their science as legitimate. This is especially beneficial when developing a
revisionist history of any science because earlier histories may contain
“Whiggish” interpretations of events that tend to glorify the genesis of a discipline.
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But often overlooked is how scientists maintain and extend their disciplinary
boundaries.
Maintaining Boundaries
As a discipline matures, scientists focus more on maintaining their
discipline’s boundaries in order to keep their acquired credibility and material
resources. As Steven Fuller (1985) suggests, by the time a science reaches this
stage “its practitioners must define and maintain the ‘normal’ state of objects in
the domain. This involves experimental and textual techniques for foregrounding
the problematic claims under study against a background of claims that are
stipulated to be unproblematic” (p. 5). Through scientists’ continuing efforts to
legitimize their field, a science becomes professionalized and institutionalized.
Professionalization and institutionalization are of the utmost importance for
gaining respect among scientific colleagues and the public because these
processes demonstrate that the scientific community and the university system
perceives a science as credible. Professionalization also helps to establish the
standards, training regimes, and methods that the scientists will use as their daily
practices. Gieryn and his colleagues (1985) believe that:
‘Professionalization’ appears as a form of occupational control:
organizational innovations restrict the supply of practitioners (through
training and licensing programs) and standardize professional practice by
threat of sanction (through codes of ethics enforced by professional
associations). The rise of professions to positions of relatively high
prestige, resources, authority and autonomy results from successful
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struggles to obliterate, absorb, or dominate competing providers of
‘similar’ services or commodities, (p. 393)
As Gieryn suggests, during this stage scientists form professional organizations,
create content-specific journals, and develop academic departments. Increases
in funding opportunities from within educational institutions, governmental
agencies, and private organizations usually accompany these developments.
The benefits scientists gain from this increased prestige do not just affect the
scientists. In her discussion of boundary maintenance, Henrika Kuklick (1980)
suggests that “while the professionalized group enjoys increased wealth and
prestige, society as a whole presumably also gains, because the achievement of
professional organizations supposedly depends on an improvement in the quality
of the services the group provides for the public” (p. 201). It is apparent that
scientists have a stake in maintaining their boundary structure.
Expanding Boundaries
After a science becomes professionalized and institutionalized, scientists
sometimes concern themselves with expanding or extending their science’s
disciplinary boundaries. Scientists undertake expanding their discipline’s
boundaries in many ways. Scientists sometimes incorporate alternative
theoretical perspectives from other disciplines. They seek funding from sources
normally sought from other fields. Scientists borrow technologies from other
fields and engage in collaborative research with scientists from other disciplines.
This is a somewhat simplified version of the boundary-work process for
the sake of explanation. The boundary-work process is usually more complex.
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Establishing, maintaining, and extending boundaries do not always occur in a
stepwise, linear fashion. Scientists constantly engage in these three processes at
different times and with different emphases throughout a discipline’s history. For
instance, scientists may focus more on reestablishing their discipline’s
boundaries when certain funding resources are no longer available or a
fundamental theory upon which a discipline depends is no longer viable.
Scientists may be more apt to maintain the structure of their boundaries when
new technologies created in other disciplines infringe upon their territory.
Irrespective of the scenario, the particular type of boundary-work in which
practitioners engage depends on numerous factors such as a discipline’s internal
coherence, relationships with other disciplines, political and economic changes,
and a discipline’s relationship to the public.
Impermeable and Permeable Boundaries
Disciplines differ in terms of their permeability based on the uniformity and
coherence of their scientists (Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991). Viewed on a
continuum, one can arrange disciplines in terms of their relative permeability or
impermeability. In his book, Academic Tribes and Territories, Tony Becher (1989)
distinguishes between these two types of boundaries:
Impermeable boundaries are in general a concomitant of tightly knit,
convergent disciplinary communities and an indicator of the stability and
coherence of the intellectual fields they inhabit. Permeable boundaries are
associated with loosely knit, divergent academic groups and signal a more
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fragmented, less stable and comparatively open-ended epistemological
structure, (p. 37-38)
Because disciplinary boundaries vary in terms of their permeability, different
disciplines employ different kinds of boundary-work. Each field has different
priorities with respect to how their scientists demarcate their discipline’s
boundaries and the strategies they use to defend them. Some sciences’
boundaries change more rapidly than other sciences’ boundaries based on
advancements in theory, collaborations with other disciplines, and the availability
of technological innovations and funding opportunities. It appears that
psychology is a discipline with relative permeable boundaries. Psychology’s
boundaries change frequently because it is a young discipline, its subject matter
is immense and certain areas of psychology deal with phenomena that are
difficult to study empirically and this leads to many disputes of knowledge.
Similarly, chemistry, physics, and biology are instances of disciplines with
relatively permeable boundaries. Recently, their boundaries have overlapped in
such fields as macromolecular studies, biophysics, and biochemistry (Klein,
1996). Other sciences are on more solid footing and do not engage in as much
boundary-work. According to Becher (1989), economics is an example of a field
with relatively impermeable boundaries. He argues that the field’s practitioners
accept basic economic theory and that very little knowledge from outside the
discipline affects this basic theory. This is the case even though economics
interacts with the fields of mathematics and political science. Becher emphasizes
this point stating, “Within economics, those who question the basic axioms of the
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subject are regarded as deranged if not possibly dangerous, and are liable to find
themselves cast into a wilderness of their own” (p. 37).
Resistances and Accommodations to Knowledge
While I have provided a typical definition of boundary-work, I use the term
boundary-work to represent the dynamic interplay between scientists’ resistances
and accommodations. Frequently, resistance comes from scientists trying to
maintain or police their discipline’s boundary structure. Barry Barnes and his
colleagues (1996) propose that scientists “can be expected to police the existing
boundaries of science, to avoid the intrusion of whatever may detract from its
reputation and to seek to expel anything potentially disreputable which arises
within it (p. 140). Resistances occur when scientists perceive threats to their
practices and accompanying knowledge domains. Conversely, boundary
accommodations occur when practitioners— individuals or groups—within a
discipline realize the potential utility of a particular idea, instrument, or theory
coming from another discipline. The practitioners incorporate this knowledge into
their own practices and sometimes fundamentally change areas of the discipline.
In summary, boundary-work analysis is a relatively recent approach to
studying scientific practices within the sociology of scientific knowledge.
Sociologists of scientific knowledge use scientists’ boundary-work to analyze how
scientists make distinctions between their own knowledge production activities
and the knowledge production activities of other groups. Essentially, boundarywork manifests in three forms: establishment, maintenance, and expansion.
Various scientists may focus on any of these three forms throughout a
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discipline’s history. Irrespective of the form in which boundary-work occurs,
scientists exhibit either resistances or accommodations to the various conceptual,
material, and social practices of scientists in other disciplines when these
practices infringe upon their cognitive authority. With this framework in mind, I
can now transition into on how psychologists have tried to establish, maintain,
and extend their field’s disciplinary boundaries.
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CHAPTER II

THE COMPLEX DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES OF U.S. PSYCHOLOGY

In his book, The Human Sciences, the historian of science Roger Smith
(1997) issued this caveat: “Psychology has no ‘origin’: its identity in the twentieth
century is fragmented and its roots diverse. Psychology is a cluster of activities
with a family resemblance but no common identity” (p. 493). This statement
would lead one to believe that a comprehensive history of psychology would be
problematic. As a discipline, psychology is simply too complex to make any
definitive statements about it as a science. Taken in one way Smith’s caveat is
true. Ever since psychology’s professionalization and institutionalization as an
academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, the disciplinary boundaries of
U.S. psychology have undergone numerous changes. In a sense, psychology
has had myriad “identities” throughout its history that connote the changing
conceptions of psychological knowledge. At times viewed as a pseudo-science
and at other times a natural science, psychology’s multiple identities prove
difficult to describe. Nevertheless, this complexity proves advantageous for
studying the boundary-work process. When psychologists establish, maintain, or
extend their field, these activities provide insight into psychologists’ boundarywork activities. To begin outlining the complexity of psychology’s boundaries, I
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present two examples of when psychology’s boundaries changed. My first
example derives from a time when psychologists were attempting to establish the
boundaries of the field. My second example comes from how psychologists
extended their boundaries during World War I and World War II. Lastly, I discuss
the reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries between 1970 and 2000 in
addition to how psychologists attempted to manage them.
Psychologists Establish Psychology’s Boundaries
Before the Civil War, one could consider psychology as having no
boundaries. The discipline of U.S. psychology did not yet exist. Unquestionably,
at this time there were many philosophers such as Herbert Spencer, James
McCosh, and Jonathan Edwards, whose interests were psychological in nature,
but there was no consensus as to what to study, no common methodology, no
professional organizations, no scientific journals, and no academic departments
devoted to psychology. Instead, U.S. colleges and universities in the middle to
late 1800s offered courses in moral and mental philosophy (Fuchs, 2000; Kosits,
2004; Maier, 2004). Moral and mental philosophers were mainly Protestant
ordained ministers (Richards, 1995). In general, they believed that in order to
comprehend God’s purposes, people must examine their own minds (Fuchs,
2000). The primary purpose of these moral philosophy courses was to train
students for the seminary or professorships. Once trained, these individuals
would then educate a new generation of students on the importance of
examining the mind in order to understand and appreciate the relationship
between humans and God.
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Laboratories. Quantification, and Experimentation
The transition from moral philosophy to academic psychology came at a
time when U.S. colleges and universities were in the process of
departmentalizing in the German academic tradition (Watson & Evans, 1991).
Many pioneers in psychology such as G. Stanley Hall, James McKeen Cattell,
Lightner Witmer, and Harry Kirke Wolfe traveled to Europe to train with
psychologists like Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in the 1880s. They
returned to establish psychological laboratories and clinics in various colleges
and universities such as Johns Hopkins University, Clark University, the
University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia Collage (Benjamin, 1992; Camfield,
1973; Leahey, 1992). Edward B. Titchener, employed at Cornell University after
his training with Wundt, exemplified this new trend. Titchener’s structuralist
perspective focused on uncovering the elementary units of the mind through
experimentation (Tweney, 1987). This was a move away from the more
subjective introspective inferences about the mind made by the mental
philosophers. Another instance of boundary-making that assisted in establishing
psychology’s boundaries was William James’ (1890/1950) textbook, Principles of
Psychology. James’ Principles helped lay the foundation for an empiricist
tradition in U.S. psychology that distanced itself from the metaphysics of Scottish
faculty psychologists and the philosophy of associationists such as David Hume,
James and John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Bain that were popular at the time. In
1875, James established the first psychology laboratory at Harvard University
(Bjork, 1988). James’ version of psychology was a psychology combining the
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work of physiologists, experimental psychologists, and comparative
psychologists.
The establishment of these laboratories and clinics rapidly placed
psychology within the academic landscape and helped shape its boundaries as a
legitimate science. The historian of psychology David Leary (1987) stated that by
the mid-1890s psychology “had all the trappings of an established scientific
discipline: laboratories, journals, professorships, graduate programs, a
professional organization, and at least one clear case of application” (p. 316). By
1903, psychology produced more doctoral students than all other sciences
except physics, chemistry, and zoology (O'Donnell, 1985). U.S. intellectuals and
students alike were coming in droves to the new field of psychology.
The quantification of and experimentation on psychological phenomena
between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a major factor in
separating psychology from its philosophical and metaphysical roots (Hornstein,
1988). Psychologists began defining their field by the phenomena they could
quantify, while eliminating phenomena not quantifiable. This process helped
promote psychology as a legitimate and empirical science. Establishing
psychology as a legitimate science was of the utmost importance for the success
of psychologists at the time. The psychologist Knight Dunlap (1920) echoed the
belief of many psychologists at the time when he proclaimed that “there is a great
need for a scientific psychology, and unless the scientific study of psychology is
promoted, in laboratories, and in the field: and unless the teaching of scientific
psychology is fostered in the class room, and in print, culture will be impaired,
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and social progress impeded” (p. 516). Historians of psychology generally agree
that this was a pivotal time for establishing psychology as a genuine science. For
instance, in his treatise on the origins of behaviorism, John O’Donnell (1985)
remarked: “In the last quarter of the nineteenth century...psychology secured
recognition as a separate academic discipline by promoting its status as an
experimental laboratory science” (p. 1). The emphasis on instruments and
instrumentation during the “brass instruments” age in psychology’s history
fostered a standardization of psychology’s subject matter in addition to
standardizing their human subjects. Echoing O’Donnell, Deborah Coon (1993)
suggested that the “laboratory and its apparatus...become pivotal to the process
of psychology’s professionalization, and its differentiation from philosophy within
the university” (p. 763). Psychologists’ emphasis on developing laboratories,
quantifying psychological phenomena, and their subsequent experimentation
legitimized their field, helped establish its disciplinary boundaries, and putatively
placed psychology on fairly equal footing with sciences like physics, chemistry,
and biology. Psychologists such as Cattell also published their work in general
science journals of the time. Journals such as Science and Popular Science
Monthly helped legitimize the field (Camfield, 1973).
Psychologists and the World Wars
During and after World War I and II, U.S. psychologists expanded their
areas of expertise and boundaries by including more applied areas, while
continuing their quantitative studies of psychophysiological variables and mental
testing. Public mental health, assessing national character, and social problems
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were some of the newer topics in which psychologists strove to become
authorities. Attempting to extend psychologists’ realms of expertise,
psychologists such as Robert M. Yerkes of Yale University, Henry H. Goddard of
the Vineland Training Institute in New Jersey, and Lewis M. Terman of Stanford
University fervently petitioned the military during World War I to include
psychologists in the war effort. The result of their efforts was the mental testing of
military personnel. These mental tests served a dual purpose. First, mental tests
identified those personnel supposedly mentally unfit for military service. Secondly,
they served to identify soldiers with superior mental abilities for officer selection
(Carson, 1993; Fancher, 1985; Reed, 1987). The mental testing of soldiers
afforded psychologists the opportunity to create new instruments (mental tests)
and employ them on a scale never before thought possible.
Women expanded the boundaries of psychology during this time as well.
While women had been present in and contributed to psychology since its
formation, they represented a minority in the field until World War I.12 It was
during World War I that large numbers of women began to fill the ranks. The
influx of women was due in part to psychologists focusing on more applied and
socially relevant problems (Furumoto, 1987). The general attitude of
psychologists at the time was that the men would continue to invest their time in
experimentation while the women, seen as being able to fill the “caretaker” role,
were more skillful at applied problems. Women assisted in expanding

12 See Elizabeth Scarborough and Laurel Furumoto’s (1987) Untold Lives for an examination of
the first generation of women psychologists such as Margaret Floy Washburn and Mary Whiton
Calkins and their contributions to and experiences in the field.
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psychology’s boundaries by taking on this role and immersing themselves in the
care of the mentally ill, the poor, and the family.
World War II saw psychologists again collaborating with the military,
however in a greater capacity than they did in the first war. This allowed
psychologists to expand their boundaries even further. Military departments such
as the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence
Agency), the Office of War Information, and the Psychological Warfare Division
of Supreme Headquarters sought out the expertise of psychologists, even giving
them a name: sykewarriors. Psychologists, in their role as sykewarriors,
interpreted and influenced enemy morale, and diagnosed “national character,”
which were personality profiles of various countries. Psychologists were moving
beyond their role as mere mental testers and applying their various theories to
worldwide problems. In her book, The Romance o f American Psychology, Ellen
Herman (1995) summarized the importance of these opportunities for
psychologists stating, “The reputation of psychological experts had risen from
one of lowly technician to one of wise consultants and managers whose wartime
accomplishments...deserved a generous payoff in public appreciation and
government funds” (p. 19). With the study of U.S. psychology becoming firmly
embedded within academic institutions, the influx of women psychologists,
psychologists’ concerns with social issues, and the public coming to recognize
psychologists as authorities on various aspects of social life, the boundaries of
psychology expanded at an enormous rate.
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AfterW orld War II, the disciplinary boundaries of psychology continued to
expand in both the research and clinical areas. Research on cognition began in
earnest, in part due to research during the war on feedback systems and
information theory as well as the decline in popularity of behaviorist theories. In
the clinical field, theorists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers developed
humanistic theories of psychological functioning that clinicians subsequently
used in therapeutic interventions. There is no question that psychology’s
boundaries changed throughout its history. The next question that needs
addressing is what are the reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries?
Reasons for Psychology’s Complex Boundaries
There are three interrelated reasons for psychology’s expansiveness and
complexity. As I mentioned previously, psychologists are both reductive and
expansive in exploring the “individual” or the “self.” For instance at the
microscopic level, physiological psychologists investigate subjects like the
structure of various neurotransmitters (e.g., acetylcholine, serotonin, and
dopamine), neural communication, and how extraneous substances like
psychotropic medication, alcohol, and illicit drugs affect neural transmission. At
another scale of representation, psychologists study various components of
personality, cognitive development throughout the lifespan, gender differences,
and a host of other phenomena. At the macroscopic level, psychologists
investigate the social behavior of groups of people within cities, states, and
countries.
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Psychologists also study nonhuman species such as rats, pigeons,
chimpanzees, and dolphins. There are several reasons for using nonhuman
species in psychological research. Some species’ reproduction rates are more
rapid, such as the reproduction rates of laboratory rats. Faster reproduction rates
allow psychologists to study successive generations more briefly. Some species’
physiological systems are less complex than human physiological systems so
experimental manipulations like cortical ablations are easier to perform.
Laboratory animals are allegedly easier to control and standardize than humans
during experimental research (Logan, 1999). It is easier to control extraneous
and confounding variables with many laboratory animals because their
environments can be controlled and modified based on the experimenter’s
discretion. Another reason why other species are used in experimental research
is that ethical considerations regarding the treatment of human subjects prohibit
carrying out certain investigations with humans but not with other species. While
knowledge pertaining to other species’ psychological and physiological makeup
is useful, the primary goal of utilizing other species is for interspecies
comparisons that produce usable knowledge about human psychological and
physiological processes.
A second reason for psychology’s disciplinary complexity is its reflexive
nature. Psychologists interact with their subject matter qua participants. In
discussing psychology’s reflexivity, Roger Smith (1997) stated that there exists a
“reciprocal relationship between psychology and the lives of ordinary people:
people are ultimately both the subject matter of the human sciences and makers
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of psychological knowledge” (p. 57). Psychology differs from the natural sciences
because of this reflexivity. Scientists such as chemists or physicists usually deal
with inanimate substances. When chemists or physicists perform experiments on
these substances, they usually do not have to worry about their substances
interacting with them. Psychologists, on the other hand, interact with their subject
matter through their experimentation and clinical interventions. Complications
about the validity and reliability of their findings arise because participants in
experiments or clients in therapeutic situations often act in unpredictable ways.
Prejudice and bias can interfere with psychologists’ establishment and
interpretation of knowledge (Kirk, 1995; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Participants
can be uncooperative and try to sabotage experiments. Participants may try to
appease experimenters by reporting results they believe will please the
experimenters.
Participants are not the only source of bias in experiments; experimenters
can introduce bias into their own experiments. In their data, experimenters can
often find the results they are expecting to find. Experimenters can exert
pressure on participants to answer in ways that may be favorable to the desired
outcome. These complications, and many others, lead to uncertainty about
psychological knowledge. The uncertainty spurs psychologists to refine
continually their hypotheses, methods of experimentation, and data interpretation.
The ambiguity of interpreting data, the refinement of methods, and the myriad
biases in psychologists’ experimental research contribute to the complexity of the
discipline.
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A third reason for the complexity of psychology is the complexity of its
disciplinary structure. Even though colleges and universities place psychology
under one heading, it is comprised of numerous subdisciplines such as cognitive
psychology, psychobiology, developmental psychology, personality psychology,
and social psychology. Each of these subdisciplines has their own specialized
training regimes for undergraduate and graduate students, esoteric terminology,
funding resources, conferences, and content-specific journals. While these sub
disciplines reflect the various content areas of psychology, there is sometimes
significant overlap between them. For instance, developmental psychologists
may rely on a cognitive theory to interpret adolescent mental development or a
personality theory to discern changes in personality through the lifespan. The
vast array of subdisciplines and the interactions between them contribute to
psychology’s expansive and complex boundaries.
Changes in Psychology’s Disciplinary Boundaries. 1970-2000
Throughout its history the internal sharing of conceptual, methodological,
and technological resources between psychologists, and external factors such as
collaborations with other scientists, the public sector, and governmental and
political organizations all have contributed to psychology’s changing boundaries.
For instance, internal sharing occurs when one subdiscipline borrows
psychological concepts from another. Some cognitive psychologists, for example,
are reexamining Freud’s ideas on the unconscious mind because of their
interests in unconscious perception, memory, and emotion (e.g., Allen & Reber,
1998; Kihlstrom, 1999). Subdisciplines also borrow methodologies from other
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subdisciplines. The methodology of psychophysical reaction time used by
Hermann von Helmholtz in the nineteenth century is now used to measure
reaction times in cognition experiments (e.g., Pashler, 1993). Collaborations
between psychologists in different specialty areas sometimes produce new
directions for research. Collaborations between cognitive psychologists and
cognitive neuroscientists produce mappings of the intersection between brain
structures and information processing using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (e.g., Hayes, Ryan, & Schnyer, 2004; Ragland, Gur, & Valdez, 2004).
Newly developed theories foster investigations into subjects traditionally viewed
as beyond the purview of psychologists. Theories of emotional intelligence are a
set of newly developed ideas now employed in some school systems to monitor
students’ behaviors and emotional stability (e.g., Elias, Arnold, & Hussey, 2003;
Tiwari & Srivastava, 2004).
Externally, governmental funding agencies such as the National Science
Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, and private funding
organizations like the Sloan and Templeton Foundations provide financial
support for psychological research. These funding resources sometimes control
the types of investigations that psychologists conduct. Psychologists often
respond to the needs of various social institutions such as the need for improved
assessment procedures in secondary education. Political and world events such
as the September 11th World Trade Center attacks prompt psychologists to
provide therapeutic assistance for the bombing victims and their families
(Goodman, Morgan, & Juriga, 2004; Miller, 2002; Stewart, 2004). In a similar vein,
56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

psychologists have developed research programs for understanding terrorism
(Ursano, Fullerton, & Norwood, 2003) while others have gotten involved in peace
psychology and anti-war efforts (Christie, Wagner, & Winter, 2001).
Psychology’s Professional Structure
An indicator of psychology’s complex disciplinary boundaries is how
psychologists partition the field. One of the ways psychologists partition the field
is through the organizational structure of its professional organizations. The
American Psychological Association (APA) is the largest professional
organization of psychologists in the world. Since the APA’s founding in 1892, the
organization has burgeoned into fifty-five separate divisions.13 The divisions span
many diverse categories like military psychology, history of psychology, gay,
lesbian, and bisexual issues, community psychology, theoretical and
philosophical psychology, educational psychology, and personality and social
psychology. These fifty-five divisions each have their own specialized research
areas, separate informal communication networks (e.g., internet list servers), and
many of them publish specialty journals. The myriad divisions of the APA indicate
that the use of psychological knowledge spans many levels of society.
Academic Departments and the Training of Students
Within the institutional structure of higher education, psychology
departments are often times divided into subdisciplines based on specialized

13 There are no divisions 4 and 11. Between 1945 and 1948, when the American Association of
Applied Psychology and American Psychological Association formally organized, the
Psychometric Society (Division 4) chose not to become a division. In 1946 Division 11, Abnormal
Psychology and Psychotherapy, merged with Division 12, Clinical Psychology. Both divisions
remain vacant today.
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research areas. It is common to find psychology departments partitioned into
specialty areas such as cognition, behavioral analysis, clinical or counseling
psychology, physiological psychology, and developmental psychology.
Depending on the particular department, there are different modes of
indoctrinating students into the discipline.
The scientist-practitioner model of training students, also known as the
Boulder model, was developed at the Conference of Graduate Education in
Clinical Psychology in Boulder, Colorado between August and September of
1949 (Benjamin & Baker, 2000). The purpose of creating the Boulder model was
to establish a standardized method of training graduate students. Psychology
departments utilizing this model train graduate students in both the research and
clinical dimensions of the discipline, with more emphasis placed on the research
dimension.
Another model of training students is the practitioner-scholar model. The
practitioner-scholar model emphasizes the counseling and clinical dimensions of
training more than the research aspect. This model originated from
dissatisfaction with the Boulder model’s lack of emphasis on clinical training
(Peterson, 2003). Several schools including Adelphi University, the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the California School of Professional
Psychology established programs for doctorates in psychology (Psy.D.).
Psychology as a Fragmented Discipline
The diversity and seemingly fragmented structure of psychology’s subject
matter makes psychology’s disciplinary boundaries more complex. Voicing his
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concern about this fragmentation, psychologist Amedo Giorgi (1992) observed,
“It is clear to most astute observers of the field that psychology’s disciplinary
status is ambiguous at best and chaotic at worst...its place among the other
sciences are still to be determined in a manner acceptable to the majority of
psychologists” (p. 46). One of the main reasons the discipline appears
fragmented is due to the increasing number of specialty areas and because of
the lack of theoretical unity in the field (Bevan, 1991; Gilgen, 1987; Yanchar,
1997; Yanchar & Slife, 1997). Another difficulty is the apparent disorganization of
psychology’s experimental literature (Katzko, 2002). For instance, the areas of
biopsychology, physiological psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral
neuroscience are separate specialty areas despite their interrelatedness. Each of
these specialty areas produces knowledge with their own instruments, methods
of analysis, and theories with little or no overlap between them. Psychologists
William Bevan and Frank Kessel (1994) lamented, “Fragmentation fosters a
mind-set characterized by separateness, but competitiveness that is excessive,
and by alienation from intellectual and human concerns” (p. 505). With the
incorporation of new subject matter, psychology’s disciplinary boundaries
become increasingly fragmented. As a result, it becomes more difficult to discern
how psychology is a distinct and separate discipline from other disciplines such
as sociology, biology, economics, and anthropology.
Accompanying concerns about psychology’s fragmentation are concerns
about the lack of productive communication between subdisciplines or “discourse
communities” (Slife, 2000). Psychology’s specialized discourse communities
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have their own esoteric terminology for various psychological phenomena. These
specialized languages make it difficult for subdisciplines to communicate with
one another.14 For instance, without prior training in personality psychology, it is
difficult to differentiate between the concepts of “self-concept” and “self-image.”
Another difficulty with specialized languages occurs when a subdiscipline uses a
completely different term to connote the same psychological variable. This
excess of concepts can occur even between opposing camps within the same
subdiscipline. Murray White’s (1985) study of the status of cognitive psychology
indicated that there were confusions about the term “icon.” White found icon in
various guises such as iconic memory, iconic storage, preattentive memory,
visual sensory memory, and visual sensory store among others, sometimes
within the same book.
There are several other concerns about psychology’s fragmentation. One
concern is that psychology lacks a common unit of measurement, unlike the
measurement units found in disciplines like physics (Tryon, 1996). As the clinical
psychologist Warren Tryon stated, “Exact replication is only possible with
equivalent units of measurements because an investigator using a larger unit will
find fewer of them than will an investigator using a smaller unit when exactly the
same quantity has been replicated” (p. 214). The lack of measurement
coherence may cause problems with the replication of research results. A

14 This has been a long-standing problem of the sciences in general, not just in psychology. See
Harding (1938) for a discussion on the esoteric and often times needless terminology in the
sciences.
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potential ramification of this is that psychologists may use different measurement
units as proof against replication.
In response to the concerns of psychology’s lack of cohesion, there have
been numerous proposals for unifying the discipline of psychology under a
common theoretical framework (Kimble, 1994; Staats, 1983; Sternberg &
Grigorenko, 2001; Yanchar & Slife, 2000). For instance, the psychologist Arthur
Staats (1991) explained that psychology’s fragmentation is a result of numerous,
unrelated studies and that only by making a conscious effort to tie together these
unrelated studies will psychology begin to mature as a science similar to that of
physics. The sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson (1998) suggested subsuming
psychology under biology to make psychology more coherent with the physical
and natural sciences. Rather than separate, unrelated disciplines, the discipline
could be placed in a hierarchy with sciences like physics and chemistry at the
most basic level and social sciences such as psychology placed under biology.
Robert Sternberg (2001; 2001) proposed that psychology’s unity may
come from the using a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrative
approach that facilitates converging operations. Psychologists would accept
different theoretical, subdisciplinary, and methodological views that would come
to examine certain psychological phenomena. For instance, psychologists
studying personality, development, and behavioral genetics could use the
methods of factor analysis and longitudinal studies for research on intelligence.
Floward Gardner (1992) asserted that, in the future, many of psychology’s
subdisciplines could merge with other fields such as cognitive science and
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neuroscience, leaving a “core” of phenomena for the remaining psychologists
with which to contend. Essentially, Gardner believes that psychology’s
boundaries will dissipate as other scientific communities subsume psychology’s
various subdisciplines.
Others disagree that fragmentation in psychology constitutes a problem.
Irwin Altman (1987) proposed that the dynamic interplay between unifying
psychology and pursuits in specialized subfields promoted healthy growth within
the discipline. The more specialized psychology became the more problems
psychologists could potentially solve. Wayne Viney (1996) believed that
psychology does not need to unify because the discipline is in no worse shape
than any other science. Most other sciences display some kind of disunity,
fragmentation, or specialization; therefore, psychologists are chasing a mythical
idea of unification.
The complexity of psychology’s boundaries and the disputes psychologists
have over them indicate that psychology’s boundary-work usually does not affect
all of psychology. It is rare when something affects the entire field’s boundaries.15
Instead, these disputes usually occur at a local level between individual
psychologists, or between competing laboratories, or even between
subdisciplines. In the next three chapters, I discuss instances of psychologists’
local boundary-work when dealing with the introduction of different kinds of

151should note that one present change taking place in the field of clinical psychology is the turf
battle between clinical psychologists and psychiatrists over prescription privileges. If clinical
psychologists are granted prescription privileges—and in some states they now have this
privilege—this would represent an example of a large scale expansion of boundaries that would
affect approximately 44% of psychologists (American Psychological Association, 1993).
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material, conceptual, and social practices by evolutionary psychologists,
cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists. Psychologists reacted to the
introduction of their practices in different ways. Some psychologists recognized
the potential value of these scientists’ practices and “opened the door” to their
knowledge products. Other psychologists vigorously fought against these
scientists’ practices, believing that they were either irrelevant or potentially
damaging to the reputation of the field.
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CHAPTER III

ADAPTATIONS OF THE MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Scientists, philosophers, social theorists, political scientists, psychologists,
and economists throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have
possessed a deep fascination with using evolutionary theories as a means of
comprehending and explaining human thought, behavior, and emotions. In the
preface to his book, What Evolution Is, the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr
(2001) encapsulated this fascination: “The thinking of modern humans, whether
we realize it or not, is profoundly affected—one is almost tempted to say
determined—by evolutionary thinking” (p. xii). Several individuals throughout the
early nineteenth century and continuing to the present exemplified this
fascination by employing various forms of evolutionary theory to generate their
theories and inspire their research. A number of these thinkers derived their
ideas from the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck and the English
naturalist Charles Darwin.
In the next section, I briefly outline some of the ways scientists,
philosophers used Lamarck’s, and Darwin’s ideas as means of explaining human
thought, behavior, and emotions. Then, I describe the science of evolutionary
psychology as practiced today. Third, I provide a history of the rise of
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evolutionary psychology. Fourth, I explain the conceptual, material, and social
practices of evolutionary psychologists. Finally, I elucidate psychologists’
boundary-work strategies in reaction to these practices.
Lamarck and Spencer on Behavior
Lamarck’s theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics, also called
Lamarckism, was one of the first evolutionary theories in the nineteenth century
to suggest how one generation of organisms transmits various traits to the next
generation. According to Lamarck, the frequent use of a particular trait
strengthens that trait. Subsequently, the next generation inherits that particular
trait. Lamarck believed the opposite was also true. Traits not used will atrophy as
a result of this disuse and will not appear in the next generation. A classic
example used in many books about evolutionary thought is the giraffe’s neck
(e.g., Bowler, 1989; Mayr, 2001). According to Lamarck’s theory, a side effect of
giraffes stretching their necks to obtain succulent leaves at the tops of trees was
the slight elongation of their necks. The trait of elongated necks passed from one
generation to the next, as giraffes’ neck proceeded to get longer in each new
generation. To Lamarck, a species’ behavior and the free will to carry out that
behavior were the important components for transmitting these traits to
subsequent generations. It was not a giant leap to focus the idea of inherited
characteristics to human evolution. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer
was largely responsible for this move during the nineteenth century.
Spencer used this teleological perspective as a model for how to improve
civilization (Richards, 1987). Spencer believed that, similar to giraffes passing the
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trait of elongated necks to their young, humans could pass desirable behaviors
onto their progeny by engaging in desirable behaviors. He was particularly
interested in the idea of humans passing on mental faculties (e.g., intelligence,
moral standards) that would ensure justice and fair treatment in a society that
would become more and more complex as time passed. Those individuals who
exercised these mental faculties would strengthen them; those faculties not
exercised would atrophy. As the philosopher and historian Robert J. Richards
(1998) suggests of Spencer’s belief in this process, “It would create both
organism and societies of organisms that displayed greater specialization of
parts within an overall integration of functions— more complex organisms and
societies, that is, more progressive and perfect organisms and societies” (p. 596).
If each generation utilized their mental faculties to their fullest potential, this
would improve each successive generation’s society. It is important to note that
Spencer’s idea of society’s progress was a “laissez-faire” perspective. The
historian of biology Peter Bowler (1989) points out that Spencer believed
society’s progress “could not be reached more rapidly through human
interference—the process of social development was so complex that it was
better to let nature take its own slow course” (p. 227).
August Weismann’s (1882) germ plasm theory of heredity and
experiments with rats effectively disproved Lamarckism as a viable explanatory
process for evolving organisms. Weismann severed rats’ tails and bred them to
see if this acquired characteristic would appear in future generations. There was
no such characteristic in the following generations. Subsequently, this led to the
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dismissal of Spencer’s ideas on social progress due to their inherent Lamarckian
tone. 16
Darwin and His Followers in Psychology
Despite these ideas concerning the nature of humans and their societal
progress, it really was not until Charles Darwin addressed the issues of human
psychology that psychologists began using evolution as a viable means of
understanding the individual and their relationship to the social world. Darwin
spent little time discussing humans in the Origin o f Species (1859/1964), but in
the final chapter Darwin argues for a new interpretation of human psychology
stating, “In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches.
Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary
acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be
thrown on the origin of man and his history” (p. 488). It was not until The Descent
of Man (1871/1981) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872/1998) that Darwin began to explore fully the implications of evolution by
natural selection on human psychology. In The Descent, Darwin proposes the
idea that humans descended from other animals. In addition, Darwin argues that
animals possess mental faculties similar to those found in humans. Dogs, for
instance, possess a form of intelligence that is not qualitatively, but quantitatively
different from human intelligence. By doing this, Darwin created a bridge

16 Lamarckism occasionally reappears in one form or another. For instance, the late
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1998) argues that Lamarckism is an appropriate metaphor for
cultural change from one generation to the next. Each generation transmits its cultural heritage
through things such as books, buildings, and tools. On occasion, ideas or lifestyles amalgamate
and these amalgamations are transmitted to subsequent generations.
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between humans and other species so that studying “lower” forms of life would
provide some insight into “higher” forms of life. In The Expression, Darwin
extends the application of natural selection to human emotions by studying the
facial expressions of humans and other species. He argues that emotional
qualities were continuous between species and that human emotions were
inherited adaptations from a common ancestor that had ensured our species’
survival. The study of human facial expressions, emotions, and their relationship
to our evolutionary history continues to this day (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Keltner &
Buswell, 1996; Neese, 1990). Paul Ekman (2002), for instance, carries on
Darwin’s work by examining people’s “microexpressions” and how these may
indicate whether a person is being truthful in a conversation.
Galton’s Hereditarian Theories
During and after Darwin’s life several other figures contributed to the role
of evolutionary theory in psychology. The English polymath and Darwin’s cousin,
Francis Galton, used Darwin’s theory as inspiration for his ideas on eminence
and genius, in addition to his development of eugenics (Gillham, 2001; Sweeney,
2001). Galton conducted research on eminent relatives, twins, and adopted
children in an attempt to verify his belief in the inheritance of mental
characteristics (e.g., intellect, swiftness of thought). Furthermore, Galton
contended that these mental characteristics could be selectively bred within a
society. Similar to Spencer, Galton believed that the better the mental
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characteristics of the individuals, the more society could improve. This led to his
advocacy of “positive” eugenics for improving society.17
The Comparative Psychologists
Many comparative psychologists in the late nineteenth century attempted
to use natural selection, Lamarckism, or a combination of the two, to contend that
our species’ intelligence could direct the process of human evolution. For
instance, the British naturalist and close friend to Darwin, George Romanes,
continued to extend Darwin’s ideas on the continuity between human and animal
reasoning abilities (Watson & Evans, 1991). The British psychologist Conway
Lloyd Morgan believed that humans could use their intelligence—something that
he believed was a distinctly human quality—to choose adaptations that would
benefit our survival (Richards, 1987). Those who chose their behaviors correctly
would survive more often than those who chose their behaviors incorrectly.
James, Baldwin, and Hall
Psychologists William James, James Mark Baldwin, and G. Stanley Hall
used various evolutionary ideas to support their own views. Darwin’s materialist
philosophy inspired James because he believed that by adopting it psychologists
could move away from metaphysical supposition (Burkhardt & Bowers, 1981).
Much of the framework for James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology and the
functionalist perspective James played a part in developing, was inspired by

17 Positive eugenics is the idea of selecting appropriate mates for reproduction for the purpose of
improving society. This contrasts with “negative” eugenics, which was the idea that unfit
individuals (e.g., poor, mentally retarded) should be prevented from procreating often through
such means as forced sterilization.
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Darwin’s work. James argued that consciousness, emotions, and instincts were
undoubtedly the product of evolution by natural selection and used Darwin’s
studies as support for this hypothesis.
Baldwin (1901), like Spencer and Morgan before him, believed that the
transmission of cultural practices—via learning—from generation to generation
was an important factor in the evolution of humans. Baldwin favored the idea of
“organic selection,” also called the Baldwin effect. Organic selection indicated
that the learning process might help protect some of an individual’s physical
characteristics long enough for them to vary and eventually be selected
(Richards, 1987). Even though the idea of transmission via cultural practices was
similar to the ideas of Morgan and Spencer, Baldwin insisted that organic
selection was random rather than a teleological process.
Hall’s “genetic” psychology was inspired by Ernst Haeckel’s
recapitulationist theory— ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Cravens & Burnham,
1971; Gould, 1977). Haeckel was one of Darwin’s most ardent supporters in
Germany and Hall used his recapitulation theory of species development as a
means to explain the mental development of children. Hall believed that, much
like a child’s physical development from early evolutionary forms, a child’s mental
development progresses through stages that mimic human evolutionary history
(Benjamin & Baker, 2004).
The Intelligence Testers
In the spirit of Galton, Robert Yerkes, Lewis Terman, and Henry Goddard
used natural selection throughout the early twentieth century to support their
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beliefs in eugenics practices. Social Darwinism, the use of evolutionary theory to
support political and economic practices, was common throughout the early
1900s (Minton, 1987). These psychologists developed intelligence tests that
coincided with immigration restrictions, involuntary sterilization, and
incarcerations of those deemed “unfit” or too dangerous to improve society
(Kamin, 1974; Sweeney, 2001). As I stated in Chapter 2, the military used these
intelligence tests during the war to separate candidates based on their scores.
The intelligence testing movement also fostered racial discrimination practices
within this country.
Ethology
After the “Modern Synthesis” in evolutionary biology, the biologists Konrad
Lorenz and Nicholis Tinbergen developed ethology, which is the study of the
origins and functions of animal behavior. Lorenz (1952) and Tinbergen (1951)
studied the evolutionary function of fixed action patterns and imprinting of such
species as ducks, geese, and stickleback fish. In 1973, Lorenz and Tinbergen,
along with Karl von Frisch shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology for their research
on animal behavior. The study of ethology fell into disuse as it became apparent
that few ethologists could make their research relevant for understanding
humans (Plotkin, 2004). It was not until sociobiology came onto the scene that
the Modern Synthesis shed light on humans. I will return to sociobiology later in
the chapter.
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Recent Uses of Darwin’s Theory
There are many other examples of the uses of evolutionary theory for
understanding some of what psychologists study. For instance, the philosopher
Susan Blackmore (1999; 2000) recently proposed that the transmission of
information from one generation to the next can be modeled after Darwin’s theory
of selection. She calls these pieces of information “memes,” which represent
ideas, behaviors, instructions, or any other information that is passed on to
others. The psychologist Donald Campbell (1975) proposed a similar idea with
his “evolutionary epistemology” for understanding our moral traditions from a
selectionist perspective. Campbell believed that our current moral structure
derived from a process of random variation in moral activity and our subsequent
selection of appropriate moral conduct among these varieties.
The Decline of Evolutionary Thought in Psychology
In a certain respect then, the idea of an “evolutionary” psychology was not
shocking to psychologists when the interdisciplinary evolutionary psychologists
began to publish their ideas in the middle 1980s. There are some who consider
Darwin the first “evolutionary psychologist,” while others, like the behavioral
geneticist Henry Plotkin (2004) believe James Mark Baldwin the first. These uses
of evolutionary theory to explain humans and their interactions in the world
represent relatively independent and isolated attempts at bringing evolutionary
theory to bear on psychological phenomena. There was no attempt to organize
these ideas into a common theoretical framework and language. Similarly, there
were no professional organizations or content-specific journals for evolutionary
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interpretations of psychological functioning. Evolutionary psychology had not yet
become “professionalized” or “institutionalized” within the discipline. Plotkin
typifies this problem by his remarks on Baldwin: “He had no disciples, no
followers or converts who spread the word and formed a school of thought.
Eighty years were to pass before that was to happen, and then it owed nothing at
all to Baldwin’s work” (p. 123).
Another factor involved in the general decline of evolutionary perspectives
in psychology was the rise in popularity of cultural explanations of behavior,
originating in the work of the cultural anthropologist Franz Boas in the early
1900s. Boas’s work continued through students such as Ruth Benedict and later
by Margaret Mead. Studies by these individuals brought into question the
dominance of evolutionary explanations of human capacities. Instead, Boas and
others argued that one’s culture plays a significant role in development.
Accompanying this cultural relativism, the 1950s through the 1970s were a time
of civil unrest, protests, and the questioning of authority, typified by the Civil
Rights movement, gay liberation, and feminist movements (Zinn, 1999). All of
these factors brought into question the validity of genetic determinism.
It was the middle 1970s to the middle 1980s that brought about a revival in
evolutionary thinking in psychology, first through sociobiology and subsequently
through evolutionary psychology. But this revival brought with it controversies
about race, equality, and freedom that had been bubbling under the surface for
the past thirty years on two fronts: scientific and political. Encapsulating this
tension, Pascal Boyer and Jutta Heckhausen (2000), suggest that evolutionary
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psychology is “arguably one of the most important new developments in the
behavioral sciences over the past 20 years. It is also most controversial” (p. 917).
Outline of Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology is an interdisciplinary program fostered on
understanding the mind from an adaptationist perspective. The adaptationist
perspective attempts to explain the functional role of human information and
decision making processes (Daly & Wilson, 1995). The evolutionary psychologist
David Buss and his colleagues (1998) contend that adaptations are “inherited
and reliably developing characteristics that came into existence as a feature of a
species through natural selection because it helped to directly or indirectly
facilitate reproduction during the period of its evolution” (p. 535). Examples of
adaptations are ubiquitous in nature. For instance, the hollow bone structure of
bird wings is an adaptation for thermoregulation. The particular configuration of
colors on moth’s wings is an adaptation that provides protective camouflage from
potential predators. The human eye’s response to light and dark—the opening
and closing of the pupil and the firing of rods and cones—are adaptations for
perceiving visual stimuli in varying conditions of light.
The adaptationist perspective forms the boundaries of the research
evolutionary psychologists conduct. This perspective was largely influenced by
David Marr’s (1982) functional approach to the visual system. Basically, Marr
asked the question: What problem must be solved for each structure and process
in the visual system? From there he reasoned that the human eyes’ adaptations
solved particular spatial and perceptual problems for humans interacting in their
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environment. Evolutionary psychologists believe that all human adaptations
occurred in what they call the environment o f evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).
They identify the EEA as the Pleistocene era in which humans flourished for two
million years as hunter-gatherers (e.g., Barkow, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Most contend that, due to the great lengths of time needed for adaptations to
occur, there have been no further human adaptations since this time. Leda
Cosmides and her colleagues (1992) argue that “our ancestors spent the last two
million years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers...and...the few thousand years
since the scattered appearance of agriculture is only a small stretch in
evolutionary terms... For that reason, it is unlikely that new complex designs
could evolve in so few generations” (p. 5). They reason that the problems
humans had to have solved during this time were those concerned with basic
needs such as food, shelter, mating, and bartering for goods and services.
Definitions of Evolutionary Psychology
Various evolutionary psychologists have attempted to define their field’s
program of research and there is considerable agreement about the purpose of
evolutionary psychology and the importance of the adaptationist perspective
between these definitions. Before going into these definitions, there are a few
issues with terminology that need addressing. First, evolutionary psychologists
frequently use the term “mind” to mean anything that the brain does, this is, the
functions of the brain. Secondly, they often use the term “psychological
mechanism,” which they also refer to as “information-processing mechanism”
and “Darwinian algorithms.” Psychological mechanisms are units in the brain that
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process specific pieces of information coming from the environment that helped
humans solve a constrained range of problems that we faced in our ancestral
environment.18 Most evolutionary psychologists believe humans possess a large
number of these mechanisms that today assist us, and sometimes impede us, in
solving specific problems in our modern world. For instance, Cosmides (1989)
proposed that humans possess a “cheater detection” mechanism that allows us
to analyze social exchanges of goods and services and to detect those who may
receive benefits from this exchange without having to pay a cost (i.e., someone
who is potentially cheating in the social exchange). The idea of psychological
mechanisms is inspired, in part, by “modular” theories of mind espoused by
individuals such as the philosopher Jerry Fodor (1983) and the linguist Noam
Chomsky (1984).19
In terms of the general agreement of evolutionary psychologists at
defining their field, I present three definitions that I believe are typical of the ones
found in the evolutionary psychology literature. Louise Barrett, Robin Dunbar,
and John Lycett (2002) define evolutionary psychology as a science that
“identifies the selection pressures that have shaped the human psyche over the
course of evolutionary time, and then tests whether our psychological
mechanisms actually show the features one would expect if they were designed

18 Evolutionary psychologists are not specific about where these psychological mechanisms exist
in the brain. Psychological mechanisms are, to a certain extent, spatially ambiguous.
19 Neither Fodor nor Chomsky seem particularly open to the ideas of evolutionary psychologists.
Fodor (2000; 2000) has brought into question some of the findings of evolutionary psychologists
who support modularity of mind and Chomsky seems reluctant to attribute evolutionary processes
to his universal grammar module (Pinker, 1994).
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to solve these particular adaptive problems” (p. 10). Leda Cosmides, John Tooby,
and Jerome Barkow (1992) define evolutionary psychology as:
Psychology that is informed by the additional knowledge that evolutionary
biology has to offer, in the expectation that understanding the process that
designed the human mind will advance the discovery of its
architecture...and by focusing on the evolved information-processing
mechanisms that comprise the human mind, supplies the necessary
connection between evolutionary biology and the complex, irreducible
social and cultural phenomena studied by anthropologists, sociologists,
economists, and historians, (p. 3)
Catrin Rode and Xiao Wang (2000) describe evolutionary psychology as a “new
approach to psychology [that] uses knowledge and principles from modern
Darwinian theories in research of the human mind. In this view, the mind consists
of a rich array of information-processing mechanisms that were designed by
natural selection to solve adaptive problems that were recurrent in hominid
evolution” (p. 926).
In summary then, evolutionary psychology is an interdisciplinary field that
searches for a mesh between current function and past adaptations to common
problems found in our ancestral history. By positing specific adaptive problems
faced by our ancestors, evolutionary psychologists can test for domain-specific
functions in our information processing capacities.
In line with these definitions, David Buss (1999) outlines four essential
questions that evolutionary psychologists attempt to ask as they carry out their
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research. The first question they attempt to answer pertains to identifying the
causal processes that designed the human mind. What were the types of
environments humans had to face that fundamentally shaped our brains? The
second question on which they focus is how the human mind was designed the
way that it was. How is it that the human mind possesses certain faculties and
abilities but not others? Another question pertains to the function of the mind.
What are the major functions of the parts of the brain and how do they work
together? Finally, they ask questions of a perceptual nature. How does the mind
interpret stimuli from the environment and use this information to produce
behavior?
These definitions and the questions evolutionary psychologists attempt to
answer demonstrate the departure from past research on the relationship
between evolutionary theory and psychology. The main difference between the
newer and older versions is that the newer versions of evolutionary psychology
organize around specific objectives. First, the new definitions point to modern
Darwinian theories, implying that evolutionary psychologists consider findings
from modern genetics and evolutionary biology in their own research. Secondly,
there are explicit statements regarding testing hypotheses about our evolutionary
history using data from the present. For instance, evolutionary psychologists may
posit hypotheses about dominance hierarchies in human mating systems that
occurred in our ancestral environment and use data from modern human
subjects to test these hypotheses. Finally, these definitions make the human
mind the focal point for evolutionary psychologists’ investigations.
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History of Evolutionary Psychology
“Evolutionary psychology” is a somewhat misleading title because the
term “psychology” gives one the impression that it is merely a branch or
subdiscipline of psychology. Evolutionary psychology is more than a
subdiscipline. Those scientists considered evolutionary psychologists come from
an array of disciplines including evolutionary biology, cultural anthropology,
psychology, sociology, sociobiology, and ethology. Because of evolutionary
psychology’s recent origins, the usual archival sources for a comprehensive
history are ill-formed or absent. Nevertheless, I attempt to put the available
pieces together to form a tentative sketch of how evolutionary psychology came
to be in order to make my arguments about psychologists’ boundary-work in
response to this program.
Evolutionary psychology developed as an interdisciplinary program in the
late 1980s when many scientists broke away from the discipline of sociobiology.
According to the sociologist Ullica Segerstrale (2000), the break away from
sociobiology arose mainly for political reasons. The political controversy began
with the publication of Harvard University entomologist Edward O. Wilson’s
(1975) Sociobiology. Wilson defined sociobiology as:
...the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior. For the
present, it focuses on animal societies, their population structure, castes,
and communication, together with all of the physiology underlying the
social adaptations. But the discipline is also concerned with the social

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

behavior of early man and the adaptive features of organization in the
more primitive contemporary human societies, (p. 4)
In the book, Wilson argues that genes are essential for the production of
social behaviors. The main controversy centers on the final chapter where Wilson
discusses the implications of genes in determining human social behavior.
Wilson’s “genocentric” perspective of human social behavior in Sociobiology
caused considerable controversy. By Wilson’s (1994) own account, numerous
factions found its fundamental framework to be too deterministic. The
controversy stemmed from the belief that sociobiologists were ostensibly
justifying acts such as rape, spousal abuse, and numerous other forms of
aggression through their belief in genetic determinism. A group of students and
professors calling themselves the Sociobiology Study Group (SSG) formed just
before the publication of Wilson’s book to respond to his claims (Segerstrale,
2000). Members included Stephen Jay Gould, Ruth Benedict, and Richard
Lewontin. For some of these critics, sociobiology heralded a new form of social
Darwinism. For instance, in a New York Times Review o f Books in 1975 the SSG
(1978) issued this statement:
These theories provided an important basis for the enactment of
sterilization laws and restrictive immigration laws by the United States
between 1910 and 1930 and also for the eugenics policies which led to
the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany. The latest attempts
to reinvigorate these tired theories comes with the alleged creation of a
new discipline, sociobiology, (p. 20)
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Perhaps the most well-known, and public, response to sociobiology came on
February 15th, 1978 in Washington when Wilson was to deliver a talk on
sociobiology for the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS). Protesters from the International Committee Against Racism showed up
to protest and one of them ran to the front and poured water on Wilson’s head
exclaiming that he was “all wet” (Wilson, 1994).20
Scientists interested in the implications of evolutionary thought on human
mind and behavior moved away from the politically charged sociobiologists and
created the title “evolutionary psychology” in the early to middle 1980s. Changing
names seemed to divert some, but not all, of the controversy. Philosopher Val
Dusek (2000), a major critic of sociobiology, observed that evolutionary
psychology “arose two decades later as a more muted and explicitly non-racist
replacement for sociobiology” (p. 556). In the span between the publication of
Wilson’s book and the beginnings of evolutionary psychology, the political
tensions seemed to abate, and, in fact, there appeared to be a general shift in
consciousness towards the acceptance of biologically determined behavior.
Dusek (1999) outlined five factors that may have contributed to this general shift
towards biological thinking. First, people were attracted to the potential medical
and economic benefits genetic research had to offer. Second, Derek Freeman’s
(1983) critique of Margaret Mead’s analysis of Samoan culture brought cultural
relativism into question. Another factor was the Minnesota twin studies, which
20 Val Dusek (1999) was present at the 1978 AAAS meeting and retold the story from a different
perspective. He noted that most of the protesters were African-Americans and after the black
woman poured water over Wilson’s head, he exclaimed that it felt as if an aborigine had speared
him. Most accounts of the event have glaringly omitted Wilson’s statement.
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reincarnated the idea that genetics had a much ignored role in people’s
intelligence and personality. Fourth, brain imaging technology began to
demonstrate sex differences in the brain. Lastly, the ongoing “discovery” of
genes for particular characteristics such as bipolar disorder and homosexuality
was an attractive explanation to many. These factors worked in favor of
evolutionary psychologists. Society was ready to accept a more deterministic and
biological view of humans during the 1980s than it was in the 1970s. This shift in
attitude played a role in the acceptance of evolutionary psychologists’ practices.
Conceptual Practices
Evolutionary psychologists brought many “new” concepts and theories to
bear on existing psychological phenomena such as the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness, long and short term mating strategies, cheaterdetection algorithms, parental investment theory, the paternity uncertainty
hypothesis, and reciprocal altruism.21 To do this, they co-opted ideas from
influential evolutionary biologists such as William Hamilton, George Williams, and
Robert Trivers to foster their credibility. Hamilton’s (1964) kin selection or
inclusive fitness theory, Williams’ (1966) requirements for adaptations, and
Trivers’ (1971) reciprocal altruism theory all were brought into psychology as
tools for evolutionary psychologists’ investigations. Leda Cosmides, a
psychologist, and John Tooby, an anthropologist, both from the University of
California at Santa Barbara, were two of evolutionary psychology’s most ardent

21 While many of these concepts and theories were new to psychologists, they were, to a certain
extent, old to sciences like evolutionary biology.
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spokespeople. They, along with anthropologist Jerome Barkow, called for a
“conceptual integration” in psychology whereby the “behavioral and social
sciences should make themselves mutually consistent and consistent with what
is known in the natural sciences” (1992, p. A) 22 In doing this they critiqued, what
they called, the “standard social science model” in psychology, believing it
“suffers from a series of major defects that make it a profoundly misleading
framework” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 2). At the heart of the standard social
science model, at least as evolutionary psychologists conceive it, is the belief
held in the social sciences that the human mind is initially a tabula rasa that,
based on experiences within the environment, forms our cognitive abilities and
behavioral repertoire. According to Cosmides and other evolutionary
psychologists, they were fighting to supplant the naive model of human
psychological functioning that had been popular for at least a century.
Evolutionary psychologists follow closely the standard methods of
statistics and data analysis traditionally used by psychologists. Evolutionary
psychologists commonly employed analytic techniques such as analysis of
variance, bivariate and multiple regression, and t-tests. These and other methods
provided evolutionary psychologists with the analytic tools they needed to
conduct their experimental and correlational studies. Similarly, their research
methods included questionnaires, self-reports, experimental manipulations, and
naturalistic observations. While some advocates of evolutionary psychology used

22 E. O. Wilson (1998) in his book Consilience also advocated this kind of conceptual integration.
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archeological data, field studies, and fossil records, the psychologists of
evolutionary psychology did not employ these methods.
Material Practices
One relatively innovative material practice of some evolutionary
psychologists was the way they conducted experimental procedures on the
computer. For instance, in a study about physical attractiveness, Victor Johnston
and Melissa Franklin (1993) developed a computer program that could morph
facial features in pictures so their participants could “evolve” the faces on the
computer screen.23 Similar programs were used to measure body type
preferences by manipulating a body’s waist-to-hip ratio (Singh, 1993). The
utilization of these types of programs obviates the need of random samples of
humans to generate the various faces and body types. Instead, computer
software creates an almost infinite number of samples with various physical
characteristics. Nevertheless, this procedure does not eliminate the need for
participants in psychological studies.
Because evolutionary psychologists follow closely the methodology of
psychologists, they did not introduce many other material practices into the
discipline. For instance, Cosmides (1989; 1992) used the Wason selection task—
a task traditionally used for reasoning research—to test her theories about social
exchange and the cheater detection mechanism. Jeffery Simpson and Stephen
Gangstead (1990; 1991) developed the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, which

231should note, however, that Francis Galton used composite photography, a similar albeit less
modern procedure, in order to identify features such as criminal types and people suffering from
various diseases.
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measures the willingness of individuals to engage in sexual behavior in the
absence of exclusive relationships. But this inventory was used for a relatively
small number of studies, mostly by the two creators, and was not frequently used
elsewhere due to its poor reliability. Similarly, other evolutionary psychologists
created various questionnaires for their research but nothing that would
constitute a significant material practice that was new to the discipline.
Social Practices
The social practices of evolutionary psychologists are similar in form to the
social practices of my other two case studies. The social practices of evolutionary
psychologists take the form of professionalizing their interdisciplinary program
and the rhetorical strategies they employed to persuade psychologists and the
public of the viability of evolutionary psychology. In terms of professionalization,
evolutionary psychologists established journals, created professional societies,
held conferences, and developed funding resources. In terms of their rhetorical
strategies, many evolutionary psychologists touted their field as a new paradigm
for psychology and continued their efforts to disengage from the shadow of
sociobiology.
Evolutionary psychologists founded The Human Behavior and Evolution
Society (HBES) on October 29th, 1988 at the University of Michigan. Participants
at a national conference on Evolution, Psychology, and Psychiatry voted to
create the organization, decided on a name for the society, elected the first
officers, and created the society’s constitution. The University of Michigan
Evolution and Human Behavior Program sponsored the conference. In 1989,
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HBES held its first independent conference in Evanston, Illinois at Northwestern
University. The evolutionary biologist William D. Hamilton was the society’s first
president. Interestingly, the keynote speaker for the first conference was E. O.
Wilson who, as Segerstrale (2000) reported, took them to task for not calling
HBES the Society for Human Sociobiology. According to Constance Holden
(1996), who covered the story in Science, Wilson “chastised the group
for...displaying a ‘failure of nerve’—caving in to critics who still label sociobiology
as ‘racist and determinist’” (p. 15). Holden reported that HBES members thought
the new name of the society was more appropriate for their goals. Nicholas
Blurton-Jones, an anthropologist attending the conference stated, “Sociobiology
raised too many hackles and got us into too much trouble" (p. 1 5)24 Establishing
HBES helped this interdisciplinary program create distance from sociobiology.
Even though “human behavior” and “evolution” in the HBES name encapsulated
what sociobiology was all about, these seemed to be less threatening terms.
In 1994, HBES took over the reigns of publishing responsibilities of the
journal Ethology and Sociobiology, but by 1996 had changed the name of the
journal to Evolution and Human Behavior. Dusek (2000) describes this change of
names as strategic. Academics tended to associate “ethology” in the title of the
journal with Konrad Lorenz and his eugenics beliefs and Nazi sympathies.
Wilson’s reputed racism made the term “sociobiology” problematic in the title. Not
only did the new title foster continuity between the society and the journal, but it
24 After the publication of Holden’s brief announcement of the journal change, twelve scientists
aligned with sociobiology, including notables like Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and Marc Hauser, penned
their names to a brief report (1996) about the contributions sociobiologists made to such fields as
women’s studies, art, philosophy, botany, and psychology.
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also assisted in further distancing evolutionary psychology from sociobiology.
Calling the society HBES and changing the name of their journal seemed to help
the society’s membership as academics joined the Society from a diverse array
of scientific and humanities professions including biology, medicine, economics,
literature, law, and art.
HBES provided opportunities for psychologists to interact with scientists
from numerous other disciplines outside its own boundaries. Through the
society’s annual conferences, other scientists exposed psychologists to the
recent findings in evolution research. These conferences served not only as a
physical space to hear about new research, but also to extend the
communication networks of psychologists for potential research collaborations
and funding opportunities. Additionally, Evolution and Human Behavior provided
a venue for psychologists to publish research specifically pertaining to
adaptations in human mind and behavior.
Evolutionary psychologists also engaged in rhetorical strategies beyond
the ones just discussed. The rhetoric of evolutionary psychologists was a
powerful and persuasive component in their arsenal. With their discourse came
the backing of “harder” sciences like biology and a powerful scientific icon:
Charles Darwin. Evolutionary psychologists and some popular science writers
were claiming that evolutionary psychology was a new way of thinking about
psychological phenomena that would usurp the standard social science model
discussed earlier. There were many claims that evolutionary psychology would
become the paradigm in psychology. In The Moral Animal, one of the popularized
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accounts of evolutionary psychology, the science writer Robert Wright (1994)
dramatically expressed this idea:
The new Darwinian social scientists [evolutionary psychologists] are
fighting a doctrine that has dominated their fields for much of this century:
the idea that biology doesn’t matter much—that the uniquely malleable
human mind, together with the unique force of culture, has severed our
behavior from its evolutionary roots; that there is no inherent human
nature driving human events, but that, rather, our essential nature is to be
driven, (p. 5)
Wright continued his discourse by calling evolutionary psychology “revolutionary”
and set the stage for his readers to believe that evolutionary psychologists have
struggled, paid their dues, and are now ready to create a paradigm shift in the
sciences: “In many ways, what is now happening fits Thomas Kuhn’s description
of a ‘paradigm shift’.. .A group of mainly young scholars have challenged the
settled worldview of their elders, met with bitter resistance, persevered, and
begun to flourish” (p. 6).
Psychologists, not just science writers, adopted this strategy in their work.
For instance, Jeffery Simpson (1995) proclaimed evolutionary psychology as a
“new paradigm whose time has come.” David Buss (1995) called evolutionary
psychology a “new paradigm” and a “metatheory” in addition to proposing that
the field could “dissolve” or “cross” disciplinary boundaries in psychology as long
as psychologists embraced the adaptationist perspective. Peggy Cerra and
Robert Kurzban (1995) contended that evolutionary psychology would provide
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bridges between disciplines such as anthropology, economics, literature, and
neuroscience. By making these claims, advocates of evolutionary psychology
attempted to place their field on the same footing as other putative paradigm
shifts such as Copernicus’ heliocentric theory and Einstein’s theory of general
relativity.
Evolutionary psychologists brought their varied practices into the discipline
of psychology. How did traditional psychologists react to these practices? What
types of boundary-work did psychologists use in response to these practices?
Were evolutionary psychologists and their ideas readily accepted, or did they
meet resistance from psychologists? The next two sections deal with
psychologists’ resistances and accommodations to evolutionary psychologists’
practices.
Resistances to Evolutionary Psychology
Certain psychologists as well as various philosophers, feminist scholars,
biologists, and other scientists questioned the validity of the practices of
evolutionary psychologists during the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, psychologists
criticizing evolutionary psychology often relied on arguments set forth by
philosophers and other scientists as ammunition for their boundary-work. But
evolutionary psychology, due to its relative newness to psychology and its
interdisciplinary nature, posed problems for those trying to prevent evolutionary
psychologists from using their theories to explain psychological phenomena.
The philosopher Paul Davies (1996b) articulated the difficulty in resisting
the tenets of evolutionary psychology when he proposed that “criticizing
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evolutionary psychology is no simple matter. The difficulty is not that evolutionary
psychology enjoys especial power or plausibility, but rather that it is not yet a
well-articulated form of inquiry” (p. 559). For instance, there are numerous
debates within the evolutionary sciences pertaining to the appropriate
mechanism(s) of evolution (e.g., Gould, 2002; Mayr, 2001; Williams, 1966). Does
evolution occur strictly by Darwinian natural selection? Or are processes like
mutations and genetic drift or a combination of all three responsible?
Furthermore, there are questions about the appropriate level at which evolution
occurs. Does evolution occur at the level of genes, which many evolutionary
psychologists argue is the case? Or does evolution occur either at the level of
individual organisms or at the species level? Accompanying the ambiguities of
evolutionary theory, as Davies suggested, evolutionary psychology is still a new
field and as a new field, there are still too few studies demonstrating the reliability
and validity of its theories.
Dusek (2000) suggested another criticism along these lines. Fie argues
that evolutionary psychologists are not experts in molecular biology—especially
the psychologists—but despite this, they still use the “harder” sciences as
justification for their ideas. It is difficult to acquire a sense of trust and expertise in
evolutionary psychologists when their lack of training is apparent. Often, when
others attack their ideas, evolutionary psychologists will resort to calling the
critic(s) cultural relativists. For instance, in David Buss’ (2003) account of his
early research into sexual strategies, he described the dominant theories of
psychology as being comprised of “social learning, socialization, and arbitrary
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social roles—all precursors of social constructionism [italics added]” (p. 219). In
How the Mind Works, Steven Pinker (1997) frequently attacked the humanities
and their poststructuralist, deconstructionist, and postmodernist perspectives as
being extreme views.
One of the main resistances that came from psychologists was that
evolutionary psychologists’ explanations of psychological mechanism were
nothing more than “just so stories” (Gannon, 2002; Rose & Rose, 2000;
Schlinger, 1996). The phrase derives from the Rudyard Kipling book of the same
name that contained outrageous stories to explain the functionality of things such
as how leopards got their spots. In an evolutionary context, “just so stories”
represent post hoc rationales for supposed adaptations. Psychologists used
arguments developed by Steven Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) in
support of their contention. The thrust of Gould and Lewontin’s position is that it
is difficult to disentangle true adaptations from mere byproducts of the
evolutionary process. Some behavior or structure may appear at first to be an
adaptation, but in fact, may be nothing more than a chance mutation. For
instance, birds’ hollow bone structure at first appears to be an adaptation for
flight, however biologists have demonstrated that these hollow bones were
employed first for thermoregulation and the ability to fly is a mere byproduct of
that evolutionary process.
From this standpoint, evolutionary psychologists’ belief in humans
possessing multiple psychological mechanisms that arose as adaptations from
our time in the Pleistocene age proves problematic. As the psychologist Linda
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Gannon (2002) expressed in her critique of evolutionary psychology: “Labeling
certain traits and behaviors adaptations and others by-products is arbitrary since
a methodology has not been developed with which to determine if a trait or
behavior is a direct adaptation of a by-product of other evolved traits” (p. 150). As
there is no definitive method for identifying adaptations, especially about
psychological phenomena, it is difficult to believe evolutionary psychologists who
propose adaptations for psychological phenomena such as social exchange
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), mate selection (Buss, 1994), language (Pinker &
Bloom, 1992), dominance hierarchies (Cummins, 1999), and rape (Thornhill &
Thornhill, 1990). Unlike bones, psychological phenomena leave no fossil records,
making it difficult to infer present functions from past events.
Accompanying the critique of adaptations, psychologists resisted
evolutionary psychologists’ adaptationist perspective on another front. Social
psychologist Shawn Meghan Burn (1996) pointed out that the adaptationist
perspective fails to consider processes other than evolution (e.g., cultural norms)
as viable means of assessing experimental outcomes. Burn analyzed
evolutionary social psychologist Douglas Kenrick and colleagues’ (1990)
research on earning capacity. Kenrick and his colleagues found that women
rated men’s earning capacity as higher than men did in searching for potential
mates. They concluded that their findings provided evidence for an adapted
difference between men and women. Men seek women who are young and
attractive because this is an indication of a woman’s fertility. Women seek men
with large quantities of material resources (i.e., money, power) because this
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ensures support for both the woman and their children. Burn criticized their
findings because they failed to consider cultural factors. Burn suggested these
findings “could be due to the fact that both women and men know that women’s
earning potentials are lower and so they both look to men to be the dominant
wage earners. It could be due to social norms that communicate to men and
women that a man’s value is determined in part by his earning power” (p. 27).
Psychologists Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood (1999) proffered a similar
criticism about evolutionary psychologists’ research results. One of the
“landmark” studies in evolutionary psychology during the late 1980s was David
Buss’ (1989b) study of differences in mate preferences. Buss studied mate
preferences in 37 cultures and questioned more than 10,000 individuals. Similar
to Kenrick’s results, his research indicated that men on average would look for
mates with good reproductive potential and women would look for mates with
good resource potential. He believed that these differences were a product of the
adapted problems males and females had to solve during the Pleistocene era.
This is exactly the kind of study evolutionary psychologists’ found attractive. It
contained a large sample size—for psychological research—and it crossed
cultural boundaries. This appeared to be strong evidence for a universal human
nature, at least for mate selection preferences. Eagly and Wood took Buss’ data
and tested hypotheses from the perspective that gender differences in mate
selection would be made on the basis of female and male social roles within a
political and economic structure. Buss’ data confirmed their hypotheses. Eagly
and Wood suggested that the social role theory could be empirically tested
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because the roles males and females adopt today can be examined, unlike Buss’
suppositions about our ancestral environment, which cannot be examined. The
developmental psychologist Annette Karmiloff-Smith (2000) also questioned the
validity of evolutionary psychologists’ findings on psychological mechanisms,
calling it the “Swiss Army knife" approach. Karmiloff-Smith suggested that there
simply is not enough evidence to state definitively that mechanisms for higher
cognitive processes exist. Instead, she argued that what evolution did do for our
brains was allow it to modify continually its structure in response to
environmental demands, thus making it appear that humans possess
psychological mechanisms.
Another way that psychologists resisted the introduction of evolutionary
psychologists’ practices into the discipline pertains to the political ramifications of
evolutionary psychologists’ research on gender differences. Eagly (1995), for
instance, claimed that gender differences research conducted by evolutionary
psychologists may be used “in far less beneficial ways by misogynist forces in
society” (p. 155). Gender differences research could possibly lead to different
standards of education for males and females. Another possible ramification of
believing too much in evolutionary psychologists’ research is that their findings
seemed to justify the “glass ceiling”—the invisible barrier in businesses and
organizations that prevent women from attaining high status and high paying jobs.
Resistances to evolutionary psychology came mostly from feminist
psychologists who believed that culture plays a more important role than
evolution in explaining psychological phenomena. To a certain extent,
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evolutionary psychologists met minimal resistance when introducing their various
practices into the discipline. Psychologists directed their resistances towards
evolutionary psychologists’ research conclusions. But questioning research
conclusions is a common practice in all fields of psychology. In fact, most
resistance to evolutionary psychology came from outside the discipline of
psychology as is seen in critiques by philosophers (e.g., Davies, 1996a; Jerry
Fodor, 2000), various scientists in the biological sciences (Fausto-Sterling, 1997;
Gould, 1991), and science journalists (e.g., Tierney, 2002). One possible reason
for this minimal resistance may be that evolutionary psychologists’ own
boundary-work was effective enough to distance their field from the controversy
caused by sociobiology. Evolutionary psychologists did not have to contend with
the excess baggage of sociobiology as they postured for intellectual space in
psychology. Another factor may be that evolutionary psychology’s
interdisciplinary nature helped legitimize the discipline to psychologists. The
psychologists of evolutionary psychology were proposing theories supposedly
backed by disciplines in which most psychologists were unfamiliar or in which
they lacked expertise. Psychologists may not have felt qualified to provide
sufficient resistance to the program. But this lack of resistance indicates
something else that is important in the context of boundary-work. It appears that,
largely, psychologists did not view evolutionary psychologists as pseudo
scientists like parapsychologists or phrenologists, but rather as legitimate
scientists whose theories were debatable and contested within the boundaries of
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the discipline. The next questions I try to answer are how and to what extent did
psychologists accommodate evolutionary psychology?
Accommodations to Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology seemed quite popular within society in the 1990s.
There were numerous articles in newspapers and magazines (e.g., Ferguson,
2001, March 19; Pinker, 1997, October; Wright, 1995, August) and a number of
books written for scientists and the public (e.g., Buss, 1994; Pinker, 1994, 1997;
Ridley, 1996; Wright, 1994), many of them bestsellers. It seems that, in general,
the public accepted the claims of evolutionary psychologists. So how did
psychologists accommodate evolutionary psychology? Despite the resistances I
just described, psychologists made accommodations in numerous subdisciplines
in psychology. One of the ways to examine these accommodations is to look at
the research literature. Did journal editors and review committees allow
evolutionary psychologists to publish in their journals? What kinds of journals
published evolutionary accounts of human behavior? Were these accounts
published in top tier journals with wide readerships or were they relegated to
fringe journals with small readerships and their own content-specific journal,
Evolution and Human Behavior?
Evolutionary psychologists’ published in a wide array of top tiered journals
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Journal like American Psychologist,
Journal for Personality and Social Psychology, Cognition, Behavioral and Brain
Science, and Human Development are but a few of the top tiered journals to
publish evolutionary psychologists’ research. The topics of this research covered
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almost every subdiscipline in psychology including cognition (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Gigerenzer& Hug, 1992), biological psychology (Deacon, 1997), human
development (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Geary & Bjorklund, 2000), personality
(Buss, 1989a; Shackelford & Larsen, 1997), social psychology (Kenrick, Groth,
Trost, & Sadalla, 1993), clinical and abnormal psychology (Cosmides & Tooby,
1999), and the psychology of women (Campbell, 1999). In a similar vein, the
Annual Review o f Psychology, which covers timely issues in more depth than
traditional journals, featured evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1991),.
Another indicator of psychologists’ accommodations for evolutionary
psychologists is through pedagogy. Were there instances of psychologists
incorporating evolutionary psychology into psychology departments, laboratories,
and the instruction of students? It seems that this was the case. There were a
number of places to study evolutionary psychology around the country. The
University of California, Santa Barbara developed a Center for Evolutionary
Psychology that trained graduate students.25 Florida Atlantic University’s
psychology department created a graduate program specializing in evolutionary
psychology. Psychologist Robert Haskell co-founded the New England Institute
of Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology in Maine. While David Buss
was at Harvard University and the University of Michigan, he trained graduate
students in evolutionary psychology.26 The psychology department of the State

251should note that due to the interdisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology, these training
centers were sometimes independent of psychology departments.
26 David Buss now has an evolutionary psychology laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin,
as does the evolutionary social psychologist Norman Li.
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University of New York, Albany formed the Evolution and Human Behavior
Laboratory. Additionally, there were an increasing number of textbooks written for
undergraduate and graduate students pertaining to evolutionary psychology (e.g.,
Badcock, 2000; Buss, 1999; Evans, 2000; Mynatt & Doherty, 1999).
Accompanying this increase in textbooks, psychologists began teaching an
increasing number of classes pertaining to evolutionary psychology. Finally,
some of the top selling introductory textbook authors started covering
evolutionary psychology (e.g., Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg, 1999; Myers,
2001; Tavris & Wade, 2001) and some introductory textbooks have evolutionary
themes running throughout the textbook (e.g., Gray, 1999). In his advocacy of
incorporating evolutionary perspectives into teaching psychology classes Peter
Gray (1996) contended, “We should devote far more attention than we do to
evolutionary theory in our psychology courses. Evolutionary theory is the only
truly integrative theory that psychology can ever have...Evolutionary theory
should be a central component of the introductory course and an integral part of
almost every other course” (p. 207). It appears that many psychologists
responded in the affirmative to Gray’s urgings.
Perhaps the best indicator of psychologists’ accommodations to
evolutionary psychologists’ practices is contained in the book Sex, Power,
Conflict edited by David Buss and psychologist Neil Malamuth (1996). In the
book, Buss and Malamuth solicited evolutionary psychologists and feminist
psychologists to discuss gender differences research. The book contains three
sections divided in the Hegelian tradition of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The
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first section contains evolutionary perspectives on gender differences. Feminist
perspectives on gender differences occupy the second section. In the final
section, authors Felicia Pratto, Barbara Smuts, Malamuth, and Buss respectively
attempt to combine evolutionary and feminist perspectives to reach some kind of
common ground on the controversial issue of gender differences. Since feminist
psychologists were particularly critical of evolutionary psychology, this book
served as a bridge between the two opposing camps.
In summary, psychologists engaged in a great deal of boundary-work as
evolutionary psychologists began appearing in the discipline in the 1980s.
Psychologists questioned the validity of evolutionary approaches to mind and
behavior by attacking their theoretical models and criticizing their interpretations
of data. In addition, they enlisted the aid of philosophers and other scientists to
support their criticisms of evolutionary psychologists. One of the things they did
not resist was the formation of HBES and the development of the Evolution and
Human Behavior journal. In terms of accommodations, evolutionary psychology
seemed to gain in popularity and support from the 1980s to the new millennium.
Journal editors published their research, book companies’ marketed evolutionary
psychology textbooks for undergraduate and graduate students, introductory
textbooks began covering evolutionary psychology as a viable program,
psychology professors began offering classes in the field, and some feminists
and evolutionary psychologists reached a delicate compromise. But
psychologists did not totally accommodate evolutionary psychologists. For
instance, most psychologists did not make attempts to unify psychology under
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the banner of evolutionary psychology. Instead, the status of evolutionary
psychology seemed equivalent to the status of other theories like behaviorism
and cognitive psychology. Including sections on evolutionary psychological
research in various textbooks did not radically change the books’ overall
framework. Textbook authors still placed more coverage on traditional
explanations of topics such as decision-making, relationships, personality traits,
and psychotherapy. There were no attempts to have evolutionary psychology
become a division in the American Psychological Association, though this may
have something to do with its interdisciplinary nature. Finally, I found no accounts
in the literature where a psychologist trained in one theoretical framework, read
about evolutionary psychology and subsequently decided to give up their
research interests and pursue a program of evolutionarily inspired research.
Undoubtedly, this occurred for a few individuals, but it certainly was not a trend.
Nevertheless, I cannot say the same thing about students. Many students
became attracted to evolutionary psychology, whether it was from taking a class,
reading the literature, or working with a professor, during their undergraduate
careers.
Can one consider the story of evolutionary psychology a successful tale of
boundary maneuvering within psychology? From an historical perspective it is
simply too soon to tell. Given that evolutionary psychology is such a young field,
there needs to be more time and distance from the subject in order to obtain an
appropriate perspective.
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CHAPTER IV

COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF THE MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Cognitive science is an amalgamation of scientific disciplines including
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence,
linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy of mind. Cognitive scientists collaborate
in this interdisciplinary endeavor in an attempt to comprehend the phenomenon
of information processing. Beginning in the 1970s, when cognitive science
developed into a truly interdisciplinary program (see, Leahey, 1987; Watson &
Evans, 1991), cognitive scientists came to infringe upon the disciplinary
boundaries of psychology and affected psychologists’ knowledge production
activities through their conceptual, material, and social practices.
Throughout psychology’s history, various psychologists have used
cognitive approaches as a way to understand human mind, behavior, and
emotions. In the late 1800s, German physiologist Hermann Ebbinghaus
(1885/1913) carried out experiments on his own memory capacity by testing his
recall of nonsense syllables. Ebbinghaus’ recall results formed the well-known
forgetting curve that professors today still introduce to students in various
psychology classes. In The Principles o f Psychology, William James (1890)
proclaimed psychology “the study of mental life” and characterized its
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phenomena as “feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like”
(p. 1). In his experimental research, the structuralist E. B. Titchener (1910)
attempted to discern the underlying components of consciousness. Titchener
trained participants in his experiments to introspect on what he believed to be the
foundations of consciousness: sensations, feelings, and images. In the early
1930s the British psychologist Frederick Bartlett (1932) found that memories
constitute reconstructions of events rather than real events.
There exists a pervasive myth found in many textbooks of psychology that
behaviorism “took over” psychology throughout the middle twentieth century, thus
wiping out any mention of things cognitive (e.g., Galotti, 2004; Robinson-Riegler
& Robinson-Riegler, 2004). Philosopher Gary Hatfield (2002) summarizes this
myth stating, “There is a general impression that during the period from 1920 to
the mid 1950s, behaviorism succeeded in driving cognitive topics and cognitive
theoretical notions out of experimental psychology in America” (p. 221). Hatfield
continued his narrative with a more appropriate interpretation: “Although
behaviorism became strong or even dominant in the period 1920-1960, it by no
means was able to stamp out the study of cognition...in American psychology” (p.
221).

In fact, revisionist historians of psychology are now pointing out that there
were psychologists still employing cognitive approaches in their theoretical and
experimental practices during this period (e.g., Greenwood, 1999; e.g., Mandler,
2002). For instance, the neo-behaviorists Edward C. Tolman and Clark L. Hull
were amenable to postulating “internal states” as long as one expressed these
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states operationally as intervening between external stimuli and behavioral action
(Greenwood, 1999). In his research on laboratory rats’ ability to maneuver
around a maze to acquire food and water, Tolman (1948) proposed that, through
a series of trials, rats develop a “cognitive map” of the maze that allows them to
more quickly acquire food and water. The ideas on perception of Gestalt
psychologists like Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffka, and Max Wertheimer,
immigrating to the U.S. during World War II, were decidedly cognitive in nature
(see, Sokal, 1984).
Given these example and many others (e.g., Piaget, 1929), it is apparent
that cognitive perspectives were present from the beginning of psychology’s
disciplinary history and continued through to the present. Also, these examples
demonstrate the vacuity of the myth that behaviorism completely wiped out
cognition as a topic of study in psychology. Psychologists’ familiarity with these
various cognitive perspectives assisted in the acceptance of the practices of
cognitive scientists in the early 1970s. Whether or not psychologists espoused a
cognitive perspective, they were at least acquainted with the study of cognitive
processes through James, Titchener, Piaget, and others.
It was also during the late 1960s that the development and introduction of
the subdiscipline of cognitive psychology paved the way for the rest of cognitive
science in psychology in the 1970s. While cognitive scientists now consider
cognitive psychologists part of their interdisciplinary program, in the late 1960s
the many disciplines comprising cognitive science had yet to professionalize and
institutionalize into a formal interdisciplinary program. Cognitive psychologists—
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who began incorporating ideas from linguistics, computer science, neuroscience,
and artificial intelligence— helped foster the introduction of cognitive science to
the discipline of psychology. In the next section, I define cognitive science and
describe some of the fundamental assumptions associated with this
interdisciplinary program.
Outline of Cognitive Science
Defining an interdisciplinary program like cognitive science can prove
problematic for several reasons. One problem is that different disciplines may
use their own esoteric terminology to define the interdisciplinary program, thus
leading to confusion among the disciplines. Cognitive psychologists may prefer to
use terms such as memory and intelligence when defining cognitive science,
whereas computer scientists may prefer expressions such as data structures and
computation in their definitions. Another potential problem in coming to some
agreement about the nature of cognitive science is that the various disciplines
comprising cognitive science may define it only in terms of their own role in the
interdisciplinary program. For instance, artificial intelligence researchers may
define cognitive science as an interdisciplinary field that attempts to develop
machines or software programs that mimic human information processing
capabilities. Philosophers of mind may ignore this definition and instead propose
that cognitive scientists explore the possibility of understanding consciousness or
of instantiating consciousness in a machine. Finally, it is important to note that
not all cognitive psychologists, artificial intelligence researchers, computer
scientists, and linguists consider themselves cognitive scientists. Some carry out
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research without affiliating themselves with this interdisciplinary program. Despite
these potential difficulties, many cognitive scientists converge on similar
definitions of their field.
Defining Cognitive Science
Cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner (1985) enthusiastically describes
cognitive science as “the mind’s new science.” Gardner goes on to define
cognitive science as an “empirically based effort to answer long standing
epistemological questions—particularly those concerned with the nature of
[human] knowledge, its components, its sources, its development, and its
deployment” (p. 6). In their interviews with twenty eminent cognitive scientists,
Peter Baumgartner and Sabine Payr (1995) summarize cognitive science as a
“joint effort of specific disciplines to answer long-standing questions about the
working of the mind—particularly knowledge, its acquisition, storage, and use in
intellectual activity” (p. 11). Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1989) characterize
it as the “study of intelligence and intelligent systems, with particular reference to
intelligent behavior as computation” (p. 1). In his overview of cognitive science,
philosopher Owen Flanagan (1991) describes cognitive science as a “wellorganized committee of disciplines and subdisciplines, all of which claim to have
something to contribute to our understanding of mentality” (p. 177).27 The
common element shared by these various definitions is that cognitive scientists
study how humans and machines process information. In other words, cognitive

27 There are others who believe cognitive science is more of a perspective various disciplines use
rather than an interdisciplinary program in and of itself (e.g., Hunt, 1989; Scheerer, 1988).
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science is the study of how humans and machines receive, store, retrieve,
transform, and transmit information (Stillings et al., 1987). This fundamental
assumption allows the various subdisciplines of cognitive science to
communicate with one another. A cognitive psychologist, for instance, can use
this information processing perspective to discuss how humans store information
in memory in the same way that a computer scientist can talk of storage in a
computer’s memory.
Cognitive scientist Michael Dawson (1998) proposes viewing the study of
information processing from three interrelated levels of analysis. The first level of
study is the computational level. At this level, cognitive scientists ask, “What
information processing problem is the system solving?”28 After identifying the
information processing problem, these scientists can then formally describe the
problem using some form of logical analysis or mathematical modeling. The
second level of analysis is the algorithmic level. At this level, cognitive scientists
ask, “What method is the system using to solve this information processing
problem?” At this level, cognitive scientists attempt to discover the procedure a
system uses to accomplish some kind of goal. At the heart of this level is the idea
that information processing involves some kind of algorithm for manipulating
internal symbols that represent something in the external world. When one views
a tree outside, there is no one-to-one mapping of the image of the tree in our

28 Note that the term "system” can represent either human or machine information processing.
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brains.29 Instead, there is a manipulation of some kind of symbol system that acts
as a representation of the tree during information processing. The third level of
analysis is the implementation level. For this level of analysis cognitive scientists
ask, “What physical structures are used to implement the algorithm in order to
solve the problem?” For instance, cognitive scientists may search for the specific
area(s) or structure(s) in the brain that carry out a particular algorithm for solving
a problem.
The ways in which cognitive scientists study information processing vary
due to their interdisciplinary perspective. Some cognitive scientists develop
theories about cognitive processes divorced from human or animal
experimentation. Others study animals and humans in order to create theories
about mental life. Finally, there are those who study the organization and
computational abilities of intelligent machines (Simon & Kaplan, 1989).
Despite their differing approaches, cognitive scientists rely on several
methods in order to obtain converging evidence on information processing
phenomena. They sometimes utilize psychophysical data to identify certain
abilities and deficits in our ability to recognize and differentiate various stimuli in
the environment. Reaction time experiments are popular among cognitive
psychologists for comparing, say, lexical decisions under varying conditions.
Artificial intelligence researchers and computer scientists develop software
programs and mathematical models that they believe effectively reproduce
components of human information processing. One of the more recent and
29 While there is no one-to-one mapping in the brain, external stimuli are projected
topographically on the visual cortex (see, Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992).

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

popular avenues for cognitive science research is brought about by brain imaging
technology. Neuroscientists use techniques such as computed tomography
scans (CT scans), positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the brain structures involved in various
information processing tasks. While each cognitive scientist uses a few of these
methods, they rely on discoveries from cognitive scientists using other methods
to develop a complete picture of information processing.
In the following section, I discuss the origins of the cognitive science
approach to human information processing. Given the vast number of disciplines
associated with cognitive science, I delimit this history by focusing on the parts of
its history most germane to psychology.
History of Cognitive Science
Cognitive science has its roots in the work of a number of different fields
that came to bear on the topic of information processing. Even though cognitive
science became a professionalized interdisciplinary program in the middle 1970s,
the foundation of cognitive science came from earlier research. One of the fields
in the formation of cognitive science was computer science. Of particular
importance are the connections computer scientists developed between how
humans and machines process information. In the 1930s, logician Alan Turing
(1936) developed a thought experiment pertaining to a simple machine—what is
now known as the Turing Machine—that could perform various kinds of
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computations.30 According to Turing, this machine could carry out any kind of
well-defined computation as long as it possessed the correct instructions, enough
time, and enough resources to carry out the computations. The idea of a Turing
Machine prompted others such as John von Neumann to develop its physical
manifestation—the digital computer.
In a later paper on computing machines and intelligence, Turing (1950)
proposed a test, now called the Turing test, to discern if a computing machine
could display some form of intelligence.31 In the test, a human would converse
with other humans and a computing machine via some communication device.
Turing argued that if the human could not tell the difference between the
computing machine and the other humans’ dialog, this would provide a kind of
evidence for machine intelligence. Largely inspired by Turing and von Neumann,
the workings of the digital computer came to be an important metaphor for
conceptualizing how humans process information throughout the formative years
of cognitive science.
Contemporaneously, research on neural networks, cybernetics, and
information theory played a role in the development of cognitive science.
Neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and logician Walter Pitts (1943) developed
the idea of neural networks. They created a mathematical model in which
individualized “neurons” operate as binary devices— on/off switches— interacting
30 Some point to Charles Babbage as the progenitor of the idea of thinking machines, but
cognitive psychologist and historian of psychology Christopher Green (2001) argues against this
interpretation.
31 Note that Turing uses the phrase “computing machine” as there were no computers in the
modern sense at the time.
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with each other to complete some prescribed function. In the same decade, the
Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb (1949) developed a hypothesis about how
neural connections in the brain are strengthened via repeated interactions
between assemblies of neurons. Neural networks began to serve as viable
mathematical models for the workings of human neural connections (Bechtel,
Abrahamsen, & Graham, 1999).
From cybernetics, cognitive scientists borrowed the idea of feedback
processes. During World War II, scientists used the idea of feedback as a
method for improving anti-aircraft missiles. Mathematician Norbert Wiener (1948)
and his colleagues began developing the idea of feedback as a way of
understanding goal-directed behavior in humans and machines.
Contemporaneously, the mathematician Claude Shannon (1948, July and
October) published work on a way to transmit information effectively and
developed statistical procedures for measuring information flow. As these ideas
became public, scientists began describing human and machine information
processing using the notions of feedback and descriptions of the flow of
information.
With these ideas in place, it fell upon the next generation of researchers to
build machines that emulated human thought processes. The 1950s proved to be
a pivotal time for the development of cognitive science as researchers from
numerous disciplines came to focus on the phenomenon of information
processing. Scientists also developed some of the first artificial intelligence
programs. In 1956, Herbert Simon, Allan Newell, and J. Clifford Shaw developed
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the General Logic Theorist and then, in 1959, the General Problem Solver (e.g.,
1958). Basically, both programs could solve simple logic problems and prove
mathematical theorems by breaking down a problem into sub-goals in an attempt
to minimize the distance between its present state and some future goal state.
Newell and Simon compared the program’s performance on problem solving
tasks with people’s introspective reports of the same tasks and found that the
program operated in a similar manner to people’s introspective reports. The
similarity between how the programs and humans solved problems provided
some evidence for the appropriateness of the analogy between computer and
human information processes.
It was also in 1956 that mathematicians Marvin Minsky and John
McCarthy organized a two-month workshop at Dartmouth College that brought
together a number of researchers, including Newell and Simon, interested in
artificial intelligence (Gardner, 1985). The two-month workshop allowed
researchers opportunities to present their research, trade technologies, make
inroads into the connection between humans and machines, and develop the
rudiments of the discipline of artificial intelligence.
A conference later that year fostered further inroads into the development
of cognitive science. Between September 10 and 12, 1956, a number of
researchers attended the Symposium on Information Theory at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) (Bechtel et al., 1999). Psychologist George Miller
presented his ideas on short-term memory capacity, Newell and Simon
demonstrated a proof of a theorem by their General Logic Theorist, Nathan
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Rochester and his colleagues presented a computer model of Hebb’s neuronal
assemblies, and Noam Chomsky delivered a talk on his transformational
grammar. Miller (2003) retrospectively described the moment he believes
cognitive science was created stating, “I date the moment of conception of
cognitive science as 11 September 1956, the second day of a symposium
organized by the ‘Special Interest Group in Information Theory’ (p. 142). Miller’s
declaration is merely a personal belief rather than a statement of fact. There is no
evidence that during this time scientists tried to develop the ideas presented at
this conference into some meaningful interdisciplinary program. The MIT
conference and the one at Dartmouth did however served as a turning point in
the development of cognitive science because it became apparent to the
presenters from various disciplines at these events that they shared a common
view that the mind was an information processor.
Linguistics also came to the forefront in the 1950s. It was not that
linguistics was a new field. Structural linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure
and Leonard Bloomfield studied language, albeit in different ways, throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather, linguistics came to the attention
of many social scientists due to a change in perspective in how to approach the
study of language. Noam Chomsky (1957) published his theory of
transformational grammar in Syntactic Structures. In the monograph, Chomsky
pointed out the inadequacies of relying solely on phrase-structures— breaking
sentences in components such as noun and verb phrases—for a complete
understanding of language. In addition to phrase structure, Chomsky advocated
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the need for a transformational grammar—a procedure that changes one
sentence into another or establishes a relationship between two sentences.
Chomsky revised these ideas continually throughout the 1960s and 1970s (see
e.g., Chomsky, 1965, 1972). For instance, he added the ideas of deep and
surface grammatical structures to his theory. But throughout these revisions, he
maintained the importance of syntax in understanding any natural language. Also
important to cognitive science were Chomsky’s ideas on universal grammar.
Chomsky believed that infants possess an innate propensity for understanding
any natural language. This propensity implied a modular view of the mind, at
least for language capabilities. This modular view helped develop another
connection between humans and the digital computer. Digital computers
operated in a modular fashion. They could only do certain functions with
proficiency, such as solving logic puzzles. Implicating modular language
capacities in humans helped solidify the relationship between humans and
computers.
During the late 1950s, a number of psychologists began moving away
from the theoretical position of behaviorism. This was evident in the rise in
publications pertaining to cognition that came out during the late 1950s and
1960s (Scheerer, 1988). George Miller (1956) published his well-known paper on
short-term memory capacity, which he had earlier presented at the symposium at
MIT. Harvard psychologist Jerome Bruner and colleagues (1956) published A
Study in Thinking, which departed from behaviorists’ stimulus-response models
of learning and focused on how humans play an active role in forming concepts.
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Their theories of the strategies people employ to solve problems mimicked those
from computer programs like the General Logic Theorist (Johnson-Laird, 1988). It
was also at this time that Leon Festinger (1957) came out with his theory of
cognitive dissonance. Finally, Chomsky (1959) provided a critical and, some say,
devastating analysis of behaviorist B. F. Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior. In his
critique, Chomsky argued that language acquisition could not occur via simple
associations, reinforcements, or stimulus-response sequences. These theories
simply do not account for either the inherent creativity in our language production
or young children’s use of language. Chomsky argued that children’s language
ability is at odds with Skinner’s behaviorist assumptions. For instance, young
children use phrases like “I goed to the park.” But adults do not make these kinds
of grammatical mistakes. Chomsky proposed that it would be extremely unlikely
for children to speak ungrammatically if simple stimulus-response learning was
occurring. Chomsky’s critique pointed out one of the limitations of behaviorist
theory and, similar to the other ideas described above, had a decidedly cognitive
tone that threatened behaviorism’s popularity in psychology.
The interest in cognition continued into the 1960s. Jean Piaget’s work on
children’s cognitive development, though developed in the 1920s, caught U. S.
psychologists’ attention in the 1960s. Miller (1962) published a textbook with a
decidedly cognitive flavor entitled Psychology, the Science of Mental Life. Finally,
psychologist Ulric Neisser (1967) introduced a new generation of students to a
cognitive approach to the study of psychology in his textbook Cognitive
Psychology.
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The cognitive turn in psychological studies spurred the development of the
Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard University in 1960. Psychologists Jerome
Bruner and George Miller developed the Center under the auspices often years
of funding from the Carnegie Corporation (Bechtel et at., 1999).32 The Center
provided opportunities for young scientists to pursue their interests in linguistics,
attention, memory, language processing, and a host of other topics germane to
cognitive science. Other schools developed similar institutes in the 1970s such
as the Institute for Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego.
Despite scientists converging towards solving problems about cognition
and information processing, there was little interdisciplinary flavor to much of
their work. The theoretical chemist and artificial intelligence researcher
Christopher Longuet-Higgins (1987) coined the phrase “cognitive science” during
an address on artificial intelligence in 1973. The phrase caught on among this
diverse group of scientists and they adopted it as the name of their program. It
was also during the 1970s that psychologists, computer scientists, linguists, and
others professionalized and institutionalized cognitive science as an
interdisciplinary program.
By 1983, a host of colleges and universities around the country had
established centers for cognitive science including Stanford University, Cornell
Medical School, the University of Chicago, and Princeton University (Bechtel et
al., 1999). At Princeton, for instance, Miller and Gil Harman, with funding from the
James S. McDonnell Foundation, developed the Program for Cognitive Science

32 The Center closed in 1970 after the Carnegie funding ran out.
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and the Laboratory of Cognitive Science (Harman, 1988; Hirst, 1988). From the
1980s into the 1990s, cognitive science expanded its scope to include
neuroscientists and philosophers of mind.
The next sections outline the types of conceptual, material, and social
practices cognitive scientists brought into psychology.
Conceptual Practices
Cognitive scientists affected the boundaries of psychology through the
introduction of numerous theoretical and mathematical models of how humans
process information. During the 1970s and 1980s, the digital computer served as
the metaphor for conceptualizing how humans process information. Using
complex objects in the environment as metaphors for our minds is common
practice in the sciences (Jaynes, 1990). The historian of psychology David Leary
(1990) argues that metaphors serve a directive function in that different
metaphors can direct researchers to see different things in the same
phenomenon. For instance, both Rene Descartes and Sigmund Freud used
hydraulic metaphors to portray various functions of the mind. In the post-World
War II era, the digital computer served this metaphorical function. David
Rumelhart (1998), co-founder of the Institute of Cognitive Science as UCSD,
exclaimed that the computer “has been a valuable source of metaphors through
which we have come to understand and appreciate how mental activities might
arise out of the operations of simple-component processing elements” (p. 207).
Accompanying this metaphor, terms related to computers and information
processing such as parallel distributed processing, neural networks, expert
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systems, channel capacity, coding, and connectionism became part of the
vocabulary of cognitive psychologists and psychologists in general.
With the computer-as-mind metaphor, cognitive scientists created two
types of models for understanding human information processing (Dawson,
1998). The first, which served as the dominant model during the 1970s, was the
classical or symbolic model of human information processing. From the classical
perspective, all of our cognitive abilities occur via a systematic process that is
similar to the processing carried out by digital computers. The steps in cognitive
processing occur in serial order, with each step occurring logically before the
next step in the same way a digital computer carries out tasks. The most well
known example of the classical model is the Turing Machine described above.
The second model of human information processing is the connectionist
network, also known as parallel distributed processing networks (e.g., McClelland
& Rumelhart, 1981). Connectionist models came into prominence during the
1980s and 1990s. Cognitive scientists who espouse this model of information
processing believe that the correct way to model our brains is through an
interconnected network of nodes. There are four defining features of
connectionist networks (Schneider, 1987). First, all information processing occurs
as a result of these simple nodes and their interconnections. These nodes can be
in one of two states at any given time: on (excited) or off (inhibited).33 Second,
there is an assignment of weighted values for the connections between nodes.
Knowledge is stored in the weighted connections between nodes. Third, the
33 Some newer models break away from this dichotomy and indicate gradients of excitation for
these nodes.
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behavior of any particular node in the network is contingent upon the inputs to
that node and the subsequent transformation of these inputs into new information.
Information input causes certain nodes to activate and these nodes in turn either
activate or inhibit other nodes. Lastly, learning involves changing the connections
between the nodes in the network via feed forward and back propagation
processes. Frank Rosenblatt’s (1958) one-layer perceptron model is an early
version of a connectionist network and, more recently, other cognitive scientists
(e.g., Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) have produced multi-layer perceptron
models (see Figure 1).
Cognitive psychologists were already using many of the methods used by
cognitive scientists such as mathematical modeling, measuring reaction times
and analyzing psychophysical data. It is safe to say that most psychologists were
familiar with these types of practices as they were appearing in widely read
psychological journals. One of the difficulties and criticisms leveled at cognitive
scientists using these methods was that they could not actually examine the
thinking processes of individuals (Ericsson, 1998). Instead, cognitive scientists
had to rely on behavioral data to infer what was going on in the unobservable
brain.
A group of methods that psychologists did have to contend with in the
1980s and 1990s were brain imaging techniques brought into the discipline from
neuroscientists. Brain imaging techniques such as fMRI scans, allowed cognitive
scientists to “look inside the mind” of their participants. These scientists could
duplicate three dimensional images of the brain and map out the various
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Output Layer

Hidden Layer

Input Layer
Figure 1. Reconstruction of a multi-layer perceptron with feed forward, partial
connectivity. The circles represent nodes in the perceptron. The directional
arrows indicate the direction of information flow and nodal connectivity. The
perceptron contains three layers with connectivity between successive layers.
The directional arrows represent weighted connections between nodes. The
input layer receives information from the environment and transforms this
information into a representation of this information. Depending on a node’s level
of excitation or inhibition, it will transmit its information to connected nodes in the
hidden layer. The hidden layer carries out further processing and then sends this
information to the output layer. The information in the output layer represents a
response to the initial information. In a massively parallel model, all nodes in
every layer connect via bidirectional arrows indicating feed forward and back
propagation processes.
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structures involved in tasks such as language comprehension, problem-solving,
and object identification. Another advantage of these techniques was that
neuroscientists could compare “healthy” brains with those from individuals
suffering from a particular brain abnormality such as Broca’s aphasia and
prosopagnosia. These techniques were not only a boon for cognitive scientists
but they served as a powerful inscription device that promoted their ideas. I
discuss brain imaging as an inscription device below.
Material Practices
The primary use of computers as a technological tool in psychology is for
collecting and analyzing data derived from humans and other species. Software
programs such as SPSS, SAS, and Minitab are mainstays in modern
psychological data analysis. These programs allow psychologists to analyze
quickly and efficiently large amounts of data. Psychologists also use humancomputer interfaces to conduct research and manipulate variables, as was the
case with evolutionary psychologists using various software programs to
manipulate body type and facial feature images.
Cognitive scientists introduced psychologists to a new technological use
for computers—developing computers and computer programs to emulate
human thought processes. This is a radical shift from traditional psychological
research. With the use of computers and computer programs, cognitive scientists
extended the realm of investigating human mind, behavior, and emotion from
organic, sentient life to inorganic machines.

120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Earlier I mentioned attempts by artificial intelligence researchers to
develop programs for cognitive processes such as Newell and Simon’s General
Logic Theorist. Another example is computer scientist Edward Feigenbaum and
colleagues’ (1971) DENDRAL program, which was used to identify organic
compounds. As a test of the program’s efficacy, Feigenbaum presented
DENDRAL with mass spectrograph data on particular organic compounds.
DENDRAL was to gather data about the molecular structure of these organic
compounds and then generate a list of all potential organic compounds for the
given data. DENDRAL was as successful at correctly identifying the organic
compounds as expert chemists (Gardner, 1985). In 1970, Terry Winograd
developed a program called SHRDLU. Part of the program was a virtual world in
which SHRDLU could act. In the “world” were basic, colored geometric shapes in
various configurations. One of the remarkable aspects of this program was that
one could type in instructions for SHRDLU to carry out in this virtual world. For
instance, one could ask SHRDLU something like, “Place the blue triangle on top
of the red square.” SHRDLU would interpret these written commands and carry
out the given tasks in this virtual world. The advance from Newel and Simon’s
work to Winograd’s indicates the notable achievements of artificial intelligence
researchers in a relatively short time and is an indication that many cognitive
scientists believed they were on the right track towards understanding human
information processing.
These programs represent a few of the initial attempts at artificial
intelligence. But these programs could only perform a few specified tasks quickly
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and efficiently. While these expert systems—programs that can only execute a
few tasks such as playing chess or proving theorems—performed their tasks well
and provided insight into a few human problem-solving strategies, they were
severely limited as representations of human cognition. Humans take on a
variety of cognitive tasks in parallel and do them with relative ease. Additionally,
cognitive scientists largely ignored attempts at simulating motivational and
emotional capacities or the relations between these two and other cognitive
processes (Simon, 1979).
The challenge then to artificial intelligence researchers was to design a
program that emulated the versatility and variety of human cognitive abilities in
addition to motivational and emotional capabilities. One of the more recent and
advanced forms of artificial intelligence is COG, a form of artificial intelligence
created at the artificial intelligence laboratories at MIT. COG is being equipped
with visual, proprioceptive, and other sensory capacities for the purposes of
understanding our thought, feelings, and behaviors. Rodney Brooks, the
developer of COG, believes that in order to develop a truly artificial intelligence;
one must build it with the same physical and mental characteristics of humans.
COG represents a form of material practice whose use is not to speed up the
process of data analysis, or make complex calculations easier, or record
psychological data, but to be something like us.
Social Practices
One of the social practices that helped the relationship between cognitive
science and psychology was cognitive scientists’ ability to obtain large amounts
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of funding for their projects. In the mid-1970s on through to the mid-1980s, many
cognitive scientists convinced the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to contribute
approximately twenty million dollars to all areas of cognitive science research
(Gardner, 1985). Cognitive scientists used much of this money to create
cognitive science research centers at the numerous colleges and universities
mentioned above. As the Sloan initiatives came to an end, the System
Development Foundation (SDF) became involved in funding cognitive science
research, investing twenty-six million dollars from 1982 to 1984 (Bechtel et al.,
1999). The biggest single contribution of the SDF went to the Center for the
Study of Language and Information at Stanford University. This Center fostered
research relationships in the areas of linguistics, computer science, and
reasoning between faculty at Stanford and research organizations such as the
Palo Alto Research Center (formerly Xerox-Parc). Additional funding during the
1980s came from various sources such as the Office of Naval Research, the Air
Force Office of Scientific Research, and the National Science Foundation (NSF)
(Schneider, 1987). The National Science Foundation, in particular, was important
to cognitive science research. When the Sloan initiatives and SDF funds stopped,
the NSF continued to fund these large research centers.
In the 1970s, the following new journals appeared: Cognitive Psychology
(1970), Cognition (1972), Memory & Cognition (1973), and the Journal o f Mental
Imagery (1977). Cognitive scientists began issuing Cognitive Science: A
Multidisciplinary Journal of Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and Language in
1977. Other journals followed such as Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 1978
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and Cognition and Brain Theory in 1981. Two years later, cognitive scientists
formed the Cognitive Science Society (CSS). The Society held its first
conference in 1979 at the University of California, San Diego sponsored by the
university’s Program in Cognitive Science and funded by the Sloan Foundation.
In 1980, Cognitive Science became the official journal of the CSS and the journal
broadened its scope to include contributions from developmental psychology,
philosophy, and cognitive anthropology (Collins, 1980). In 1985, Cognitive
Science merged with Cognition and Brain Theory, which resulted in more
contributions by philosophers and neuroscientists (Schunn, Crowley, & Okada,
1998). By 1997, the subtitle of Cognitive Science changed to “A Multidisciplinary
Journal of Anthropology, Artificial Intelligence, Education, Linguistics,
Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology.”
Undergraduate and graduate classes in cognitive science became
common in colleges and universities. In 1985, Vassar College held a conference
with approximately fifty colleges and universities concerned with implementing
cognitive science into the undergraduate curriculum (Gardner, 1985). Michael
Dawson (1998) estimates that by 1995 colleges and universities developed
approximately two hundred cognitive science programs around the world. Many
of these centers and programs acted independently of psychology departments.
In some cases, cognitive psychologists kept their original disciplinary affiliation
but began working in cognitive science centers. In other cases, psychology
departments dissolved to make way for the development of cognitive science
centers (Hirst, 1988).
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Like my other case studies, cognitive scientists claimed their field as a
revolution or paradigm shift for psychological science. These claims served the
rhetorical function of persuading others of their expert and authoritative status in
the field of human mind and behavior. The historian of psychology Thomas
Leahey (1992) contented that, “Belief in a cognitive revolution is an entrenched
part of modern psychology’s form of life” (p. 313). Their claims of a revolutionary
field rode the coattails of the general cognitive and mentalist perspectives that
had supposedly ousted the behaviorist perspective prevalent in psychology at the
time. For instance, a statement by a number of cognitive scientists to the
Research Briefing Panel on Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence claimed
that cognitive science was “advancing our understanding of the nature of mind
and the nature of intelligence on a scale that is proving revolutionary” (Estes et
al., 1983, p. 21). Roger Sperry (1993) proclaimed that “by 1971 it was already
clear that many psychologists had come to recognize that their discipline was in
the process of a major paradigm shift, in which behaviorism was being replaced
by an opposing new mentalism or cognitivism” (p. 881).
Bernard Baars (1986) is perhaps the most articulate individual regarding
the putative revolutionary nature of these ideas. Baars calls it a “quiet revolution
in thought” in which “the dominant meta-theory of the previous 50 years
[behaviorism] was discarded or changed fundamentally, and a new point of view
began to take shape” (p. 4). Baars breaks the cognitive revolution into three
stages. A group of scientists characterizes each stage. Those scientists initially
trained as behaviorists who subsequently changed to cognitivism, Baars
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characterizes as “adapters.” The adapters were able to break away from the
traditional behaviorist perspective after realizing the anomalies caused by this
perspective. Examples of Baars’ adapters are the aforementioned George Miller,
James Jenkins, who studied language acquisition, and George Mandler, whose
research focused on memory and emotions. The “persuaders” constitute the
second stage in Baars’ model. The persuaders’ role was to change the
psychological community’s perspective from behaviorism to cognitivism. Baars
claims Ulric Neisser as an exemplar of a persuader due to his influential textbook
on cognitive psychology. The “nucleators” comprise the final stage. The
nucleators came from outside psychology but provided assistance in bringing
about the revolution via new techniques and ideas from other disciplines. Baars
considers individuals like Noam Chomsky, Herbert Simon, and Jerry Fodor, the
philosopher of mind, as nucleators.
The inclusion of neuroscientists and their brain imaging studies in
cognitive science provided another social practice to which psychologists had to
attend. In the Social Science Citation Index from 1980 to 1996 publications of
brain imaging studies ran into the thousands, increased to almost 350 in 1996,
and the rate was doubling every 18-24 months (Fox, 1997). Brain imaging
“powerfully redefines concepts like behavior, nurture, culture and environment”
(Beaulieu, 2003, p. 563). I mentioned previously that one of the major criticisms
of the cognitive approach was the need to infer mental events. The introduction
of brain imaging helped alleviate this critique and created a powerful inscription
device for cognitive scientists. These images or mappings of the brain redefined
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concepts like “behavior” and “culture” and recast them in biological terms,
specifically through the ability to view spatial patterns in the brain. Cognitive
scientists displayed these spatial patterns in their publications, bringing credibility
to their research. They were able to propose theories about cognitive processes
such as memory and intelligence in addition to providing a visual display of
where in the brain these processes took place. Similarly, cognitive scientists
could create pictorial images of the structural differences between “healthy” and
“pathological” brains. Brain images formed powerful “visual arguments” about the
nature of cognitive processes and helped to promote cognitive scientists as
authorities in the field of cognition (Dumit, 2004). The 1990s reflected the
popularity and perceived importance of these kinds of brain studies. The 1990s
were proclaimed the “Decade of the Brain” by President George H. Bush. The
Library of Congress and the National Institute of Mental Health collaborated to
bring this message to the public through conferences and other forms of media.
Given these numerous conceptual, material, and social practices, it is
important to examine psychologists’ reactions to these practices. The next
section outlines the resistances and accommodations psychologists made to the
claims of cognitive scientists.
Resistances to Cognitive Science
Resistances to the practices of cognitive scientists came mainly from
behaviorists. Their primary contention pertained to cognitive scientists’ focus on
mental events. As I described earlier, with the exception of radical behaviorists
(e.g., John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner), most neobehaviorists (e.g., Tolman, Hull)
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did not deny the existence of mental events. Instead, they tended to relegate
these events as either impossible to study empirically or as intermediary between
the more important environmental and human action variables. Behaviorists
found this to be the major weakness of cognitive approaches. The behaviorists
argued that even if mental events such as concept formation and representations
of stimuli exist, these events were unobservable. There was no place for the
study of mental events in a truly scientific psychology.
The most public resistance to cognitive science came from psychologist B.
F. Skinner, whose behaviorist theory of operant conditioning stood in direct
opposition to the tenets of cognitive science. Skinner’s resistances make sense
in light of the boundary-work framework. He created a theory that was
recognizably antithetical to cognitive science, yet Skinner was arguably the most
well-known psychologist of the twentieth century (Rutherford, 2000). Skinner
derived much attention with his operant conditioning research and with this
attention came epistemic authority and expert status. Skinner developed enough
expert status that he felt confident to write about issues such as improving
society and the elimination of free will through operant conditioning and behavior
modification (e.g., Skinner, 1971, 1976). He had a personal stake in defending
his intellectual territory, as did those professionals trained in behaviorist doctrine
for years.
Skinner (1986), for instance, attacked those who espoused a cognitive
perspective because they “invent internal surrogates, which become the subject
of their science” (p. 79). Elsewhere, Skinner (1985) outlined five major reasons
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why psychologists should not adopt a cognitive science perspective. First, he
believed cognitive scientists’ use of the metaphor of storage was inappropriate
because he believed people did not store representation of experiences in their
minds. Second, as the above quote illustrates, he felt that speculation of internal
processes was a mistake, as no one could directly observe these processes.
Third, Skinner accused cognitive scientists of “emasculating the experimental
analysis of behavior” with their focus on descriptions of environments instead of
the actual environment and reports of intentions rather than behaviors. Fourth, he
believed it a mistake to rely on states of mind as a cause of behavior rather than
as side effects of the true causes of behavior. Finally, Skinner objected to the
“relaxing standards of definition and logical thinking,” resulting in a “flood of
speculation” that was “inimical to science” (p. 300).
Behaviorists had another reason to resist the practices of cognitive
scientists. Most behaviorists used laboratory animals for their experimentation.
Essentially, the data they obtained to verify their theories pertaining to human
behavior were products of animal models. According to historian of science
Hunter Crowther-Heyck (1999), “The study of rats in T mazes or pigeons in
Skinner boxes was the paradigmatic experiment. The study of human behavior
was not wholly neglected by behaviorists...but even when human behavior was
the subject of study it was generally the ‘animal’ aspects of humanity, rather than
the ‘higher qualities,’ such as language, that were examined” (p. 47). Cognitive
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scientists, on the other hand, used humans and computers as their data sources,
but most found little use for nonhuman species in their research.34
Some psychologists also resisted cognitive scientists’ reliance on artificial
intelligence and the computer metaphor as models for human information
processing.35 Skinner resisted the use of artificial intelligence, believing it offered
no new insight into human behavior. In an article explaining why psychology had
yet to become a science of behavior, Skinner (1987) questioned the need for
cognitive scientists’ reliance on artificial intelligence stating, “If an artificial
organism can be designed to do what logicians and mathematicians do, or even
more than they have ever done, it will be the best evidence we have that intuitive
mathematical and logical thinking is only following rules, no matter how obscure.
And following rules is behaving” (p. 784). The cognitive psychologist and
historian Christopher Green (2001) brought into question the viability of using
connectionist networks as models for neural processes. He argued that
individuals applying these networks are vague in terms of what these networks
supposedly model because “Despite some superficial similarities, the way in
which connectionist networks are constructed appears to violate some basic
facts on neural function” (p 104). One possibility for psychologists’ resistances to
artificial intelligence and computer modeling was the threat posed by these

34 I should note that cognitive ethologists use nonhuman species in their research on animal
minds (e.g., Bekoff, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
35 Many philosophers connected to cognitive science have engaged in the debate on the
computer metaphor and artificial intelligence (e.g., Dennett, 1998; Hardcastle, 1995; Haugeland,
1981; Horst, 1996; Searle, 1980). Also see mathematician Roger Penrose’s (1994) Shadows of
the Mind for an exposition of the different levels of belief (i.e., strong artificial intelligence, weak
artificial intelligence) in artificial intelligence.
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endeavors. This perceived threat may not be a consequence of psychologists
giving up some kind of expert status, but rather a more general threat to human
nature. Humans have always perceived themselves as the pinnacle of intelligent
life. The resistance to artificial intelligence research may be a reaction to the
threat that, in principle, something could be as intelligent as humans could.
Another resistance came from those psychologists who felt that
neuroscience and brain imaging would somehow damage the field. Some felt
that the increased use of brain imaging technology might lead to erasing the
“individual” from psychological research (Beaulieu, 2003). Images from PET
scans, for instance, require averaging and renormalizing data over many
subjects. These brain images remove the unique structural features of each
individual’s brain. Given the inherent complexity of the brain, these images may
provide the wrong impression about brain structure and the localization of
function. Additionally, demonstrating the location of a particular structure and
correlating it with a particular function answers the questions of where and what
but does not get at the question of how people carry out processes such as
memory and problem solving. Some (e.g., Goertzel, 1995; Paller, 1995) criticized
the materialist assumptions behind the growing popularity of brain imaging.
Finally, others were concerned with the increasing reliance on neuroscience for
explanations of human mind and behavior. For instance, Skinner (1987) believed
that cognitive scientists may put themselves out of a job due to their reliance on
neuroscience. He stated, “Once you tell the world that another science will
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explain what your key terms really mean, you must forgive the world if it decides
that the other science is doing the important work” (p. 784).
Accommodations to Cognitive Science
There are several instances of psychologists making accommodations for
cognitive science. One measure of psychologists’ accommodations for cognitive
science is the number of citations attributed to cognitive science in psychology.
Were psychologists using the literature of cognitive science more than the
literature of, say, behaviorism? A citation analysis comparing cognitive
psychology and behaviorism literature indicates the increasing number of
citations pertaining to cognitive topics in flagship journals (American Psychologist,
Annual Review of Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, Psychological Review)
from 1977 to 1996 as compared with citations of behaviorist topics (Robins,
Gosling, & Craik, 1999). During this twenty year span, there appeared to be a
ubiquity of cognitive approaches to understanding a variety of phenomena in
psychology’s various subdisciplines including social psychology (e.g., Fiske &
Haslam, 1996), personality (e.g., Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000),
educational psychology (e.g., Glaser, 2000), developmental psychology (e.g.,
Carey, 1990), and clinical psychology (e.g., Stein & Young, 1992). Previously, I
mentioned the number of journals pertaining to cognition that came out during
the 1970s such as Cognition, Cognitive Psychology, and Memory & Cognition.
In terms of pedagogical accommodations, cognitive psychology courses
became part of the curriculum at most colleges and universities. Some
institutions offered courses, and undergraduate and graduate specializations in
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cognitive science through their psychology departments (e.g., Carnegie Mellon
University, University of Pittsburgh) instead of in separate centers or institutes.
Some introductory textbooks began covering cognitive science, albeit sparingly.
But there was usually ample coverage of cognitive psychology (e.g., Gleitman et
al., 1999; Gray, 1999). Cognitive psychology textbook authors, of course,
devoted space to the history of cognitive science, in addition to topics such as
artificial intelligence, linguistics, and connectionist networks (e.g., Anderson,
2005; Galotti, 2004; Martindale, 1991). Publication began on many textbooks for
undergraduate and graduates students in cognitive science (e.g., Collins & Smith,
1988; Johnson-Laird, 1988; Posner, 1993; e.g., Thagard, 1996).36 Along with the
inclusion of the topic of cognitive science in some psychology textbooks, PET
images, CT scans, and fMRI brain images served as picture covers for many of
psychology’s textbooks (Beaulieu, 2002).
Similar to evolutionary psychology there is no division of cognitive science
within the American Psychological Association, but this may pertain to cognitive
science’s interdisciplinary nature. Most people aligned with cognitive science can
be members of the APA’s experimental psychology division (Division 3), the
Psychonomic Society, the American Psychological Society, and the Association
for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. So there are a number of professional
organizations for those who consider themselves cognitive scientists within the
discipline.

36 While interdisciplinary in nature, most of these cognitive science textbooks primarily focus on
information processing from a psychological perspective rather than perspectives from linguistics,
artificial intelligence, computer science, or philosophy of mind.
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Did psychologists accommodate cognitive science enough for one to
consider cognitive science a scientific revolution or paradigm shift in psychology?
Certainly, one of the social practices of many cognitive scientists was to
pronounce the field as such and they introduced a number of conceptual and
material practices into the field. Examining the status of cognitive science as a
paradigm, historian of psychology Thomas Leahey (1987) answers in the
negative stating, “Cognitive scientists believe in a revolution because it provides
them with an origin myth, an account of their beginnings that helps legitimize
their practice or science...But there was no revolution...The cognitive revolution
was an illusion” (p. 456). Murray White’s (1985) analysis of cognitive psychology
textbooks mentioned in Chapter 2 concurs with Leahey’s assessment. White’s
analysis indicated little agreement among textbook authors about important ideas
and concepts within cognitive psychology. The computer-as-mind metaphor
served as a useful heuristic for developing models of information processing, but
few psychologists outside the study of cognition use it with any regularity. There
was also the question of the extent of cognitive scientists’ actual knowledge of
human mind and behavior. For instance, cognitive scientist Donald Norman
(1980) admits that he is “struck by how little is known about so much of
cognition...I have studied memory for years, yet am unable to answer even
simple questions about the use of memory” (p. 8). In order to remedy this
deficiency, Norman urged cognitive scientists to incorporate social, cultural, and
emotional perspectives into their work. Finally, behaviorism, the alleged usurped
paradigm, never entirely disappeared with the advent of cognitive science.
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Behaviorists still conducted and published stimulus-response and reinforcement
theory research throughout cognitive scientists’ involvement in psychology. While
it is safe to say that cognitive science achieved some degree of respect within
the discipline of psychology between the 1970s and 2000, it did not provide a
new paradigm for psychology.
In summary, the relationship between the interdisciplinary program of
cognitive science and the discipline of psychology is still evolving. As computing
technology advances at an exponential rate, advanced forms of artificial
intelligence are possible. This leads to the possibility of new, sophisticated
models of human information processing that may affect the boundaries of
psychology. As Howard Gardner (1992) suggested, sometime in the future
cognitive science may absorb most of the topics and personnel in psychology,
leaving the remaining psychologists just a few issues to deal with such as
therapy and motivation. Until then, psychologists will need to continue their
boundary-work efforts of resistance and accommodation with the conceptual,
material, and social practices of cognitive science.
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CHAPTER V

THE SELF-ORGANIZING MIND: CHAOS THEORY

Of my three case studies, chaos theory is perhaps the most unorthodox
interdisciplinary program to have prompted psychologists to engage in boundarywork in the period between 1970 and 2000. Its connection and relevance to
psychology is not as apparent as that of evolutionary psychology and cognitive
science. Evolutionary psychologists conduct research on the adaptive
mechanisms that helped humans survive and reproduce during the Pleistocene
age and on how these mechanisms play a role in our cognitive and behavioral
skills today. Cognitive scientists investigate human and machine information
processing systems and attempt to develop models of these processes in order
to gain an understanding of cognitive skills such as memory, language, decision
making, and problem solving. But “chaos” is an unusual and evocative term that
conjures up images of disorder and randomness. The Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) defines chaos in a number of different ways such as a “gaping void, “utter
confusion and disorder,” and “a confused mass or mixture.” These definitions of
chaos seem paradoxical to the goals and general interests of psychologists.
Psychologists are usually concerned with finding regularities in or prescribing
order to psychological phenomena. For instance, personality psychologists
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attempt to create order in personality typologies by grouping people according to
categories such as “extroversion,” “conscientiousness,” and “neuroticism.”
Clinical psychologists rely on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (1994) as a taxonomy for the various psychological disorders.
Physiological psychologists attempt to find order between brain structure and
brain function. So a theory pertaining to chaotic phenomena appears to be at
odds with the general philosophical perspective within the discipline of
psychology. But in 1997, the OED added another definition to its list on chaos,
one that provides a different viewpoint on this common word: “The behaviour of a
system which is governed by deterministic laws but is so unpredictable as to
appear random.” Even though this definition derives from the fields of
mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology, the idea that deterministic
behavior is often unpredictable resonates with the complexity and often
unpredictable nature of human mind and behavior. It is this idea that a small
number of psychologists found favorable and attempted to use to reinterpret
numerous psychological phenomena beginning in the middle 1980s.
Outline of Chaos Theory
Chaos theory is a group of experimental techniques, mathematical tools,
and theoretical models pertaining to how dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems
produce this complex order as they change over time. Many scientists from fields
such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, ecology, and meteorology
began developing chaos theory in the middle 1970s to understand chaotic
behavior in the dynamic systems apparent in their respective fields. In order to
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begin to understand chaos theory’s relationship to psychology it is first necessary
to provide a brief outline of the theory. While there are numerous mathematical
accounts of chaos theory (e.g., Arrowsmith & Place, 1990; Hasselblatt & Katok,
2003; Peitgen, Jurgens, & Saupe, 1992; Schuster, 1984), most of these accounts
are directed towards scientists and mathematicians possessing knowledge of
advanced mathematics. I present a conceptual account that I believe does not
sacrifice the underlying principles of chaos theory.
Dynamic Systems
Simply, chaos or chaotic behavior is a property of dynamic systems. A
dynamic system is a set of interrelated and interacting components that change
over time. Dynamic systems can be composed of molecules, billiard balls,
chemical compounds, electrical circuitry, mechanical parts, living tissue, and a
host of other substances. Dynamic systems are ubiquitous in the laboratory and
in nature; therefore, it is relatively easy to generate some examples. For instance,
something as simple as a cup of hot coffee is a dynamic system. The molecules
within the beverage interact with each other in complex ways while at the same
time the coffee’s “behavior” is constrained by the parameters of the coffee mug.
As the coffee in the mug cools, the molecules on the top of the coffee slow and
proceed to fall to the bottom of the mug. Conversely, the rapidly moving
molecules at the bottom of the mug push their way to the top. This convection
cycle continues until the temperature of the coffee reaches an equilibrium state
equivalent to the temperature of the environment. A more complex example of a
dynamic system is the process of human ontogenetic development. The process
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of human development from a fertilized egg, through puberty, and into adulthood
constitutes a complex interaction of innumerable endogenous and exogenous
variables. Genetic factors, socioeconomic status, life stressors, nutrition, exercise,
and quality of education change throughout the ontogenetic process often in
unexpected and surprising ways.
Conservative and Dissipative Dynamic Systems
There are two kinds of dynamic systems: conservative and dissipative
(Schuster, 1984). Conservative dynamic systems do not lose energy over time,
whereas dissipative dynamic systems do lose energy over time (Williams, 1997).
A model of a “forced” pendulum is an example of a conservative dynamic system.
Some kind of mechanical device pushes the bob of the pendulum, causing it to
oscillate from one point to the other and, barring the influence of friction, the bob
does not lose energy. The forced pendulum model is, of course, an idealized
dynamic system because it ignores the effects of friction. In fact, there are very
few truly conservative systems in the real world. A “dampened” pendulum—one
that loses energy as a result of friction— is an example of a dissipative dynamic
system. As the bob oscillates, it slowly loses or dissipates energy until it comes
to a complete stop (see Figure 2). Some conservative and all dissipative dynamic
systems are nonlinear as opposed to linear dynamic systems.
Linear and Nonlinear Systems
Linear dynamic systems are any systems that map onto a straight line
using the formula y = mx + b. For instance, a plot of the relationship between two
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Figure 2. Hypothetical time series for a “dampened” pendulum.

140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

idealized time series variables such as years in a company and earnings is a
linear dynamic system. This system is dynamic because employee earnings
increase as a function of the number of years of employment. Linear dynamic
systems, consisting of two or more variables, are often modeled using solvable
difference or differential equations that describe the behavior of the entire
system.37 Difference and differential equations may describe the behavior of
nonlinear dynamic systems as well, but these systems do not plot as a straight
line and sometimes are not solvable. A simple equation—though not a difference
or differential equation—for demonstrating a nonlinear dynamic system is
Equation 1:

xf+i = 1 .9 - x f2

(1)

In this equation, xt is an arbitrary value at time 1 and xt+1 reiterates into the
equation as a new value for x at time 2. The “forced” pendulum example is a
relatively simple example of a conservative, nonlinear dynamic system. Plotting
the position of the forced pendulum as a function of time produces a line of
consistent peaks and valleys (see Figure 3). Barring any external perturbations,
one can perfectly predict the position or the state of the pendulum at any given
time. Other dynamic systems prevent perfect prediction due to their inherent

37 Difference equations are used to model variables that are discrete (i.e., restricted to integer
values such as time in years), while differential equations are used to model variables that are
continuous (i.e., values can take on any number such as the case of the swinging pendulum).
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Figure 3. Hypothetical time series of a “forced” pendulum.
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complexity and these are usually dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems. A
common cause of this complexity is the number of variables in the system. This
is the case with human ontogenesis. The complexity arises from the number of
variables and their interactions, making predictions about the behavior of the
system difficult if not impossible. For instance, given an infant’s birth weight and
an almost infinite supply of data about the infant’s current state, it would be
exceedingly difficult to predict perfectly the height or weight of that infant at age 1
or 2 and even more unlikely when the infant was 21 years old.
Some, but not all, nonlinear systems exhibit chaotic behavior, that is,
seemingly random behavior that, depending on the mode of analysis, reveals a
hidden complex order. The phenomenon of chaotic behavior is only evident in
dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems, so the remainder of my discussion
focuses exclusively on these types of systems.
Chaotic Nonlinear Systems
Dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems are common in the real world.
Outside of scientists’ laboratories, it is the case that most systems interact with
their environments in complex and often unpredictable ways, which leads to
chaotic behavior. These systems exist at all levels of representation, from the
molecular level to the planetary level. Chaotic systems exhibit a behavior called
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, also known as the “butterfly effect”
(Lorenz, 1963).38 This behavior indicates that a system is sensitive to tiny

38 A common example to illustrate the butterfly effect is the idea that a butterfly flapping its wings
in Texas, in principle, could cause a tornado in Japan.
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perturbations that could, but do not always, significantly affect the behavior of
that system. Because it is difficult to measure the initial states of a system with
absolute certainty, sensitive dependence makes perfect prediction exceedingly
difficult. Take, for instance, two drops of water that are extremely close together
at the top of a waterfall. Even though physicists may know the precise equations
of motion for fluids, and the effects of gravity and friction for these droplets,
predicting where they will land at the bottom of a waterfall with any degree of
precision is virtually impossible. One seemingly irrelevant change in the position
of one of the droplets results in changing the measurement in position of the
droplet. This change radically affects the outcome of where that particular water
droplet will land. In fact, even if the droplets began infinitely close to each other,
the effects of innumerable variables would cause a radical divergence in their
positions at the bottom of the waterfall. Physicists and engineers have to deal
with sensitive dependence on initial conditions as they attempt to explain
phenomena such as turbulence in fluids and aerodynamics.
As a chaotic system changes over time, it reaches bifurcation points that
indicate potential qualitative changes in the system’s behavior (see Figure 4).
Through a series of bifurcations, a chaotic system settles into a particular
configuration of behavior known as an attractor. Attractors come in three
categories: fixed point, limit cycle, and strange (Abraham & Shaw, 1983). Fixed
point attractors characterize behaviors that have reached equilibrium. For
instance, when dropping a tiny iron ball down a funnel, the ball will roll around the
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Figure 4. Bifurcation diagram illustrating the potential qualitative shifts in a given
system using every parameter for a reiterative equation. For parameter values R
= 2 through 3, the system exhibits a series of fixed point attractors. At R = 3, the
system oscillates between two potential states. Before R = 3.5 the system
bifurcates again and oscillates between 4 potential states. After R = 3.5 the
system becomes chaotic and never repeats the same value twice. (Adapted from
a bifurcation diagram courtesy of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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funnel until it reaches its fixed point attractor—the resting state at the bottom of
the funnel. Limit cycle attractors occur when a system oscillates between two or
more states. This behavior is evident in the previous example of a forced
pendulum where the bob of the pendulum comes to rest briefly in one state, then,
after the pendulum is forced, moves to its second resting state. Strange
attractors describe a system’s behavior when it settles into a particular behavioral
configuration that does not change beyond certain parameters. Within these
parameters, however, the system never repeats the same behavior twice. While
the system’s behavior may appear random, the system is actually demonstrating
a complex order. This is one of the behaviors most characteristic of chaotic
systems and can be found in systems such as weather patterns (Lorenz, 1963),
solid mechanics (Moon, 1991), circuit boards (Lesurf, 1991), epilepsy
(Babloyantz & Destexhe, 1986), and heart beat arrhythmias (Glass, Goldberger,
& Courtemanche, 1987).
One way of identifying the type of attractor a system exhibits is through an
analysis of its phase space portrait. Phase space is a multidimensional graphical
representation of a system’s behavior over time. The dimensions most often
illustrated in phase space portraits are the X and Y coordinates and time. Phase
space portraits work similarly to a traditional Cartesian grid in that a particular
location in the portrait defines the state of a system. Instead of points in
Cartesian space, phase space portraits outline the trajectories of systems. For a
system exhibiting a fixed point attractor like a “dampened” pendulum or an iron
ball rolling around in a funnel (see Figure 5), the phase space
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X
Figure 5. Phase space portrait of a fixed point attractor. The curved arrows
indicate trajectory direction. This image corresponds to the time series of the
“dampened” pendulum in Figure 1.
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trajectory would look like an ever decreasing spiral that would signify the loss of
energy of the pendulum over time. A phase space portrait of a limit cycle attractor
such as a forced pendulum would map out to a circle or a series of circles to
indicate the perpetual and repetitive behavior of the pendulum (see Figure 6).
One half of the circle signifies the pendulum’s trajectory from left to right; the
other half of the circle signifies the pendulum’s trajectory from right to left.
Strange attractors can take on many different forms in phase space. As I
mentioned earlier, strange attractors show a complex order. One can tell the
difference between random behavior and this kind of attractor in that random
behavior fills the entire phase space portrait whereas strange attractors fill only
specific portions of phase space. Perhaps the most common strange attractor
shape is the Lorenz attractor (see Figure 7).
One of the characteristics of strange attractors is that they exhibit fractal
properties (Mandelbrot, 1967). Fractals are geometric shapes whose spatial
dimensions are fractions (see Figure 8). Instead of being one-dimensional or twodimensional, fractals have dimensions of, say, 2.3 or 1.5 (Goerner, 1994).
Fractals display self-similarity, meaning a fractal’s geometrical structure at all
scales of measurement will be similar. The Koch snowflake in Figure 8
demonstrates this self-similar scaling property. Irrespective of the scale, the
same shape will be evident: a triangle.
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Y

X
Figure 6. Phase space portrait of a limit cycle attractor. The curved arrows
indicate trajectory direction. This image corresponds to the time series of the
“forced” pendulum in Figure 2.
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Y

X
Figure 7. Phase space portrait of a strange attractor. This figure represents the
Lorenz attractor. Note that even though its trajectory is unusual compared with
the trajectories of the fixed point and limit cycle attractors in Figures 4 and 5, it
only fills up a certain region of phase space. (Image of Lorenz attractor courtesy
of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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Figure 8. The Koch snowflake. One creates the Koch snowflake by taking the
original triangle, reducing its size by one-third, and then placing this reduced
copy in the middle third of each side of the original triangle, a process called
affine transformations. In the image above, this iterative process occurs three
times. (Image courtesy of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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The Koch snowflake is an idealized fractal, but there are abundant examples of
objects that have fractal properties in nature such as leaves, flowers, broccoli,
earthquake features, cracks in surfaces like sidewalks, the respiratory system,
and the nervous system (Peitgen et al., 1992; Williams, 1997). If a strange
attractor demonstrates fractal properties, its self-similarity suggests an ordered
pattern and is evidence of chaotic behavior.
Defining Chaos
There are a number of problems with encapsulating chaos theory into an
easily understood form. As I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the term
“chaos” is somewhat misleading because it implies random or stochastic
behavior even though chaos theorists search for order in the behavior of systems
within their respective disciplines. Another problem with chaos theory is that
scientists use it to describe chaotic behavior and to describe nonlinear dynamic
behavior in general. This leads to ambiguity because not all nonlinear systems
display chaotic behavior. The term is also problematic because chaos theory is
resistant to any definitive definition. Confusion arises over chaos theory’s
definition due to its interdisciplinary scope. Mathematicians want to define it one
way and physicists another way. The mathematician Ian Stewart (1989)
discussed the difficulty experienced by the Royal Society of London to define
chaos theory during a meeting in 1987: “Although everybody present knew what
they thought ‘chaos’ meant— it was their research field, so they really ought to
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have known—few were willing to offer a precise definition” (p. 17).39 Chaos
theory is also an umbrella term for a number of interrelated theories and
concepts that do not sufficiently capture its precise meaning. Other names
commonly, and sometimes inappropriately, associated with chaos theory include
complexity theory, self-organization, self-organized criticality, fractal geometry,
ergodic theory, the edge-of-chaos, and catastrophe theory. Catastrophe theory,
for instance, is a method for modeling abrupt qualitative shifts— bifurcations— in a
system’s behavior as a result of small changes in a system’s variables (Brown,
1995). While dissipative, nonlinear systems exhibit this kind of behavior, it is only
one of many characteristics of chaos and therefore it is inappropriate to use
catastrophe theory and chaos theory as equivalent terms.
Despite these difficulties, there are some scientists, mathematicians, and
philosophers who have proffered definitions of chaos theory that inspired the
OED definition I provided earlier. In his critical treatise on chaos theory, In The
Wake o f Chaos, the philosopher of science Stephen Kellert (1993) defined chaos
theory as “the qualitative study on unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic
nonlinear dynamical systems” (p.2). The geologists Garnett Williams (1997)
offered two related definitions: a) the study of “sustained and random-like long
term evolution that satisfies certain special mathematical criteria and that
happens in deterministic, nonlinear, dynamical systems” and b) the study of
“largely unpredictable long-term evolution occurring in a deterministic, nonlinear

39 Stewart dates the meeting as 1986 but according to the Proceedings o f the Royal Society o f
London, the meeting took place between February 4 and 5, 1987 with discussion organized by M.
V. Berry, I. C. Percival, and N. O. Weiss.
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dynamical system because of sensitivity to initial conditions” (p. 449). According
to Stewart (1989) the Royal Society succinctly defined it as “stochastic behavior
in a deterministic system” (p. 17). Considering the similarity of these definitions, it
appears there is some general agreement on definitions. Nevertheless, the
ambiguities I outlined above pertaining to the exact nature of this interdisciplinary
theory were problematic throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In the next
section, I provide a brief historical sketch of chaos theory and its uses.
History of Chaos Theory
The nineteenth century French mathematician Henri Poincare was
perhaps the first individual to identify and attempt to fully describe chaotic
behavior mathematically (Barrow-Green, 1997; Diacu & Holmes, 1996). Poincare
was responding to a nationwide request of scientists made by King Oscar II of
Sweden to discern if the solar system was stable. To do this, Poincare studied
the three-body problem of planetary motion, which deals hypothetically with two
large stationary bodies and one smaller body revolving around the two larger
bodies. While Poincare was unsuccessful in his attempts to establish if the solar
system was stable, he identified the complexity inherent in trying to describe the
behavior of a system with more than two variables (bodies). Poincare discovered
that miniscule errors in measurement of the smaller bodies’ initial states made
prediction of its future state problematic—that is, sensitive dependence on initial
conditions. As the system evolves over time, the trajectory of the smaller body
becomes complex and difficult to map, a trajectory he appropriately called a
homoclinic tangle.
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Poincare’s work, however, went largely unnoticed by the scientific and
mathematical communities. The trajectory of homoclinic tangles was simply too
complicated to work out by hand for any reasonable length of time. It was not
until the late 1960s and early 1970s that many scientists from a diverse array of
fields came to work on similar problems in mathematics and the physical
sciences (e.g., Lorenz, 1963; Mandelbrot, 1967; May, 1974, 1976). The
availability of computers assisted greatly in resurrecting Poincare’s work on
homoclinic tangles. Computers could perform the needed calculations quickly
and provided visual displays of a system’s complex dynamics, which helped
scientists and mathematicians visualize how dynamic systems like the threebody problem change overtime. The MIT meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1963),
for example, modeled weather patterns using differential equations on his
computer and inadvertently rediscovered the aforementioned sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. He found that seemingly minute rounding errors
in his computer programs of simulated weather produced radically different
patterns of weather in the same manner as Poincare’s three-body problem.
Most chaos theorists generally agree that the word “chaos” only became a
popular term associated with this kind of phenomena after two papers named this
kind of behavior in systems “chaos.” Robert May (1974), a population biologist
from Princeton University, published a paper on simple predator-prey models of
wildlife population growth. May’s work indicated that, depending on parameter
and initial state values, simple equations that model predatory-prey interactions
can exhibit stable population values (fixed points), populations that cycle
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between certain values (limit cycles), and chaotic fluctuations of population
values. Mathematician Tien-Yien Li and physicist James Yorke’s (1975) paper
“Period Three Implies Chaos” in the American Mathematical Monthly discussed
similar chaotic behavior using simple equations in a more mathematical style.40
The take home message of both papers was that simple equations that represent
processes in nature simulate chaotic behavior. If these equations accurately
represent processes in nature, then it should not be difficult to find real world
examples of chaotic phenomena in nature. These papers enjoyed a wide
readership among scientists from a number of disciplines and the term “chaos”
caught on as a buzzword for this type of phenomena.
Accompanying the new research developments in chaos during the 1960s
and 1970s was the emergence of professional meetings on the subject. For
instance, in 1977 the New York Academy of Sciences recognized chaos theory’s
impact on the scientific community and sponsored a conference on chaotic
behavior hosted by mathematician Okan Gurel and physiologist Otto Rossler
(1979). There were only a few dozen participants at the conference, but they
included the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (see, 1967), who developed the
idea of fractal geometry, and the aforementioned Robert May and James Yorke.
The New York Academy of Sciences held a second conference on chaos theory
two years later. Unlike the first conference, which was relatively small, there were
hundreds of professionals and graduate students flocking to this one (Gleick,

40 An often overlooked citation from that same year was F. Henin and Ilya Prigogine(1974) paper
entitled “Entropy, dynamics, and molecular chaos” in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences.
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1987). Chaos theory had caught on as a new way of thinking about various
phenomena in the physical world and scientists were beginning to clamor for a
piece of this new research area. Conferences on chaos theory continued
throughout the 1980s and the topics of presentation became more diverse. For
instance, the Royal Society of London’s conference in 1987 included papers
presented by Robert May and colleagues (1987) on chaos in biological
populations, physiologist Leon Glass and colleagues (1987) on chaotic behavior
in heartbeats, and physicist Jack Wisdom (1987) on chaos in the solar system.
Chaos theory was gaining recognition as a legitimate topic of research even if the
formal definitions about what it was and how to study it were at best ambiguous.
Chaos theory was moving from the fringe areas of science to the mainstream of
numerous disciplines.
The late 1970s and early 1980s presented graduate students with
opportunities to explore phenomena now grouped together under the name
“chaos.” For example, Doyne Farmer, Robert Shaw, and James Crutchfield,
graduate students from the University of California, Santa Cruz began
investigating chaotic behavior in dripping faucets (Crutchfield, Farmer, Packard,
& Shaw, 1986; Shaw, 1984). Graduate student interest prompted universities to
begin offering classes in nonlinear dynamics, fractal geometry, and chaos theory.
Similarly, scientists started creating institutes for the study of nonlinear and
chaotic behavior. The University of Maryland founded the interdisciplinary Chaos
Group in the middle 1970s. Cornell University started its Chaotic Dynamics
Laboratory in the late 1970s. In 1980, Los Alamos opened the Center for
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Nonlinear Studies. Others followed suit such as the Santa Fe Institute in 1984
and the Center for Nonlinear Studies at the University of North Texas in 1994.
With the advent of conferences and places to study, there emerged
content-specific journals and textbooks pertaining to chaos theory. The journal
Chaos, from the American Institute of Physics, began publication in 1991. David
Campbell, a physicist and editor in chief of Chaos, was also the director of the
Center for Nonlinear Studies at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Technical
manuals such as Ralph Abraham and Chris Shaw’s (1983) Dynamics: The
Geometry of Behavior, Robert Devaney’s (1986) An Introduction to Chaotic
Dynamical Systems, and Benoit Mandelbrot’s (1982) The Fractal Geometry of
Nature became popular among scientists and students trying to understand the
ideas and methods of chaos theory.
It was during the middle 1980s that psychologists began seeing the
possibility of using chaos theory as a way of understanding psychological
phenomena. Chaos theory found its way into psychology via physiological and
neuronal investigations in addition to popularized accounts of chaos.
Physiologists began investigating phenomena such as heart rate variability
(Goldberger, Bhargava, & West, 1985), physiological control systems (Glass &
Mackay, 1979; Mackey & Glass, 1977), neurophysiology (Mandell, 1984), and
brain activity (Babloyantz, Nicolis, & Salazar, 1985). The physiologists analyzed
physiological time series data obtained from electrocardiogram and
electroencephalogram output. Researchers in neural networks developed
nonlinear mathematical models of neural processes (Carpenter & Grossberg,
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1987). It was only a small leap from studying internal processes such as brain
activity and neural networks to other psychological phenomena.
The 1980s and 1990s also saw the introduction of chaos theory to the lay
public in the form of popularized books (e.g., Briggs & Peat, 1989; Carpenter &
Grossberg, 1987; Coveney & Highfield, 1995; Gleick, 1987; Jantsch, 1980;
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Stewart, 1989). These popularized accounts
attempted to bring this esoteric subject to a more general audience. The focus of
many of these accounts was on the scientists studying chaos rather than on the
mathematics of chaos theory. The authors of these accounts dramatically
characterized the individuals studying chaos theory as misunderstood geniuses,
loners, and rebels that were fighting against the theoretical and philosophical
dogma inherent in traditional disciplines. For instance in James Gleick’s (1987)
bestseller, Chaos: Making a New Science, he describes Mitchell Feigenbaum, a
scientist working in the theoretical division of Los Alamos, this way:
His hair was a ragged mane, sweeping back from his wide brow in the
style of busts of German composers. His eyes were sudden and
passionate. When he spoke, always rapidly, he tended to drop articles and
pronouns in a vaguely European way, even though he was a native of
Brooklyn. When he worked, he worked obsessively. When he could not
work, he walked and thought, day or night, and night was best of all. The
twenty-four hour day seemed too constraining, (p. 2)
These simplified versions were appealing to the general public as well as to
psychologists. Many psychologists simply lacked the mathematical training
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needed to understand the underpinnings of chaos theory and these accounts
gave them the illusion of understanding.
Accompanying the glamorized portrayals, these authors hailed chaos
theory as a new Kuhnian paradigm shift for the sciences that would overthrow
the putative dominant, reductionistic Newtonian worldview and replace it with a
theory more conducive to studying holism, change, and complexity. In one of
these accounts, Fritjof Capra (1996), theoretical physicist, stated, “We are now at
the beginning of...a fundamental change of worldviews in science and society, a
change of paradigms as radical as the Copernican revolution” (p. 4). Ralph
Abraham, a mathematician from the University of California, Santa Cruz, stated
that chaos theory was “the paradigm shift of paradigm shifts” (from Gleick, 1987).
Elsewhere, Abraham (1994) called the fervor for this new perspective the “chaos
revolution” because it had influenced virtually all the physical sciences. In 1989,
the journal Science devoted a six part series to exploring chaos theory’s uses in
physiology, epidemiology, meteorology, quantum physics, and population biology.
The sixth installment in the series discussed the possibility of chaos theory being
a new paradigm in the sciences. In the discussion, the physicist Joseph Ford
argued that science was “in the beginning of a major revolution...The whole way
we see nature will be changed” (in Pool, 1989, p. 2 6 )41 In other media, the
television show NOVA featured an episode entitled “The Strange New Science of
Chaos” that was geared towards a general audience and pronounced chaos
41 Others were more skeptical of the merits of chaos theory as a new paradigm. The philosopher
of science Steven Toulmin contended that while chaos theory brings into question the
predictability of the world, it has not opened up a new level of behavior for investigation as had
quantum mechanics and relativity (Pool, 1989).
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theory as a revolution in the sciences (Taylor, 1989). Exemplifying the general
spread of interest in chaos theory is the best selling novel and subsequent movie
Jurassic Park in which one of the protagonists was a chaos theorist (Crichton,
1990). The take-home message of these books appealed to the public and
psychologists’ “folk knowledge” of the way the world worked and the
philosophical assumptions scientists used in their research. Essentially, the takehome message was this: (1) nature is messy, complex, and often unpredictable,
(2) nature is unpredictable because it exhibits nonlinear or chaotic behavior, (3)
systems that display chaotic behavior are constantly evolving and are healthy,
whereas systems that reach a steady state cease to evolve and perish, (4) the
reductionism of the Newtonian perspective is inadequate to explain many of
these “real world” processes, (5) what scientists in a laboratory can demonstrate
after controlling all extraneous variables is nothing like the complex behavior one
sees in nature.
With scientists from closely related disciplines such as physiology
beginning to investigate chaos theory, the glut of popular books on the subject,
and the rhetoric of a new paradigm coming from individuals in the “hard”
sciences, some psychologists began to conduct research and write theoretical
papers on chaos theory’s possible uses for understanding human mind and
behavior. The reference sections from many works pertaining to chaos theory in
psychology support my claim that the popular books influenced these
psychologists (e.g., Blitz, 1992; e.g., Sally Goerner, 1995; Krippner, 1994; Mosca,
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1995; Parry, 1996). In the next section, I describe the kinds of practices
psychologists incorporated into the discipline that were part of chaos theory.
Conceptual Practices
Chaos theory provided a wealth of concepts, theories, and methods on
which psychologists needed to conduct boundary-work between the 1980s and
2000. Terms such as “fractals,” “bifurcations,” “the butterfly effect,” “phase
space,” “self-organization,” “auto-catalysis,” and “strange attractors” began to
appear in psychology’s literature in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Research
oriented and applied psychologists often used these terms as metaphors for
describing psychological phenomena. The biopsychologist Frederick Abraham
(1989), for instance, used the concept of attractors to develop a hypothetical
model of Jung’s concept of the psyche. Following Jung’s idea that the human
psyche oscillates, Abraham’s model outlined the various states of the psyche as
different kinds of attractors. According to Abraham’s model, as the psyche
focuses on various internal processes (e.g., two conflicting thoughts) and
external stimuli (e.g., daily stressors), these forces produce bifurcations in the
psyche that propel it between various attractor states.
Some clinical psychologists and family therapists began viewing humans
in general and the therapeutic relationship between client and therapist as
nonlinear dynamic systems (e.g., Chubb, 1990; Gottman, 1991; Lonie, 1991;
Stevens, 1991). Clinical psychologist Michael Butz (1993), for instance, claimed
that psychotherapeutic interventions perturb the client qua a nonlinear system
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and it is the therapist’s responsibility to understand that this destabilization is a
necessary process for client change. Of this process Butz stated
Based on a client’s history the therapist might select a particular time to
make an interpretive intervention to bring the client’s chaotic state towards
greater complexity, and yet, at the same time to create new order. On the
other hand, some interpretations may be used to destabilize previously
held rigid beliefs that are no longer adaptive to move a client towards a
more chaotic state, (p. 549)
Butz argued that either of these options promotes “adaptive growth’’ in the client,
which is the goal of effective treatment in therapy. Family therapist Margaret
Ward (1995) contended that the family be seen as a nonlinear system that
exhibits chaotic behavior. She argued that the tenets of chaos theory are a more
effective way of viewing the family and its interactions than previous models of
the family. She argued further that the possibility exists that therapists could
begin to mathematically model family interactions and develop computer
simulations of family dynamics in much the same way scientists from other
disciplines were modeling their respective phenomena.
In line with these metaphorical uses, it also became fashionable to
propose various psychological phenomena as self-organizing systems—an
inherent property of any chaotic system in which it continually becomes more
complex via interactions with the environment. Michael Schwalbe (1991)
proposed the concept of the “s e lf as one such self-organizing system within
humans. He proposed, “By considering the human organism as a...dynamical
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system with inherent capacities for self-organization, we can expand our vision
and reconnect the body and the natural world to the emergence of self and mind”
(p. 278). In a related vein, developmental psychologist Marc Lewis (1995) argued
for a self-organizing process in the relationship between cognition and emotion
feedback processes. Lewis believed that a central process in personality and
behavioral development is the complex interaction between stability and chaos in
the cognition and emotion system. Clinical psychologist Frank Masterpasqua
(1997) argued that human development is a process of self-organization. This
process keeps humans changing and growing as they develop. It is through this
self-organizational process that people stay healthy. People who reach a state of
equilibrium begin to experience problems such as psychopathology during their
development because they stop self-organizing. According to Masterpasqua, a
therapist’s duty is to recognize this process towards psychopathology, distress,
and disease and help clients move toward “far-from equilibrium” states that will
foster the self-organizing process.
Other conceptual practices that psychologists borrowed from chaos
theorists were their methods of analysis. These included methods such as
attractor reconstruction, nonlinear time series analysis, and catastrophe modeling,
in addition to measures of chaos such as Lyapunov exponents and KolmogorovSinai entropy. Psychologists found two primary uses of chaos theory’s methods.
First, psychologists’ used differential equations to build mathematical models of
psychological phenomena. For instance, Stephen Guastello (1981) created a
catastrophe model for equity in the work place in an attempt to outline various
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types of employee behavior— innovation, motivated performance, absenteeism,
turnover, strike, riot—and at which point between employee costs and rewards
would there be qualitative shifts from one behavior to the next. Frederick
Abraham and colleagues (1990) developed a dynamical model of John Dollard
and Neal Miller’s approach-avoidance conflict scheme, which indicated that at
certain parameters approach-avoidance behavior will exhibit fixed, limit cycle,
and chaotic attractors. Scott Clair (1998) demonstrated that his catastrophe
theory model of situational pressures was a better predictor of adolescent alcohol
use than three traditional linear models.
The second use, and by far the more common one, was that psychologists
used the methods of chaos theory to examine actual data to see if there was any
evidence of chaotic behavior. Most data psychologists generated that lent itself to
this kind of analysis were time series data. According to psychologist Keith
Clayton (1997, July) these new approaches from chaos theory served three
purposes in the analysis of time series data: (a) distinguishing chaotic from
random data, (b) discerning if the data are from a deterministic system, and (c)
assessing the dimensionality of the data. I present a few of the many studies
pertaining to the search for chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena. For
instance, Allen Neuringer and Cheryl Voss (1993) analyzed time series data of
participants attempting to anticipate the next number in the logistics equation—
an equation that produces chaotic output. The time series data indicated that
subject responses closely resembled chaotic behavior. Therapist Gary
Burlingame and colleagues (1995) analyzed times series data of client-therapist
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interactions using the Hill Interaction Matrix (1973) during time-limited
psychotherapy. They discovered that the time series data contained a fractal
dimension indicating a complex, nonlinear order.
Material Practices
The material practices of chaos theorists that prompted psychologists to
engage in boundary-work were brought about largely by the increasing
availability and pedagogical utility of computing technology during the 1980s.
Computers were essential for carrying out the complex calculations necessary for
detecting and analyzing a system’s chaotic behavior. Not only were computers
essential for carrying out the calculations, but advances in software development
were making computer graphics more visually appealing. There were a number
of software packages offering scientists the opportunity to view chaotic behavior
visually including Mathematica, Dynamical Software (Schaffer, Truty, & Fuimer,
1988), and Chaos Data Analyzer (Sprott & Rowlands, 1992). These software
packages afforded psychologists who lacked the mathematical background a
way to comprehend chaos theory. The understanding came through graphically
displayed output, simulations of chaotic behavior, and through the analysis
components of the software. These programs allowed psychologists a way to
begin exploring possible chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena.
Social Practices
In the late 1980s, individuals interested in the relationship between chaos
theory and the social sciences began publishing newsletters such as The
Dynamics Newsletter and The Social Dynamicist. At the time, most scientists
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interested in chaos theory worked in relative isolation, as was the case with the
graduate students from Santa Cruz and Mitchell Feigenbaum at Los Alamos. It
was a new field, especially to social sciences like psychology, and the published
material on chaos could only be found in journals with which most social
scientists were unfamiliar. These newsletters assisted in alleviating this problem.
The newsletters helped to facilitate shared communication networks by providing
psychologists with conference announcements, brief articles, software reviews,
and contact information from a number of scientific disciplines including physics,
chemistry, mathematics, and biology.
It was also during this time that conferences related to chaos theory and
psychology began to appear. In 1987 Walter Freeman, Alan Garfinkel, and Otto
Roessler presented a workshop on the implications of chaos theory for the study
of cognitive processes at the International Conference on the Dynamics of
Sensory and Cognitive Processing by the Brain in West Berlin (Freeman, 1987).
In 1988, the Beth Israel Medical Center hosted a conference on mathematical
models, many of which were models derived from chaos theory, for
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (Abraham, 1988). Other conferences also
being held during this time included Fractals and Chaos in the Natural and Social
Sciences held in Miami, Ohio in June of 1989 (Goerner, 1989b) and Chaos and
its Implications for Psychology held in the same year at the Saybrook Institute in
San Francisco (Goerner, 1989a).
Places to study chaos theory in psychology began to appear as well. For
instance, in 1985, Scott Kelso, a psychologist at Florida Atlantic University, and
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Herman Kaken, a theoretical physicist at Stuttgart, established the Center for
Complex Systems at Kelso’s university (Kelso, 1995). The Center offered training
in complex systems brain research for undergraduates, graduate students, and
postdoctoral fellows coming from the natural and behavioral sciences (Kelso,
1989). Funding for the Center came from the National Institute of Health, the
Office of Naval Research, and the National Science Foundation (Kelso, 1995).
In 1991, psychologists and other scientists formed the Society for Chaos
Theory in Psychology and the Life Science (SCTPLS) in San Francisco
(Guastello, 1997). The Society aimed to bring together “researchers,
theoreticians, and practitioners interested in applying dynamical systems theory,
far-from equilibrium thermodynamics, self-organization, neural nets, fractals,
cellular automata, and related forms of chaos, catastrophes, and bifurcations,
nonlinear dynamics, and complexity theories to psychology and the life sciences”
(p. 301). Due, in part, to the multiple areas of SCTPLS, members were an
interdisciplinary group comprised largely of psychologists, neuroscientists,
computer scientists, mathematicians, and educators. In 1997, the Society
developed a quarterly journal, Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life
Sciences. As the title indicates, the journal sought to publish peer-reviewed
papers pertaining to psychology and other sciences.
The rhetoric of a new paradigm was a common strategy for legitimizing
the use of chaos theory in psychology. Bolstering these claims was the rhetoric
about chaos as a new paradigm in the physical sciences. In his inaugural
address of the first SCTPLS conference Fredrick Abraham (1995), the Society’s
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second president, boldly pronounced: “Within five years, the dynamical vision
[chaos theory] will be the hegemonical view in psychology” (p. xxvii).
Psychotherapist Sally Goerner (1995) described chaos theory as a “revolution”
that would have profound implications for comprehending psychological
phenomena. Therapist and consciousness researcher Allan Combs (1995)
proclaimed that “Chaos theory is not simply a set of novel procedures that can be
imported into the existing establishment of scientific psychology; it in fact
represents a fundamental revolution [italics added] in viewpoint” (p. 129). The
psychiatrist Isla Lonie (1995) argued, “Chaos theory will be able to provide a
paradigm that can permit a greater understanding of [psychodynamic processes]
especially in that it provides a basis for demanding recognition that Newtonian
science is unequal to the task” (p. 293). Similar to my other case studies,
psychologists using chaos theory felt it would be the next “revolution” in both the
applied and scientific realms of psychology. Given such strong claims, it is
important to describe psychologists’ reactions to such claims.
Resistances to Chaos Theory
Surprisingly, psychologists did not engage in much boundary-work with
the introduction of chaos theory into the discipline. There were only a small
number of psychologists interested in chaos theory and the work they did
seemed to be of little importance and relevance to most psychologists’ research.
Despite the unorthodox nature of the theory, psychologists using it neither
caused as much political controversy as the evolutionary psychologists nor
threatened an established theory such as behaviorism like the cognitive
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scientists. Psychologists using chaos theory’s models and methods were on the
fringes of the discipline and apparently merited little attention, despite their claims
that chaos theory constituted a paradigm shift for the discipline. Nevertheless,
some psychologists, even those interested in using chaos theory in psychology,
resisted some of its uses.
Because chaos theory’s main uses were in the physical sciences, some
psychologists questioned its relevance for psychology. They argued that while
chaos theory may provide insight for processes such as transitions to turbulence
in fluids, chemical reactions, planetary orbits, stock market fluctuations, and a
host of other physical phenomena, its ability to explain human mind and behavior
may be beyond its explanatory power. The psychologist Wayne Powell (1995)
collaborated with Eric Kincanon, a physicist, to warn psychologists of their
explorations into chaos theory. By collaborating with a physicist, Powell brought
with him the authority and prestige of a “hard” science to help him patrol
psychology’s boundaries. While the overall tone of the article was enthusiastic
about chaos theory’s potential for explaining psychological phenomena, Powell
and Kincanon made sure to point out that psychologists’ misuse of chaos theory
was still very apparent. In one of their major points of contention they stated,
“Although many areas will benefit from the application of chaos theory,
psychologists must still beware of the misapplication, misunderstanding, and
poor metaphorical uses of chaos” (p. 504). For instance, they pointed out that in
psychologist H. A. Skinner’s (1989) article on the potential of chaos theory for
explaining alcohol addiction, he misuses the idea of sensitive dependence on
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initial conditions. First, Powell and Kincanon argue, Skinner failed to explain how
the chaos leading to sensitive dependence could be measured with any precision.
Secondly, Skinner believed that small changes in interventions by therapists
would have a “dramatic effect” on whether an individual developed an addiction.
According to Powell and Kincanon, the problem with this supposition is that
Skinner confused small changes with small measurements. They pointed out that
it is small measurement errors and not small changes to the addiction system
that lead to sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
In another attempt at boundary-work with chaos theory, psychologist
Susan Ayers (1997) questioned whether psychologists’ metaphorical uses of
chaos theory offered a viable explanatory framework in psychology. Using chaos
as a metaphorical device was quite common in the published literature,
especially among psychotherapists (e.g., Butz, 1992; Mosca, 1995), family
therapists (e.g., Chamberlain, 1995), and the closely related fields of psychiatry
(e.g., Ehlers, 1995; Globus & Arpaia, 1994) and psychoanalysis (e.g., Levenson,
1994; Spruiell, 1993). While using metaphor to develop theories and to create
new perspectives is common in science, there comes a time when the theory
needs testing. Many psychologists seemed content to use merely the ideas from
chaos theory as a metaphor. She continued her critique, stating “there are many
obstacles to the application of chaos to psychology: chaos can be difficult to
understand, difficult to apply and sometimes even difficult to believe” (p. 392).
These difficulties were at the heart of psychologists’ resistances to chaos theory.
Many psychologists simply did not understand chaos theory and this is evident in
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the seemingly cavalier way some of them used concepts like fractals, nonlinearity,
and bifurcations. But resistances also arose in reaction to psychologists using the
methods of chaos theory to analyze their data.
Resistances came from those who questioned whether the methods of
chaos theory could ever adequately explain psychological phenomena.
Measuring static psychological variables with the precision that, say, physicists’
measure physical variables is problematic. Describing and defining the
parameters of dynamic psychological systems further exacerbates precise
measurement. Exemplifying this type of resistance, mathematical psychologist R.
Duncan Luce (1995) argued, “The difficulty with this approach is the crudity with
which the dynamic processes are known. Until they are pinned down in much
more detail, one cannot view this approach [chaos theory] as more than an
interesting speculation” (p. 23). Essentially, his argument is that psychologists
working with nonlinear models cannot work from the bottom-up and derive their
dynamic variables from basic laws like those in physics. Instead, they have to
infer dynamic processes from unobservable mechanisms through trial and error.
Luce pointed to the work of Robert Gregson (e.g., 1988), who develops nonlinear
models of psychophysical processes, as an example of this trial and error
process. He ends his critique of nonlinear modeling on a less than enthusiastic
note: “it is hard to be optimistic about our ability to test these nonlinear models
effectively” (p. 20).
Paul Rapp (1995), a physiologist studying brain functions at the Medical
College of Pennsylvania, issued this caveat to psychologists after many years of
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trying to demonstrate chaotic behavior in the brain: “Is there any evidence for
chaos in the human central nervous system? The body of evidence in support of
this conclusion continues to decrease as analytic methods improve” (p. 99).
Similarly, Radford University brain researcher Karl Pribram (1996) discussed the
difficulty of distinguishing between stochastic and chaotic behavior. Pribram and
others found that nerve impulses function more characteristically as stochastic
processes rather than as chaotic processes (Pribram, 1994).
Accommodations to Chaos Theory
Psychologists did not accommodate chaos theory as much as they did
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. Still, psychologists made some
accommodations for chaos theory. For instance, the SCTPLS triggered interest
from the American Psychological Association. In 1992, Karl Pribram persuaded
psychologist Albert Gilgen from the University of Northern Iowa to contact the
SCTPLS. The purpose of contacting the Society was to see if its members could
promote chaos theory as a unifying theme for the APA’s theoretical and
philosophical psychology division (Division 24) annual program (Gilgen, 1995).
The program helped to promote chaos theory’s use in psychology by exposing a
large number of psychologists to its tenets. The APA’s interest continued when,
in 1994, the journal American Psychologist published its first article on chaos
theory entitled “Chaos, Self-Organization, and Psychology” (Barton, 1994). The
issue of the journal even included a picture of a fractal on the cover. The article
was critical of the uses of chaos in psychology, pointing out a number of
methodological difficulties that needed addressing when using its methods to
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study human psychological processes. Nevertheless, Barton hailed chaos theory
as a “new paradigm for understanding systems...gaining the attention of
psychologists from a wide variety of specialty areas” (p. 5). The APA
demonstrated its continuing interest in chaos theory by publishing an edited
volume on the relationship of chaos theory to the areas of development,
psychopathology, and psychotherapy entitled The Psychological Meaning of
Chaos (Masterpasqua & Perna, 1997).
Another indicator of the acceptance of chaos theory in psychology is
evident from a citation analysis of the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)
conducted by Peter Weingart and Sabine Maasen (1997) between the years
1974 and 1996. Their analysis indicates that the psychological literature
accounted for the most citations pertaining to chaos theory of all the social
sciences covered in the SSCI— including economics, business, sociology, and
education between these years.42 Additional analysis indicates that psychologists
used chaos theory not only as a metaphorical device, but also as a
methodological tool and theoretical framework in virtually every subdiscipline
within psychology (Root, 2002, August). Examples from the psychological
literature include applications to thought and memory (e.g., Clayton & Frey, 1996;
e.g., Garson, 1996), intelligence (e.g., Goertzel, 1998), psychophysics (e.g.,
Gregson, 1992), behavioral analysis (e.g., Hoyert, 1992), development (e.g.,
Howe & Rabinowitz, 1994; Metzger, 1997), sensation and perception (e.g.,
Gilden, Schmuckler, & Clayton, 1993), psychotherapy (e.g., Fuhriman &
42 Weingart and Maasen’s original study separated citations in psychology from citations in
experimental psychology. I combined the two here.
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Burlingame, 1994; Hager, 1992; Paar, 1989, 1992), and industrial organizational
psychology (e.g., Gregersen & Sailer, 1993; Guastello, 1995).
Despite these accommodations, psychologists did not accept the tenets of
chaos theory as they did the ones of evolutionary psychology and cognitive
science. The relative excitement about its potential uses and as a revolutionary
paradigm quickly waned. As Stephen Guastello (2001) indicated, “The days of
‘Here’s Chaos!’ have been gone for quite some time” (p. 27). There were only a
relatively small number of courses taught on chaos theory in psychology and
those who did offer these courses were usually members of SCTPLS (e.g., Keith
Clayton, Fred Abraham, and Stephen Guastello). A cursory survey of
undergraduate and graduate statistics and research textbooks (Aron & Aron,
1999; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000; Grimm & Yarnold, 1998, 2000; Howell, 2004;
Kirk, 1995; Myers & Well, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; Winer, Brown, &
Michels, 1991) indicate that the mathematical modeling strategies and data
analysis methods of chaos theory did not permeate the pedagogical research
literature. Unlike evolutionary psychology, no introductory psychology textbooks
contained sections on chaos theory’s uses in psychology.
Of my three case studies, it appears that by 2000 chaos theory was still on
the fringe of the discipline and on the verge of fading into disuse altogether. I
postulate several reasons for chaos theory’s distant relationship to the discipline
of psychology. Most psychologists never received appropriate training in the
methods of chaos theory so they never incorporated it into their research.
Psychological data is often more “noisy” than data from physics, chemistry, and
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biology due to the difficulty psychologists experience when trying to control
extraneous variables. It is often difficult to separate this noise from truly chaotic
behavior even with the methods of chaos theory. Generating the appropriate and
correct amounts of psychological data is difficult, especially considering the
requirements to search for chaotic processes. Most chaos theorists agree that in
order to find chaotic behavior in any type of system, one need acquire thousands,
if not tens of thousands, of data points (Williams, 1997). This proves problematic
for most psychologists, though physiological data may meet this requirement.
Finally, as Rapp (1995) suggested, as the methods to measure chaotic behavior
become more refined, there are questions as to whether psychological
phenomena really do exhibit chaotic behavior.
Psychologists did not do much boundary-work pertaining to chaos theory.
Psychologists realized the difficulties of using chaos theory to explain human
mind and behavior. Some psychologists however, began using dynamic systems
frameworks and the idea of self-organization to study psychological phenomena
in fields such as development (e.g., Thelen, 1992; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 1987),
social psychology (e.g., Vallacher & Nowak, 1994), personality (e.g., Pervin,
2001) and cognition (e.g., van Geert, 2000; van Gelder, 1998). As identifying
chaotic behavior in psychological data proved problematic, these psychologists
decided to develop models of psychological phenomena based on the broader
category of dynamic systems. While they do not ignore the possibility of chaotic
behavior, they realize that chaotic behavior is only a small subset of possible
behaviors in dynamic systems. One of the advantages of adopting this approach
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is that one can use both nonlinear and linear models and statistics in their
investigations. So even if chaos theory dies out completely in psychology, the
use of dynamic systems theory will keep the idea of complexity and
unpredictability within the repertoire of psychologists’ practices.

177

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The discipline of U.S. psychology is a complex web of interacting
subdisciplines. Psychologists from each of these subdisciplines carve out niches
of power, control, and expertise in particular psychological domains. Social
psychologists carve out niches in the realm of social interactions, personality
psychologists control information pertaining to the basic components of the “self,”
and so on. Psychologists have a stake in keeping their epistemic authority in
these domains. Society in general perceives psychologists as experts of human
mind, behavior, and emotion and society elicits their help in many ways. The
justice system, for instance, relies on psychologists’ expertise in evaluating
competence and sanity in court cases. Businesses hire psychologists to improve
worker productivity and evaluate new employees. It is difficult to find an area of
society in which psychologists or their various conceptual, material, and social
practices do not come into consideration.
Because of this perceived expertise, society relies on psychologists to
prescribe appropriate ways of “being” in the world. Psychologists receive
accolades, rewards, and prestige from their expert status. As I previously
outlined, psychologists receive funding from various governmental and
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philanthropic sources such as the National Institute of Mental Health and the
Sloan Foundation. These funds allow psychologists to pursue their areas of
specialization. The more funding a psychologist receives typically results in
more rewards (e.g., promotion and tenure) and prestige for the psychologist.
In order to keep this epistemic authority, psychologists engage in
boundary-work. They patrol their boundaries, constantly scanning the
disciplinary landscape for possible “cracks in the wall” where undesirables
may enter. When psychologists find these undesirables, they use their
authoritative position in society to demonstrate, through intellectual and
political means, how they are distinct from these undesirables. Psychologists
will often attack the scientific credibility of these undesirables, calling them
pseudo-scientists, as they did and still continue to do with parapsychologists
(e.g., Benjamin & Baker, 2004; Coon, 1992). In other situations, they will
distance themselves from recognized fraudulent practices as some
psychologists did after discovering discrepancies in Cyril Burt’s intelligence
data (e.g., Gieryn & Figert, 1986; Zenderland, 1990). Boundary-work is not
only a tool for resisting practices; it is also a useful activity for bringing in new
practices. Psychologists engage in boundary-work to incorporate new
practices into the discipline, especially if they deem these practices as
beneficial to their epistemic authority. At first, many psychologists resisted
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, but after the growing public interest in Freud’s
theory, they began associating psychoanalytic theory with their own discipline
(Hornstein, 1992). Psychologists’ boundary-work is a continual process of
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resistances and accommodations towards objects, technology, ideas,
metaphors, and theories impinging on their intellectual territory.
Between 1970 and 2000, the interdisciplinary programs of evolutionary
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory impinged upon the
intellectual territory of psychology. Scientists from each of these disciplines
brought with them an array of conceptual, material, and social practices that
forced psychologists to evaluate the boundaries of their discipline.
Psychologists reacted to the practices of these programs by resisting
particular dimensions of these scientists’ practices or making
accommodations for them. Within this thirty year span, psychologists dictated
the allocation of these practices by what they believed to be useful for
furthering their epistemic authority and general understanding of
psychological phenomena.
Evolutionary Psychology
While psychologists have used the evolutionary theories of Lamarck
and Darwin throughout the discipline’s history, it was not until the 1980s that
an organized group of scientists calling themselves evolutionary
psychologists began to bring their conceptual, material, and social practices
into the discipline. Evolutionary psychologists built their interdisciplinary
program based on the controversial and politically-charged theory of
sociobiology developed a decade earlier by the entomologist E. O. Wilson.
Conducting boundary-work in their own program, evolutionary psychologists
distanced themselves from sociobiology by focusing solely on the adaptive
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function of the human mind rather than the adaptive social behavior of all
living organisms. Evolutionary psychologists proposed that cognitive abilities
such as mate selection and retention, and reasoning in social exchanges
were adaptations produced during our time in the Pleistocene era as huntergatherers.
Conceptually, evolutionary psychologists attacked psychologists’
standard social science model, considering it an inadequate theoretical
framework for psychology. Evolutionary psychologists’ argued that humans
were not born as “blank slates” but instead were born with innate,
psychological mechanisms designed to solve adaptive problems such as
those for detecting cheaters in social exchanges. In terms of material
practices, evolutionary psychologists used software programs that changed
the physical appearance of human faces and body types for their experiments
on physical attractiveness. The social practices of evolutionary psychologists
typify the ways in which organizations become professionalized and
institutionalized. They developed a professional organization—The Human
Behavior and Evolution Society—and a professional journal—Evolution and
Human Behavior. These social practices enhanced evolutionary
psychologists’ credibility with the public and psychologists. Another social
practice of evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buss, 1995; Simpson, 1995) was
their rhetoric about their theory being a revolution or paradigm shift in
psychology.
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Psychologists reacted in different ways to evolutionary psychology.
Some resisted the practices of evolutionary psychologists, some made
accommodations for these practices, and still others seemed to ignore their
ideas altogether. I found that some psychologists resisted evolutionary
psychologists’ advocacy of the adaptationist perspective. Evolutionary
psychologists relied on evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, and other
scientists (e.g., George Williams, Robert Trivers) to outline the adaptationist
perspective. Some psychologists responded by obtaining arguments from
other scientists (e.g., Gould and Lewontin) to refute the adaptationist
perspective (Rose & Rose, 2000). Others objected to evolutionary
psychologists’ reliance on adaptations and not enough on cultural factors in
the understanding of human cognitive processes (Burn, 1996). Feminist
psychologists such as Alice Eagly (1995) were concerned with the political
ramifications of the gender difference findings of many evolutionary
psychologists.
There is ample evidence that psychologists made accommodations for
some of evolutionary psychologists’ practices. Many top tier journals such as
Psychological Review and American Psychologist published evolutionary
accounts of various psychological phenomena. Evolutionary psychologists’
research permeated many subdisciplines in psychology including cognition,
development, and social psychology. Similarly, a number of introduction to
psychology textbooks provided sections on evolutionary psychology. Also,
textbooks for introductory and advanced psychology classes specifically
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written by evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buss, 1999) came on the market.
Accompanying the published accounts, a number of schools offered
undergraduate and graduate courses in evolutionary psychology in addition to
a few schools offering doctoral students specialization in evolutionary
psychology. Finally, some evolutionary psychologists and feminist
psychologists attempted rapprochement in the published literature (Buss &
Malamuth, 1996).
Cognitive Science
The interdisciplinary program of cognitive science began infringing
upon psychology’s territory in the 1970s. The formation of cognitive science
occurred as disciplines such as computer science, artificial intelligence,
cognitive psychology, and neuroscience converged on the idea of using the
digital computer as a metaphor for how humans process information.
Cognitive scientists try to understand human cognitive processes such as
memory, language, and problem solving, in addition to developing computer
programs that mimic aspects of these processes.
Conceptually, cognitive scientists brought the computer-as-mind
metaphor to many psychologists. For some, this metaphor served as a new
way to view human cognitive activities. This helped shape the language some
psychologists used to describe human thought, behavior, and emotions. The
language became oriented towards computer programming and terms such
as storage, parallel processing, and channel capacity began serving as
descriptive terms for cognitive processes. With this language came two types
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of models— symbolism and connectionism—that psychologists employed in
their attempts to understand information processing.
Cognitive scientists’ material practices took the shape of attempting to
create forms of artificial intelligence. Many psychologists still continue to use
animal models to explain aspects of human psychological phenomena, but
developing intelligence out of inorganic material was new and psychologists
had to be contended with this new practice. While cognitive scientists made
technological strides from Newall and Simon’s simple General Logic Theorist
to Brooks’ more sophisticated COG, attempts at recognizable intelligence in
machines still remain in their infancy.
Cognitive scientists brought many social practices to psychology. First,
psychologists had to deal with the large amount of funding from governmental
and private organizations cognitive scientists received for studying cognitive
processes. Secondly, psychologists’ realizations of the importance and
possibility of studying mental events for their discipline spawned a number of
journals specifically tailored to cognitive scientists such as Cognition and
Cognitive Science. Accompanying the journals, cognitive scientists developed
the Cognitive Science Society, which allowed scientists from various fields to
interact and exchange ideas. Third, the undergraduate and graduate
curriculum changed in many institutions as they began offering introductory
and advanced classes in cognitive science. Some held classes in cognitive
science institutions while others held them in psychology departments. Fourth,
many cognitive scientists believed their approach to cognition was a
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revolution or paradigm shift for psychology (e.g., Sperry, 1988). Finally,
cognitive scientists, specifically neuroscientists, brought brain imaging
technology to the discipline. These images served to represent the internal
structures and functions of the brain, while serving as a persuasive rhetorical
device. Psychologists now had the technology to peer inside the mind of
humans and watch the dynamical processes in action.
Resistances to cognitive scientists came mainly from behaviorists.
Cognitive science threatened the behaviorist perspective that was prominent
in psychology throughout the early to middle 1900s. Behaviorists found
cognitive activity superfluous for hypothesizing or impossible to study. A
science of psychology, so the behaviorists’ argued, comes about only through
a systematic study of stimuli and responses, and not through postulating
mental events that act as intermediaries between stimuli and behaviors. I
outlined a number of Skinner’s (e.g., 1985) objections to cognitive science as
a putative science. Other resistances came from those psychologists using
animal models to explain human behavior. They found it difficult to accept the
notion of using computers and computer programs to study humans. Others
resisted cognitive scientists’ reliance on brain imaging. Brian imaging, they
argued, only tells part of the story of cognition. It answers the “where”
questions but the not the “how” and “why” questions of cognitive processes.
Despite these resistances, some psychologists made accommodations
for the ideas, theories, and technology of cognitive scientists. According to
Robins and colleagues (1999), cognitive topics published in flagship journals
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rose from 1977 to 1996. This increase in citations coincides with the wide
range of applications of cognitive science in psychology’s subdisciplines
including education, personality, developmental, and clinical psychology.
Many psychology departments began offering cognitive science courses and
several textbooks within the discipline provided it with ample coverage.
Similarly, many cognitive psychology textbooks increased their coverage of
the neuroscience aspects of cognitive science. With this increased coverage
came the use of fMRI and PET images as evidence for cognitive processes.
Chaos Theory
Finally, in the mid-1980s some psychologists began considering the
viability of chaos theory as a way of understanding and analyzing human
mind, behavior, and emotions. I argued that psychologists became interested
in chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena as physiologists (e.g.,
Skarda & Freeman, 1987) began exploring its features and as the popular
science literature flooded with books on chaos theory (e.g., Gleick, 1987). In
particular, the popularized accounts of chaos theory, with their promises of a
scientific revolution, fascinated many psychologists. Many early works by
psychologists referenced either the physiologists or the popular portrayals of
chaos theory.
In terms of conceptual practices, some psychologists began adopting
the language of chaos theory to explain various dimensions of human
psychology. It was common to find terms such as “fractals,” “self
organization,” and “bifurcations” used metaphorically to explain diverse
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phenomena such as personality development and the psychotherapeutic
process. Some psychologists also began employing many of the methods
used by chaos theorists in other disciplines such as catastrophe modeling
and nonlinear time series analysis.
The computer offered the most salient material practice for chaos
theory. Some psychologists began using software programs such as Chaos
Data Analyzer (Sprott & Rowlands, 1992) specifically designed to analyze
large amounts of data quickly and efficiently. These types of programs helped
identify chaotic behavior in psychological data. Additionally, they used these
programs for visualizing the results of their experiments. The phenomena
these psychologists studied were dynamic and these programs allowed them
to view the changing nature of the systems under investigation in a much
more effective way than offered by traditional data analysis.
Socially, psychologists interested in chaos theory began
communicating through newsletters and conferences established largely for
other scientists. These communication networks allowed psychologists to
interact with scientists beyond their discipline and with other psychologists
interested in chaos theory they might not have otherwise met. Centers to
study chaotic behavior in psychological systems began to emerge in the
1990s such as the Center for Complex Systems at Florida Atlantic University.
In 1991, those interested in the ramification of chaos theory for psychological
phenomena formed the Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology and the Life
Sciences. Six years after the Society, they began publication of their
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interdisciplinary journal, Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences.
As with the other interdisciplinary programs, some psychologists began
referring to chaos theory as a new paradigm for psychological science (e.g.,
Combs, 1995).
Because employing chaos theory in psychology was a relatively small
movement, many psychologists ignored its uses. Those psychologists who
tried to resist its uses in the discipline attacked it on two fronts. First, they
objected to using chaos theory as a metaphor for psychological phenomena.
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, for instance, offered an
inappropriate metaphor for comments made by therapists to their clients
because it pertains to measurement rather than changes in conversation. The
second resistance involved psychologists trying to use the analytic techniques
of chaos in their research. Chaos theory’s methods were relatively new and
they were being refined constantly throughout the 1990s. Some psychologists
believed it to be premature to use such techniques. Others criticized the
difficulty in measurement of dynamic processes. It was much easier to
measure phenomenon in physics than it was psychological phenomena.
Finally, there were those who questioned if any psychological processes truly
exhibited chaotic behavior.
Despite chaos theory’s fringe status in the discipline, psychologists did
accept some of the practices inherent in this interdisciplinary program. For
instance, psychologists elicited assistance from members of the Society to
develop a program on unifying psychology for the APA in 1992. The APA also
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published a number of journal articles and a book on chaos theory. A number
of subdisciplines including developmental, cognitive, clinical, and social
psychology published accounts of chaos theory in their content-specific
journals. In fact, according to the Social Science Citation Index, psychologists’
publications account for the greatest number of citations on chaos theory of
all the social sciences.
General Themes in Psychologists’ Boundary-Work
Are there any general themes of psychologists’ boundary-work in
relation to these three interdisciplinary programs? Even though evolutionary
psychologists, cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists introduced different
types of practices into the discipline, they all contributed to changing
psychology’s boundaries to a certain degree. According to my analysis,
resistances most often came when psychologists faced new conceptual
practices. Psychologists resisted evolutionary psychologists’ use of the
adaptationist perspective, cognitive scientists’ use of the computer-as-mind
metaphor, and chaos theorists’ chaotic behavior metaphor. Psychologists
showed different resistances to the analytic methods of each of these
programs. Evolutionary psychologists use mainly the same technologies for
analyzing their data; therefore, psychologists did not resist these kinds of
material practice. Some psychologists did resist cognitive scientists’ reliance
on computer program modeling as a viable means for understanding
cognitive processes. Similarly, some psychologists objected to the fact that
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chaos theory’s methods were inadequate for analyzing psychological
phenomena.
Based on my analysis, it appears that psychologists’ first line of
defense in their boundary-work activities is to attack their opponents’
conceptual practices. Conceptual practices lie at the heart of psychology’s
disciplinary structure. Psychologists rely on their theories and methods of
analysis largely to define their discipline. Conceptual practices are the locus
of psychologists’ expert knowledge. It is not surprising then that psychologists
resisted the introduction of new concepts, theories, and analytic methods.
The conceptual practices of these three programs threatened many
psychologists’ roles as experts. Feminist psychologists felt threatened by the
political ramifications of evolutionary psychologists’ adaptationist perspective.
Behaviorists felt their goal of a science of behavior challenged by cognitive
scientists’ contention of a science of information processing. Other
psychologists faced questions about reductionism and predictability in their
research programs from chaos theorists who believed in holistic approaches
to research and an emphasis on understanding over prediction.
Even though the computer served as the primary material practice for
each of these interdisciplinary programs, psychologists’ resistances to the
uses of computers were different for each program. Evolutionary
psychologists’ use of software programs to morph facial features and body
types did not cause psychologists to engage in much boundary-work.
Similarly, there was not much resistance to using computers to search for
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chaotic behavior in psychological processes, even though some
psychologists objected to the validity of chaos theorists’ findings. Cognitive
scientists’ use of computers in the development of artificial intelligence did
cause resistance from some psychologists.
Psychologists, of course, were familiar with the many ways of using
computers to facilitate experiments and analyze data. Since evolutionary
psychologists and chaos theorists used the computer in these ways, it is not
surprising that psychologists put little effort into resisting this type of material
practice. But cognitive scientists’ efforts to develop intelligent machines are a
qualitatively different use of computer technology. Creating artificial
intelligence brought up many issues for psychologists, not all of them
explicitly stated. There are many ethical and philosophical dilemmas to this
kind of endeavor usually only debated by philosophers. Do we rely solely on
the Turing test to decide what constitutes an artificial intelligence? If not, what
other kinds of tests can be used? Should scientists even attempt this feat
without fully understanding human intelligence? Is it even possible to develop
some kind of intelligence from inorganic material? While most psychologists
did not concern themselves with these issues, many who resisted the
possibility of artificial intelligence felt it necessary to defend their own material
practices. Animals served as the primary source of data for many of these
psychologists. The advent of something else taking over as a primary source
of data in psychology was a threatening possibility.
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Psychologists seemed not to resist many of the social practices of
these interdisciplinary programs. This may have more to do with practicality
than anything else. It is one thing to write a scathing book review or
devastating critique of an opponent’s theory. It is another thing altogether to
try to stop people with a common interest from organizing. I found no
instances of psychologists trying to prevent the development of any of the
interdisciplinary programs’ professional organizations, though this may be due
to the lack of archival sources on the matter. Similarly, I found no resistances
to the publication of their flagship journals. I should mention, however, that I
found no evidence for the large professional organizations in psychology like
the APA making attempts to develop distinct divisions for these scientists’
areas of expertise.
One surprising feature of my analysis is that few psychologists
attacked these interdisciplinary scientists’ rhetoric of scientific revolutions and
paradigm shifts. It seems likely that the incursion into psychologists’
intellectual territory would prompt them to defend their disciplinary boundaries.
Each program had individuals claiming revolutionary or paradigm status for
their science, yet psychologists did not spend time refuting these claims. One
possible explanation for psychologists’ inactivity is that they found these
claims preposterous and not worthy of a response. But this solution is
problematic. Surely, if psychologists spent time resisting the possible gender
inequality inherent in the adaptationist perspective, they would also spend
time refuting the claims of a supposed paradigm shift. A second and more
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probable reason for this inactivity is that, since Kuhn’s (1962/1996) The
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, terms such as “revolution” and “paradigm”
have become fairly ubiquitous in science. Scientists tend to use these terms
seemingly without understanding Kuhn’s message. Scientists often use
phrases like “method X is a paradigm” or “theory Y is a paradigm” as a way to
describe some common scientific activity or idea. It is probable that
psychologists paid no attention to these claims because they were
accustomed to seeing these terms in their own scientific literature. A third
possibility is that psychologists’ had minimal exposure to these claims in their
resistance attempts. Psychologists may not have read as widely in the
literature as I have and may not have found a significant number of scientists
claiming their program as a new paradigm. These possibilities do not do this
topic justice and I suggest future research on the lack of psychologists’
boundary-work on these claims.
To a certain extent, psychologists’ resistances were largely ineffective
because accommodations occurred at every level of practice for all three
interdisciplinary programs. By 2000, evolutionary psychology was a common
theoretical framework found in psychology books, journals, conference
presentation, and the classroom. The same is true of cognitive science,
though it was just as likely that psychologists migrated out of their
departments and into cognitive science institutes. While some psychologists
accepted the ideas of chaos theory, many pulled back from trying to discover
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chaotic behavior and preferred to examine psychological phenomena from
the larger perspective of dynamic systems.
These accommodations indicate that, overall, psychologists did not
view these three interdisciplinary programs as pseudosciences or fraudulent
practices. In this respect, psychologists’ boundary-work for evolutionary
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory was fundamentally different
from the boundary-work they conducted in the late 1800s with the practices of
spiritualists and psychic mediums (Coon, 1992). At that time, psychologists
had to demonstrate to the public how psychology was different from the study
of psychic phenomena, while at the same time ensuring that the spiritualists
understood they were not part of the discipline. Instead, the boundary-work
psychologists conducted in response to these interdisciplinary programs looks
similar to boundary-work psychologists used with psychoanalysis throughout
the 1900s (Hornstein, 1992). Initially, psychologists attacked psychoanalysts
as being unscientific. By the beginning of the 1960s, psychologists began
adopting ideas from psychoanalysis. Hornstein argues that this adoption
helped make psychology a “more flexible and broad-based discipline.” I
believe this to be the end result of psychologists’ accommodations to my
three interdisciplinary programs. Psychologists were able to open new areas
of expertise through their associations with these interdisciplinary programs.
The interdisciplinary programs brought with them expertise from fields like
evolutionary biology, computer science, physics, and mathematics.
Conceptual practices such as the use of new metaphors and models, material
194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

practices like new computer programs and data analysis techniques, and
social practices including increased funding and new professional journals
helped psychologists develop into a more flexible and broad-based discipline
between 1970 and 2000.
Interestingly, during this thirty year span the interdisciplinary programs
began borrowing ideas from each other. I expected to find some overlap
between cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists because of their
closely related goal of studying the human mind. Indeed, Cosmides and
Tooby (1995) argued for evolutionary psychology as a critical link between
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. I also expected a small degree of
overlap between cognitive scientists and chaos theorists in psychology.
Earlier, I referenced scientists working on the connection between cognition
and chaos theory (e.g., Goertzel, 1994). I also mentioned those who pulled
back from searching for chaotic behavior and shifted their perspective
towards viewing cognition as a dynamical system (e.g., Thelen & Smith,
1994; van Gelder, 1998). I did not expect to find a relationship between
evolutionary psychologists and those studying chaotic or dynamic systems
behavior in psychology. Interestingly, the evolutionary psychologist Douglas
Kenrick and his colleagues (2001; 2003; 2002) are now exploring the
relationship between evolutionary adaptations and dynamic systems theory.
The History of Psychology and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
My research attempted to bring the history of psychology and the
sociology of scientific knowledge together using boundary-work as a
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framework. The choice of psychologists’ boundary-work on the practices of
scientists from three interdisciplinary programs was both productive and
problematic. It was productive in the sense that I was able to examine the
lines of intellectual demarcation that psychologists laid out for three different
programs. This provided a broad survey with rich sources of information on
their boundary-work activities in reaction to multiple infringements. I was also
fortunate because these interdisciplinary programs developed and interacted
with psychology over a relatively recent period in psychology’s history. This
made much of the information readily available in published form.
From a historical perspective, it was problematic because these
programs were relatively new and are still influencing psychologists’
boundary-work. In this respect, my story is incomplete. Another difficulty
came with my brief histories of the interdisciplinary programs. Given their
recent past, it was difficult to establish proper historical perspective on these
programs. Many of their practitioners are still active in the field today. I had to
dispense with archival material because, in this recent period, the documents
have not yet been deposited.
I believe psychology’s history to be unexplored territory for sociologists
of scientific knowledge. Most accounts by sociologists of scientific knowledge
focus on the physical sciences (e.g., Barnes & Shapin, 1979; Pickering, 1984).
Their focus is strategic because one of their goals is to demonstrate the
contingent nature of scientific practices. If they can demonstrate the
contingent nature of scientific practices in the “hard” sciences, it should follow
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that scientific knowledge is constructed rather than discovered in the “softer”
social sciences. But by ignoring social sciences like psychology, sociologists
of science miss a number of opportunities to compare the fields of physics,
chemistry, and biology with those such as sociology, anthropology, and
psychology. For instance, future research may provide answers to questions
like, “Do physicists’ conceptual, material, and social practices differ
fundamentally from psychologists’ practices?” and “What are the similarities
and differences between the intellectual boundaries of chemists and those of
psychologists?”.
Finally, I believe psychologists’ boundary-work to be a viable and
potentially fruitful area of study for historians of psychology. Few historians of
psychology explicitly use boundary-work in their research. In the middle
1960s, Robert Young (1966) encouraged historians of psychology to move
away from Whiggish history and focus on the fine details in psychology’s
history such as the institute and the laboratory. In the 1990s, Roger Smith
(1998) argued that the history of psychology was mature enough to start
looking again at the big picture. I believe it is time to start revising these
histories through an examination of psychologists’ boundary-work. Boundarywork analysis strikes a balance between the big picture and the small details.
It does this by focusing on the intellectual territory of the discipline as a whole,
while examining the pockets of controversy that play a role in shaping this
intellectual territory. At the very least, I believe textbook histories of
psychology should move away from the “great” men, ideas, and dates
197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

approach and focus more on how psychologists established, maintained, and
extended their disciplinary boundaries. All the fascinating stories, the rich
detail, and the archival research remain the same, but there would be a
unifying purpose to the historical scholarship. The purpose would be to
understand how psychologists achieved, kept, and furthered their expert
status in society throughout the discipline’s history.
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